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AN ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY
ABSTRACT
Viewing democracy in the light of an ethico- 
philosophical understanding of human nature and politics, 
this study develops a theory of how popular government can 
be made compatible with the needs of the ethical life. The 
hypothesis is that constitutional democracy, as distinguished 
from plebiscitary democracy, is potentially supportive of 
man's moral destiny.
A "procedural" definition of popular rule is rejected, 
because it evades the fundamental moral question. Crit­
icism is also directed against an exclusive reliance on 
"empirical" evidence in the study of politics. An approach 
is adopted which recognizes politics as essentially a form 
of symbolical and spiritual activity calling for methods of 
explanation quite different from those employed in the nat­
ural sciences.
An ethical philosophy is developed which draws heav­
ily on Plato and Aristotle, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer 
More. The notion of plebiscitary democracy is examined 
through an analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea of the 
general will. The American Constitution is used to illustrate
the concept of constitutional democracy. The content and 
conclusions of the dissertation may be summarized as follows.
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Ethical conscience can be defined as consciousness 
of the Good. It is never identical to particular inclina­
tions to act# but orders them from without. Human life is 
a dual awareness of imperfection and transcendent perfection. 
To the extent that men affirm the latter by disciplining 
their impulsive life, they build into their characters a 
certain meaningful purpose attended by happiness, in 
Aristotle's sense. To the same extent, they become capable 
of community with others. The realization of this supreme 
value is dependent on assimilation and creative development 
of cultural tradition.
Rousseau bans constitutional restrictions on the 
majority of the moment. Basing his theory of democracy on 
a belief in the goodness of human nature, he envisions 
identity between morality and politics. It can be achieved 
through a social contract. But he confuses the ethical with 
uninhibited spontaneity, a mistake which translates into a 
belief in the goodness of the uninhibited popular majority. 
Rousseau1s conception of democracy ignores the unavoidable 
presence in human life of non-moral motives. An attempt to 
put his teaching into effect would reveal the general will 
as something rather different from what he imagines.
An ethically acceptable theory of democracy must 
concern itself with the principle of moral restraint. To 
give the popular majority complete freedom would be to max­
imize the danger of blatantly partisan politics. This danger 
can be reduced through a system of constitutional checks 
which requires something approaching a "concurrent majority" 
before government policy can be set. Such a system makes a 
consideration of the wishes of other groups advisable for 
those who want to advance their own cause. A constitution 
of this type is recommended by enlightened self-interest. 
Ethical conscience, however, is the self-less concern for 
the common good of community. Still, its working material 
is the always imperfect reality of politics. Out of prac­
tical necessity it becomes "the spirit of constitutionalism," 
a morally inspired call for institutional checks. The 
demands of ethical conscience, as it applies to politics, 
tend to run parallel to those of enlightened self-interest, 
but only the former have moral worth.
Plebiscitary democracy is an unrealistic dream, the 
attempted realization of which would not have the intended 
result. Only some form of constitutional democracy can be 
maintained. Constitutional checks on the people and its 
representatives are a necessary but not sufficient condi-
viii
tion for community. To serve the transcendent moral goal, 
they must form part of a whole pattern of high spiritual 
culture.
I. DEMOCRACY AS AN ETHICO-PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
The prevalent tendency among modern theorists of 
democracy is to define it without reference to a transcen­
dent ethical standard. Democracy is more often treated as a 
kind of procedural form, neutral in regard to the substance 
of the popular will. It is viewed as a "method" for making 
public decision, a modus procedendi in Joseph Schumpeter's 
phrase.'*' This form of government, it is argued, does not 
imply a presumption in favor of any particular set of values 
beyond that which is necessarily embodied in those rules and 
rights which constitute democracy. In fact, democracy is 
sometimes regarded as the form of government which recognizes 
the impossibility of demonstrating the inherent superiority 
of one scale of values over another. This view has been 
succinctly stated by Hans Kelsen:
■̂ ■For some variations on this general theme, see Joseph 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: 
Harper & Row^ 195U); Henry !b . Mayo,' An Introduction to Dem­
ocratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, I960;
hereinafter referred to as Democratic Theory); E. F. M. Dur­
bin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1940); David Easton, The political System. 
2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971); David Truman, 
The Governmental Process, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 1971); Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Anthony Downs, 
An Economic Interpretation of Democracy (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1957; hereinafter referred to as Economic Interpretion).
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He who holds that absolute truth and absolute values 
are beyond human understanding is forced to look upon a 
rival alien opinion as possible at the very least. Rel­
ativism is therefore the Philosophy (Weltanschauung) 
which the democratic conception presupposes.^
Without passing moral judgment on anyone, except pos­
sibly the anti-democrat, democracy provides the framework 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
This type of reasoning about democracy bears a cer­
tain logical resemblance and appears intimately related to
the view of political theory which Arnold Brecht calls
3"scientific value relativism." According to that doctrine, 
which incorporates the attempted dichotomy between "facts" 
and "values," scientific work is ethically neutral. While 
it is recognized by those who adopt this view that devotion 
to science and its methods involves some sort of moral commit­
ment, they deny that science as such has any ultimate moral 
purpose. It is a way of proceeding, a method of inquiry 
which may serve men with very different values. Political
O /Cited in Rene de Visme Williamson, "The Challenge of 
Political Relativism," The Journal of Politics IX,(May, 1947). 
150.
^The term "scientific value relativism" is used by 
Brecht in Political Theory; The Foundation of Twentieth Cen­
tury Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton university 
Press, 1959). The book contains an extensive explication 
of the doctrine.
theory proper does not attempt to establish the moral super­
iority of one scale of values over another# for all sci­
entific claims have to be intelligible to the community of 
scholars, and we do not have access to an objective, commun­
icable order of values. All we have access to by scientific 
means, as defined by Brecht, are the subjective preferences 
of individuals.
The similarities between the doctrine of scientific 
value relativism and much modern democratic theory are thus 
apparent. Both attempt to separate method from ultimate end. 
That is not to say that the analogy between the dominant 
view of democracy and the mentioned conception of science is 
complete— it is not— only that there appears to be consid­
erable cross-fertilization. It can be said about both that 
they exhibit a fundamental ambiguity, growing out of a 
failure to come to grips with basic problems of ethics. 
Although most academic defenders of the procedural view of 
democracy and scientific value relativism admit that they 
must ultimately justify their preference for democracy and 
science by falling back on a value judgment, they claim to 
ascribe to their systems no overriding purpose or predeter­
mined goal. Among the theorists of democracy, this point is 
emphatically made by Henry B. Mayo:
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Democracy sets up no scientifically ascertained "end" 
for man, has no all-consuming purpose, no Form of the 
Good, no final ultimate to serve. It has its opera­
ting principles and their values; it has the values 
inherent in the system; and it has a typical character 
which it both presupposes and promotes. Within these 
limits a democracy may be used to pursue aims which 
change from time to time. . . . The realm of political 
and social purposes in a democracy is open and indeter­
minate. . . .4
The difficulty with this statement, and any analogous 
statement about science, is that we are asked to picture the 
good democrat as one how places a high value on certain 
procedural rules which together are supposed to form a democ­
racy, but who does so with no ulterior motive in mind. It 
is not easy to grasp what meaning there would be in a value 
judgment which expresses a liking for democratic procedures 
but does not also imply an endorsement of some 
ultimate goal, such as the achievement of civilization or 
happiness. The postulation of the existence of this type of 
value judgment would seem to involve a distinction between 
ends and means of very doubtful validity. As is forcefully 
argued by John Dewey, ends have to be viewed as constituted 
by the means chosen for their attainment. Conversely, means 
are a partial fulfillment of ends. "Ends" and "means," in 
other words, are only two ways of looking at the same process 
of continuous purposive activity. In Dewey's formulation:
4Mayo, Democratic Theory, p. 277.
"'End' is a name for a series of acts taken collectively. . . .
'Means' is a name for the same series taken distrib-
5utively. . . . "  The "methods" of democracy, thus, cannot 
be distinguished from the consequences, more immediate and 
expected or distant and unforeseen, which are implied in and 
promoted by those methods.
How else could democratic rules acquire value for a 
person than by contributing to what he understands, with or 
without justification, to be the final value of life? It is 
of course possible to endorse a certain set of means with 
only an incomplete or mistaken view of its effects, but to 
the extent that our choice is not completely irrational, 
that set of means must be assumed by us to be conducive to 
the goal which in the end makes life worth living. Mayo 
admits that democratic procedures promote certain values.
By that token, we might add, they also counteract the real* 
ization of other values, notably many of those advocated by 
Communists or Nazis. Can it be argued at the same time that 
democracy leaves the final goal of life open? Conversely, 
if it is true that as good democrats we must view the end of 
life as completely undetermined, by what logic are we favor­
ing certain political arrangements over others?
5John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Mod­
ern Library, 1957), p. 35.
To argue in response, for instance, that democratic 
procedures require or imply no ultimate end, but receive the 
only justification needed from the fact that they give the 
individual a measure of freedom to pursue his own goals, 
partly by giving him some control over public policy, is to 
have missed the point of this argument, which is that "free­
dom," "control," etc., if they are not to be empty slogans, 
have to be defined with reference to a value conceived as 
ultimate. Insofar as the procedural means of democracy are 
intelligently chosen, that end is implied in, indeed, partial­
ly fulfilled by them. Mayo and other theorists with a sim­
ilar view of democracy are assuming considerably more about 
the proper goal for man than they are clearly aware of.
Only if we have some idea, however vague or confused, 
of the intrinsic worth of things,, can we maintain the sense 
of direction and proportion without which existence would 
become meaningless, all science pointless. Science pre­
supposes not only order in the universe but the value of 
discovering that order. Instead of facing squarely the pos­
sibility that men's ethical concerns, as reflected, for 
instance, in an affirmation of democratic rights and the 
pursuit of truth, have a common focus; that there is an aware­
ness of the good for man which transcends the subjective 
biases of individuals and which can be examined scientif-
ically, the scholar who accepts scientific value relativism 
establishes residence in a philosophical half-way house.
There he can entertain a certain scale of values, and thus 
give some meaning and coherence to his view of life, without 
ever having to examine its final tenability, without in a 
sense ever having to accept responsibility for it. By label­
ling all statements of "ultimate values" subjective, he ends 
inquiry into their validity before it has had a chance to 
begin. And he does not manage to keep science ethically neu^ 
tral in return, but only makes it easier to introduce value 
preferences in an uncritical manner.
Democracy in an ethical perspective
The word "democracy" is both one of the most used and 
abused terms in modern Western political discourse. It may 
be argued that the corresponding theoretical confusion is 
partly the result of the vast influence of some kind of eth­
ical relativism or nihilism. Having rejected the belief in 
a definite, enduring purpose for human life, democratic 
theorists have a difficult time establishing a common point 
of reference. The doors are open for a raid on the democratic 
vocabulary. The aim of this study is to contribute to a 
restoration of theoretical and terminological clarity about 
democracy by relating it to man's quest for the moral life.
In choosing that approach we join the philosophical tradi­
tion founded in the West by Plato and Aristotle. An attempt 
will be made to develop an ethical interpretation of democ­
racy, that is, one which takes its sense of direction and 
proportion from an ethico-philosophical understanding of 
man's nature and destiny, and states the implications of 
that understanding for popular government. Rather than start 
with a ready-made definition of democracy and then look for 
its moral prerequisites, we shall try to decide how popular 
self-rule needs to be designed in order to support the eth­
ical life. If the demands of ethics are to be taken ser­
iously, this would seem to be putting the horse before the 
cart.
Ethics will not be regarded as confined to the study 
of inherently subjective claims about the end of human life. 
It will be postulated that man is able to go beyond the rel­
ative and subjective in morals, and that philosophy 
can give an account of this process. By ethical conscience 
will be understood, not some arbitrary, merely private or 
conventional principle of conduct, but the awareness, 
stronger in some people than in others, that there is a 
sacred purpose to human life which transcends the transitory 
biases of individuals and peoples, and which can be violated 
only at the price of a loss of meaning and worth. Ethical
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conscience is that in man which wills, not the private advan- 
tage of individuals or groups as an end in itself, but the 
realization of the universal good for man. Ethical philos­
ophy seeks to describe the nature of this ordering principle. 
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be said that ethical 
philosophy is trying to give ever clearer intellectual 
expression to a sense of spiritual direction which in the 
end defies all specific formulations. By ethical conscience 
we mean a special grasp of reality, dynamically related to, 
but transcendent of,ordinary rationality. What is absolute 
about man's ethical life, therefore, is not this or that 
standard of conduct which he formulates in response to the 
ethical demand on him, but the moral obligation itself, the 
self-justifying goal which the moral man is always trying to 
approach more closely. Some Christians would perhaps prefer 
to say that our ethical conscience is the Holy Spirit reveal­
ing itself to man. To use that terminology would have the 
advantage of ruling out unfortunate references to the loose 
and slippery meaning of the word "conscience" in common par­
lance. It would also make the intended association with 
divine purpose clearer. On the other hand, it would probably 
unnecessarily complicate acceptance of our analysis by those 




To state'adequately the reasons for rejecting ethical 
relativism and nihilism and siding with the classical tradi­
tion in ethics started by Plato and Aristotle and the closely 
related Judaeo-Christian tradition would be ample material 
for a separate work- It is necessary here to refer to other 
scholars who continue those traditions. Although this gen­
eral frame of reference collides at important points with 
some widely held modern beliefs, the writer who regards it 
as valid in central respects cannot always begin from the 
ground, so to speak, by defending its basic assumptions 
against the most recent attacks. To be able to make his 
own contribution to these old traditions by suggesting clar­
ifications, revisions, developments, or new applications of 
their ideas, he must be allowed to build on the base which 
has been laid by others. At the same time, the value of 
scholarly exchange makes it desirable that his arguments be 
presented in such a way as to be meaningful and persuasive 
also to those with a different frame of reference. We may 
hope that in the course of the proposed inquiry into the 
relationship of ethical conscience to popular self-rule a 
good case for the postulated view of ethics will also be 
developed.
The introduction of an ethical perspective on popular 
government will force the rethinking of democratic principles
11
as widely understood by political scientists today. An eth­
ical theory of democracy will not be satisfied with stating, 
for instance, that democracy is a form of government in 
which public policy rests on the will of the great mass of 
the people as opposed to some privileged elite. While this 
principle has something to contribute to a theory of popular 
rule, it evades the question whether democracy has to foster 
a certain quality of popular will. An ethical theory of 
democracy lookB for more in the celebrated principle of 
majority rule than the idea that a numerically superior por­
tion of a people is entitled to greater influence over pub­
lic decisions than a numerically inferior one. As stated, 
the principle leaves the demands of ethics aside. The same 
type of deficiency marks most influential modern theories of 
democracy. In search of the "basic feature" of this form of 
government, Henry Mayo decides upon the following criterion:
". . . a  political system is democratic to the extent that 
the decision-makers are under effective popular control."6 
There is of course more to Mayo's definition of democracy, 
but the fact that he regards this as the most "basic feature" 
is a good illustration of the tendency in modern democratic 
theory to view this type of government as a mere form in
6Mayo, Democratic Theory, p. 60.
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which almost any substance may be put. There is contained 
in this allegedly fundamental criterion no reference to the 
quality of will which democracy is supposed to articulate, 
but only this formula: The more popular control, the more 
democracy. Once again, we are left with a principle that 
does little more than define democracy in terms of more or 
less on a quantitative scale.
As soon as the demands of the ethical life are rec­
ognized, it becomes necessary to find out how government 
could be made to respect those demands. How can moral 
standards be promoted and maintained by a form of government 
based on popular consent? Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is 
widely regarded as one of the fathers of modern democracy, 
finds the answer in his concept of the general will. The 
latter is by definition always moral, and it is the only 
legitimate expression of ^he people's will. To make gov­
ernment moral it is necessary to create the circumstances 
under which the general will can assert itself. It is impor­
tant to note that Rousseau regards the general will as 
incompatible with constitutional restraints on the people.
As will be argued in more detail later, he does so because 
he associates morality with uninhibited spontaneity. The 
cause of the good society is not threatened by man's first 
impulse, which is always good, but by the artificial motives
with which historical society has imprisoned and perverted 
his natural, original goodness. Constitutional checks on the 
will of the people are examples of such vitiating influences. 
In order for man's spontaneous sense of right to break forth, 
they have to be removed together with all other artificial 
restraints which bind his natural goodness, This, in brief, 
is the ethical philosophy behind Rousseau's notion of pleb­
iscitary democracy.
Rousseau's view of how morality is to be served in 
politics differs fundamentally from the thesis that will be 
advanced in this study. It will be contended here that the 
idea of democracy, viewed as a realistic statement of human 
potentiality,- is at the same time the idea of constitutional 
democracy, that is, of popular rule under legal restraints 
not easily changed. This is so because of the nature of 
man's moral predicament. The argument will be developed 
partly through an analysis of Rousseau’s concept of the gen­
eral will. His thought deserves careful examination, for 
not only has it had an enormous influence, directly and 
indirectly, on democratic theory and political thought gen­
erally in the West; it also takes one to the root of problems 
which have to be faced and solved before the present oanfusion 
in democratic theory can be overcome. While Rousseau 
deserves credit for raising the moral question of popular
14
rule, it may be shown that on the whole his influence has 
not been beneficial. Importantly, he is the great pioneer 
in the West for the type of ethics which identifies the prin­
ciple of moral good with positive human feelings, a morality 
of the "heart" from which the West has yet to recover. It 
is this understanding of ethics which lies at the bottom of 
his impatience with inner or outer restraints on man. We 
shall try to show that the general will, for which Rousseau 
claims total power and freedom, is not what it is purported 
to be, a principle of right above subjective and particular 
wills.
It will be argued here that man's ethical conscience 
is not adequately defined as a positive force inside our 
impulsive life. It is better described as a principle of 
self-examination or censure set apart from particular human 
feelings and actions. Except in a special sense, it does 
not order this or that specific line of conduct. It alters 
the motive with which action is contemplated. Human impulse 
is never itself the standard of morality. It may be said to 
partake of that standard to the extent that it advances the 
transcendent purpose known in ethical conscience.
This moral principle of self-examination can be shown 
to be closely related to the idea of constitutionalism. A 
constitution even more than other laws is a check on human
15
will. In a democracy where constitutional provisions, 
whether written or unwritten, regulate popular voting, rep­
resentation, terms of office, divisions of power, legisla­
tive procedure, etc., and these rules can be changed only 
with difficulty, arbitrariness and whim in the people at 
large and in their representatives are restrained. Such a 
state does not give free rein to the people's impulse of the 
moment, but requires of public decisions that they be reached 
in a certain deliberate way.
In a democracy, constitutional checks may be viewed 
as inhibitions imposed by a people and its representatives 
on themselves. But why would a people restrict its own 
freedom of action? Rousseau completely rejects this idea of 
government. Constitutionalism involves a distrust of unham­
pered action and spontaneous decision. These are regarded 
as containing an element of arbitrariness destructive of the 
spirit of the civilized political order. One purpose of 
constitutional law, and lesser laws, is to purge government 
as far as possible of this element and to create the condi­
tions for reasoned, well-considered public decisions. The 
attempt to make room for critical detachment in the formula­
tion of policy may have an ethical aspect. Where there is 
room for deliberation, there is room for the application of 
a moral perspective. It will be our thesis that constitu­
16
tionalism in one of its aspects is the political dimension 
of ethical self-restraint and hence the necessary political 
condition for the furtherance of the ethical life. The idea 
of constitutional democracy, as opposed to the Rousseauistic 
notion of plebiscitary democracy, can be viewed as implying 
a recognition on the part of the people that there is a need 
to protect ourselves from our own spontaneity in politics.
We need to be on our guard against premature, unthinking 
inclinations and the selfish arbitrariness which usually 
lurks behind them. Just as an individual may resolve on the 
basis of experience of his own moral weakness not to give 
free rein to his impulses in the future, but to make room 
for moral scrutiny of his motives before acting, so a people 
may recognize the need for putting brakes on its own momentary 
will in the interest of the common good.
Nothing in formal logic stops a thinker from advancing 
a theory of democracy in which the need for constitutional 
checks is denied or discounted. The question is if it must 
not then be regarded as belonging to the realm of futile and 
potentially dangerous dreams. One may argue that such a 
theory becomes palatable only when certain traits of human
nature are assumed to be not really a part of man's being.
Specifically, such a theory makes light of man's moral predic­
ament, which may be described as the permanent inner tension 
between ethical conscience and contrary inclinations.
17
Democracy as a way of life
In the following attempt to give an ethical inter­
pretation of democracy it will not be taken for granted that 
democracy is inherently superior to all other forms of gov­
ernment, as is often done by modern Westerners, It is well 
to remember Aristotle's observation that no one type of gov­
ernment is suited to all circumstances. It is pointless to 
argue in the abstract that only democratic governments are 
legitimate. As John Stuart Mill points out# "a people may 
be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a partic-
7ular form of government requires of them." The question of the 
legitimacy of different types of rule should not be dis­
cussed in isolation from the cultural context to which they 
belong. Democracy may be a realistic proposition in 
Europe or North America, but on the African continent most 
peoples still seem to lack the special type of political 
maturity which is needed to sustain it. In the West of to­
day where democracy has come to be viewed as the normal form 
of government, it should be remembered that historically and 
internationally democracy, in a meaningful sense of that 
word, is not the rule but the exception. We should be on
7John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism. Liberty, and 
Representative Government, intro, by A. D. Lindsay (London:
J. M. Dent & Sons, 1929), p. 178.
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our guard lest we adopt an overly provincial attitude in 
regard to the means whereby a society may provide for its 
political needs.
At the same time, there are strong reasons why the
idea of democracy must be regarded as a very noble one. A
good case can be made that in a certain sense it represents
the apex of associated human life. This argument relates
democracy to the moral end of man, introducing the image of
popular sel.f-government in the cause of community. Without
assenting to his entire political philosophy, we may quote
these pregnant lines by John Dewey:
Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to 
other principles of associated life. It is the idea of 
community life itself. It is an ideal in the only 
intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and 
movement of some thing which exists carried to its final 
limit, viewed as completed, perfected.8
Clearly, the word democracy is used by Dewey in a much 
broader sense than a set of political institutions and rules. 
It refers to the sum of conditions which prevail in a society 
where community has been realized. Certain political 
arrangements form only a part of a more comprehensive design. 
The word democracy implies that the active involvement of 
the whole people is necessary for the achievement of the
8John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Chicago: 
Swallow Press, 1954), p. 148.
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goal of community. It should be added without delay that 
according to Dewey "democracy in this sense is not a fact
Qand never will be." We may understand him to be using the 
term in an Aristotelian fashion: something is what it is 
potentially.
Dewey's broadening of the democratic concept to 
denote a whole way of life with a definite end puts him at 
loggerheads with those theorists who regard democracy as a 
mere political form without any predetermined, overriding 
purpose. He would seem to be more sensitive than they are 
to the fact that government derives its shape, strength, and 
direction from the aspirations of the people it serves. It 
will reflect and promote the ultimate goals for life that 
are held by that people and its leaders. One cannot really 
define a form of government by abstract principles, such as 
universal suffrage, popular control of government officials, 
and majority rule, for these take on different meanings
depending on the cultural atmosphere that pervades them. To
give just one example, universal suffrage means something 
quite different in a Communist state and a Western democracy. 
By defining democracy in terms of community, Dewey ascribes 
to popular self-rule a definite goal with reference to which
its various procedural rules must be understood.
9Ibid., p. 148.
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Dewey's broad definition of democracy brings up the 
artificiality of all sharp distinctions between public and 
private life. The political scientist needs to make
distinctions along that line, for they are useful to him in
organizing his thought and in communicating his ideas to 
others. But while it may be practical for some purposes to
define the casting of a vote by a legislator as a public act
and the disciplining of a child by a parent as a private act, 
it should not be forgotten that this distinction is, in the 
final analysis, arbitrary. The label "public" i3 tacked on 
to the first,not because it is somehow sui generis,but 
because it pertains,to "government" as conventionally under­
stood and has a direct and powerful effect on the lives of 
many other people. One need only change the example of the 
"private" act to one in which the effect on others is both 
direct and powerful to find it even more difficult to draw 
the line. It may perhaps be said that an act is public as 
opposed to private to the extent that it affects the lives 
of other people, but that formula involves no sharp distinc­
tion, only a diffuse sliding scale.10
10To avoid misunderstanding it should perhaps be said 
that in introducing the notion that democracy implies a 
whole way of life we are not also moving in the direction of 
the idea that all decisions which have "public" ramifica­
tions should be made according to majority rule or some 
other principle of "participatory" democracy.
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It is thus in a sense unreal to think of "government" 
as something distinct from a surrounding "society." It is, 
or becomes, what the total number of "private" and "public" 
acts make it. It is impossible to determine with any final­
ity where the "rules" and "institutions" of democracy end 
and the cultural "environment" begins. They are dynamically 
related. They are parts of one and the same process of pur­
poseful human action.
Dewey's idea of community suffers from certain phil­
osophical difficulties which make it impossible to adopt 
many of the specifics of his view of popular rule. Still, 
his notion that democracy carries within it the idea of 
community is an intriguing one. It suggests that popular 
self-government has a built-in moral requirement and logical 
end, whose fulfillment would be community, and which cannot 
be ignored if this form of rule is to continue in existence. 
Although it will not be our purpose to prove that democracy 
is "the idea of community life itself," the analysis will 
point in that direction. We shall be trying to show that 
the ethical quest to which democracy owes allegiance is at 
the same time the quest for community, to borrow Robert 
Nisbet's phrase.^ Needless to say, the idea of community
i;1-See Robert Nisbet, Community and Power (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Galaxy edition, 1962).
as the goal to which politics should be directed is central 
to the classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition. How this 
idea is to be understood and related to the concept of pop­
ular government will have to be discussed in some detail. 
Ethical conscience, we shall argue, pulls man in the opposite 
direction from the centrifugal forces of subjective bias, 
arbitrariness, and egotism. It may be described as a sense 
of belonging, of participation in a harmonizing, supra- 
individual purpose. Given man's contrary proclivities, the 
only type of popular self-rule which can serve that goal in 
the political realm is a constitutional one.
Morality and self-interest
The emphasis in this study will be on the ethical 
aspect of the problem of democracy. It would not be surpris­
ing if in the course of such an investigation the impression 
would emerge that the principle of morality is the principle 
of order in a democracy. To avoid creating that impression, 
some cautionary and sobering remarks should be made.
Human nature, as we know it so far in history and in
ourselves, does not give any reasons for optimism about the
triumph of ethical motives over selfish motives in human
affairs. Respect for the ethical goal of life does not seem
to be the rule of politics but the exception. Some political 
philosophers, Machiavelli and Hobbes prominent among them.
have been so overwhelmed by the element of raw power in pol­
itics that they have been able to see almost nothing else. 
Hobbes is even led to the drastic step of redefining morals 
in terms of the urge for power. However great their exag­
gerations, these philosophers have driven home an important 
truth which must not be ignored by anyone who studies politics 
and particularly not by anyone who wants to do so in the 
light of ethics: politics is primarily an arena of conflict, 
of clashing individual wills and group interests. One may 
go a step further and say that life in general has an element 
of war, of which military conflicts and other forms of 
violence are only one type of manifestation. A basic role 
of government is to provide for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Laws, including constitutions, have the function 
of steering the perpetual war of all against all into forms 
which can make life tolerable.
Of this function of government modern theorists of 
democracy are for the most part quite aware. In the United 
States, the Madisonian tradition makes it difficult to for­
get that constitutions have as an important aim the checking 
and balancing of conflicting interests. The realism of 
Madison's insights are attested to by the success of the 
American constitutional experiment.
24
'There is thus much to be learned from those who are 
sensitive to the clash of wills that forms a part of all 
political life- The trouble with that type of observation 
is that it often sees nothing in politics but the war of all 
against all. When government is conceived as based on 
nothing but a prudential, pragmatic effort to settle disputes 
peacefully, when the ethical perspective is pushed aside or 
dropped entirely, the result is a distortion of political 
reality. It is forgotten that while regulation of conflict 
may be the first and foremost task of government, citizens 
have an ethical conscience which demands more- Man's moral 
aspirations, too, are a part of political life. Although 
they may not often triumph over the demands of the power- 
play, they are there to give a sense of higher direction to 
politics, to smooth the rough edges of the war of wills, at 
rare times even to raise government to a level of some moral 
dignity.
Man's ethical conscience is not the ordering principle 
of politics, not even in a democracy, but it does pull our 
will in the direction of worthier political goals, limiting 
to some degree their ingredient of mere selfishness. Insofar 
as it gains influence, we may say that the good society is 
being realized. In that society, which we can also call the 
civilized society, selfishness has not been uprooted: One
might say that it has been tamed, bent to the purposes of 
the moral life. Where man’s awareness of the ethical goal 
of life recedes, on the other hand, the ever present power 
struggle will soon assume uglier forms, giving new support 
to a cynically Machiavellian view of politics.
An ethical theory of democracy, then, must not blind 
itself to the inescapable non-ethical motives in politics. 
These forces must be taken into account by the realistic 
theorist, and the prudent politician. If the politician is 
to be successful in attaining his goals, he must try to 
adjust to these forces, try to enlist them in his support. 
That is not to say that he has to be immoral and opportunis­
tic, only that he must not be naive about his working mater­
ial. He may have a deeply moral view of his duty as a 
politician, but if he refuses to face up to the degree to 
which non-moral motives are among the forces with which he 
has to contend, he will be reduced to a futile moralism 
which may even produce the opposite of the intended results. 
It is not moral, but merely foolish, to ignore the more 
unpleasant political drives, it might even be said that it 
is a moral duty for the politician to adjust his means to 
the circumstances, that is, to adopt a pragmatic approach, for 
this is the only way in which some progress towards the eth­
ical goal can be made. Even the most moral politician has
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to master the type of prudential political calculus which is 
sometimes called the art of the possible, or his efforts will 
come to naught.
While there is in all political action a purely prag­
matic ingredient— a consideration of available means under 
given conditions— it does not follow that the whole truth 
about politics was told by the author of The Prince. The 
art of the possible, if it is to be complete, must include 
considerations of a non-rutilitarian, moral order. For an 
explication of that point we may rely on a philosopher and 
statesman with a keen appreciation of the Machiavellian 
aspect of politics, the Italian Benedetto Croce. Recogni­
zing that "in political action, in attempts to reach a def­
inite goal, everything becomes a political means— everything, 
including in certain respects morality and religion,
Croce also warns against the belief that moral norms have no 
application to politics. Man, he argues, is a moral being 
as well as a utilitarian creature looking for success in his 
dealings:
. . .  it may not be imagined that there can exist a 
political man entirely devoid of moral conscience.
This would be the same a3 admitting that a "political 
man" can exist without being a "man."13
■^Benedetto Croce, Politics and Morals, trans. by 
Salvatore J. Castiglione (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1945), p. 22.
13Ibid., p. 25.
The human conscience does not abdicate in political affairs. 
Against the notion that there is one set of ethics for pri­
vate life and another for public life, it cries out that
. . . one cannot do evil in order to attain good, as 
though evil and good were merchandise to be exchanged? 
that our hands must be kept clean? that the quality of 
the means must not conflict with the quality of the 
end.14
Politics has its own law of utility and convenience, but it 
is not a closed-off, self-sufficient sphere of activity. 
Utilitarian skill in attaining ends is a virtue in a pol­
itician, but he must never fail to take into account that 
men have a moral nature to which the pragmatic calculus must 
be adjusted.
The true statesman, we may conclude, has a clear 
conception of the moral end of human existence, and he will 
always strive to make politics subservient to that end. He 
is also sufficiently a realist to know that morality, in the 
strict sense of performing good acts for their own sake, will 
never become the law of politics. Even Plato reluctantly 
conceded that fact. We may infer that Jesus had the same 
in mind when he separated between the things of God and the 
things of Caesar. The statesman knows that the best he can 
normally hope for is to put self-interest in the service 
of moral ends. He can find some comfort in the fact
14Ibid., p. 3.
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that in most cases enlightened self-interest drives man in 
the direction of morality. As an example we may point to 
constitutionalism. The latter unquestionably owes much to 
sophisticated egotism. Prom a purely selfish point of view 
it is better to have rule of law than arbitrary government.15 
But constitutionalism also serves an ethical need. It is 
the political condition for the furtherance of the ethical 
life.
Lest the influence of ethical motives in politics be 
entirely discounted, it should also be noted that in a soci­
ety where men are growing insensitive to the demands of the 
ethical life, their enlightened self-interest will be 
increasingly difficult to discern. As their ethical vision 
is blurred, there is going to be less to restrain their 
cruder inclinations. They will become more indiscriminate 
in their choice of ends and means. The power struggle, which 
before was leavened somewhat by the ethical pull, will get 
harsher. Whereas ethical conscience, the will to the common 
good, used to give to the constitution and the laws generally 
an aura of dignity which made it easier for the citizens to 
recognize allegiance to the lawful order as being in their
^Cf. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Cal­
culus of Consent; Logical Foundations of constitutional 
Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
long-term interest, they are now going to look at the laws 
with less reverence and not be as predisposed against break­
ing them, if it would serve their own immediate goals and go 
undetected. In that sense, it may be said that any civilized 
political order is ultimately rooted in ethical conscience.
It should be evident from these remarks that the 
proposed attempt to give an ethical interpretation of democ­
racy will not rest on some exaggerated view of the influence 
of moral motives in politics. It is clearly understood that 
politics has the dimension of conflict which is emphasized 
by many modern thinkers. The fact that references to moral 
principle are frequently on the lips of politicians is any­
thing but a sure sign that they are propelled by moral 
considerations. One need not be a cynic to see that self- 
interest often masquerades in moral garb. At the same time, 
the need that the politician feels to give a moral justifica­
tion for his proposals suggests a recognition that his poten­
tial supporters would like to feel that the policies they 
endorse are sanctioned by a higher court than the selfish 
ego. Why all these moral appeals in politics, now and 
throughout history, if there is not at the bottom of men's 
endless arguments about the proper political order also some­
thing more than a concern for private advantage, a real eth­
ical awareness, however vague, that we may not proceed arbitrar­
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ily? Whether the moral sentiments expressed by politicians 
are for the most part genuinely felt or not# they indicate 
that there is more to politics than the power-play, be it 
crude and violent or modified by enlightened self-interest.
This study is an attempt to supply in broad outline 
what is lacking in a theory of democracy which does not look 
beyond the clash of wills. The needs of the ethical life 
cannot be ignored in a society which wants to be known as 
civilized. They remain an unconditional demand on man, a 
constant reminder that a political order based on mere self­
ishness is not worthy of man's true purpose. It is incumbent 
on the political thinker to come to grips with the role of 
the ethical in human affairs and try to answer the question 
of how it may be maintained and expanded in political life. 
The present study is an attempt to perform that task in 
regard to democracy.
Spiritual man and the scientific method
The development of an ethical theory of democracy 
comes up against a number of modern preconceptions about 
what type of evidence may be accepted by the political sci­
entist. As has already been stated, conscience will be 
regarded here as an opening to the transcendent purpose of 
human life. This understanding of conscience forms part of
a general view of human nature, according to which man has a 
spiritual existence, a type of self-awareness and freedom 
that is lacking in physical nature and in the animal world. 
Together with the type of ethical philosophy with which it 
is indissolubly bound up, that view has come under attack as 
based on "unscientific," non-empirical evidence.
The last two centuries have seen a vast and increas­
ing amount of activity in the natural sciences. The result­
ing progress in bringing physical nature under our control 
has endowed the methods of experimental science with an 
immense prestige, creating a wish in many quarters for their 
widest possible application. They have come to be viewed by 
some as the key to more complete and reliable knowledge, not 
only of physical and biological nature, but of human nature 
and social life. The distinction between a specifically 
human, spiritual order, where freedom and responsibility are 
not only meaningful but unavoidable concepts, and a "quant­
itative" order of causal relationships has become blurred. 
Reflecting this general trend, modern political science is 
marked by a certain reluctance to study politics in the light 
of a philosophical understanding of man, one which views 
life from the perspective of actual human self-experience 
rather than in analogy with what is known about physical 
nature. Many political scientists are prone to evade the
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difficult question of the special nature of man and its 
implications for the study of politics and proceed instead 
according to some version of the acclaimed "scientific method."
It is not possible here to state fully the case against 
making empirico-quantitative methods, and theory, viewed as a 
set of working hypotheses potentially capable of verifica­
tion by such methods, the norm for the study of political 
man. Just enough should be said to show that this approach 
suffers from grave difficulties. The following attempt to 
lift the ban on a certain type of evidence and reasoning 
will have the additional purpose of making the notion of a 
distinctively human, spiritual nature clearer. It should be 
noted that we shall be dealing with a tendency in modern 
political science (and other social sciences) rather than 
with individual intellectual positions, such as may be found 
among those loosely and often ambiguously described as 
"behavioralists." We are not trying to deny that there are 
political scientists sometimes said to be in the latter cat­
egory who, especially in practice, go beyond a dogmatic 
insistence on empirico-quantitative methods and related 
types of theory. Needless to say, our argument i3 not direc­
ted against a general concern with finding support in facts 
for hypotheses. It is difficult to quarrel with the wish to 
acquire as much knowledge as possible about a subject, provi-
ded that the subject is not trivial and the collection of 
information guided by a sense of proportion. Our criticism 
focuses on the tendency to define "facts" in socio-political 
matters with reference to what is so defined in the natural 
sciences, to assume, in other words, that the nature of man 
and society do not, in any way essential to a meaningful and 
reliable understanding of politics, transcend the type of 
reality which is investigated by the natural sciences. 
Although often mixed with or counterbalanced by less ques­
tionable approaches, this inclination remains a considerable 
influence. To the extent that social scientists exhibit this 
tendency, our argument applies; to the extent that they are 
beginning to question it, it is a reminder of sins past.
In the attempt to achieve the closest possible approx­
imation to the principles of natural science in the study of 
politics, a premium is put on evidence believed to be quan­
titative or susceptible of quantification. According to one 
of the pioneers of this modern orientation, Arthur Bentley, 
the statement of social fact that "takes us farthest along
the road toward quantitative estimates will inevitably be
16the best statement." In Bentley's view, "ideas" and "feel­
ings" are not intelligible social forces but meaningless
^Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Bloom­
ington; Principia Press, 1935), p. 201.
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abstractions. The social scientist should try to eliminate
such "unmeasurable elements" from his investigation and aim
for the enviable position of the natural scientist whose
research material is "susceptible of measurement and quan-
17txtative comparison all the way through." One is reminded
of William James's phrase that "you must bring out of each
18word its practical cash-value." A more recent but very
similar view of political science is that of David Easton.
Although less hostile to "introspective psychology,"^9 he
emphasizes the great indebtedness of the discipline to
Bentley. Easton calls for the development of a theoretical 
20"master plan" to guide empirical research, which might one
day conceivably "reach the stage of maturity associated with
21theory in physics, for example." Discussing his hopes for
the discipline, he regrets that the physical sciences are
centuries ahead of the social sciences and that therefore 
"all social research cannot yet be conducted with the meth­
odological rigor familiar to the natural sciences or in
^Ibid., p. 200.
lO-^William James, Essays in Pragmatism, ed.byAlburey 
Castell(New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1968), p. 145.




terms of the systematic frameworks resembling the model of 
physics. 1,22
In part, the attempted introduction into political 
science of methods believed to approach the type of rigor 
and precision characteristic of methods in the natural sci­
ences may be a reaction against instances of sloppy scholar­
ship and extravagant speculation in the past. But the 
proposed cure has' important features which are probably as
problematical as the disease. While it should not be denied,
for instance, that there are political investigations for 
which measurability in some sense of that word is a desir­
able goal, it can hardly be argued that it should be sought 
even at the price of a one-sided or distorted view of polit­
ical reality, not to mention triviality in the resulting 
findings. We would seem to be better advised to heed 
Aristotle’s dictum that "it is the mark of an educated man 
to look for precision in each class of things just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits."2^
One of the stated purposes of using "the scientific
method" in political science is to discover "patterns" or
^Ibid., p. 59.
2^Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 
intro, and trans. by Sir David Ross (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1954), p. 3 (1094^).
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"uniformities" in political behavior. In the words of a
sympathetic explication of the method,
we . . . are assuming that these regularities can be 
expressed in generalizations which approximate the 
universality of a scientific law or theory in the nat­
ural sciences.24
Presumably, this must be taken to mean that the special 
nature and complexity of human life is discounted or denied 
by political science proper. Or to state the same conclu­
sion in a way that clarifies the word "special": to the 
extent that important differences are recognized between man 
and thing and between man and animal, they are not believed 
to be of the order that different principles of explanation 
must be applied to each. It is hard to see that truth could 
be served by such a blurring of distinctions. To take an 
example, it would appear to be only by a facile reductionism 
that one can regard the effect of men's social background on 
their political actions as belonging to the same general 
category of "regularities" as the effect of a lever on 
another in a machine or the effect of some stimulus on a 
rat. It belongs to the specifically human sphere of con­
scious, purposive action. It has to be understood from 
within that context by methods which recognize the fundamen-
2^M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, Political 
Analysis: An Introduction (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1972), 
p. 14.
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tal difference in meaning between the word "effect" as 
applied to human political behavior and the same word as 
applied to a piece of machinery or a biological organism.
The presumption in favor of applying the methods of 
natural science, as conceived by their proponents in the 
social sciences, to a political subject matter carries more 
far-reaching implications than is generally recognized. It 
is sometimes argued by advocates of "the scientific method" 
that its application to socio-political reality is not nec­
essarily the equivalent of introducing a whole world-view, 
but merely an attempt to pursue further a method which has 
been found to "work," in the sense, for instance, that it 
facilitates prediction. It must be asked, however, whether 
the effort to imitate natural science does not imply that 
human behavior is of a certain kind. If man as a political 
being transcends biology and physics in ways essential to 
the very definition of political life, exclusive employment 
of empirico-quantitative methods and related types of theory 
would be unsatisfactory or misdirected. Their use in polit­
ical science could be defended only if the "patterns■' and 
"regularities" discernible in political life did not tran­
scend the causal order of reality investigated by the natural 
sciences. The conclusion seems inescapable: If "the sci­
entific method" is set up as the only way of acquiring reli-
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able knowledge of socio-political reality, the latter is by 
that token assumed to conform in respect to its defining 
attributes to what we know of the nature of relationships 
between phenomena in the physical and biological world. But
in that case, a certain view of human nature is indeed 
tacitly presupposed.
It may be argued in response that it is only by con­
centrating on measurable phenomena and aiming for quantifica­
tion that we can reach any exact and therefore reliable 
knowledge of socio-political reality. But whence this pre­
sumption in favor of'texact” knowledge in the quantitative 
sense? If it has not somehow been determined beforehand
what socio-political reality is like, why is it that only
* ,
"exact" knowledge of it is supposed to be meaningful?
The hidden hypothesis about man and society is always
verified, or at least never contradicted, for all "regular­
ities" of political behavior are forced into the Procrustean 
bed of "scientific" explanation. It is assumed that the 
lingering element of uncertainty and unpredictability is a 
temporary problem whose resolution will only have to await 
more extensive research and further refinement of the methods. 
An almost Newtonian conception of reality appears to be 
implied, one which has been found wanting even in physics.
The humanistic objection that the "patterns" of social life
do not belong to the same category as "patterns" in astron­
omy or physics, for example, but are acts of will in a 
context of freedom, purpose, and responsibility cannot be 
handled on its own ground. It must either be thrown out as 
"unscientific," and thus unworthy of consideration, or 
emasculated through a redefinition of the concepts used in 
terms of "the scientific method," that is, by a reduction of 
them to a predetermined level of explanation.
The point to be made is that the proponents of an 
exclusive or primary reliance on empirico-quantitative 
methods in political science are exhibiting a fundamental 
arbitrariness in their determination of scientific relevance. 
It becomes the more glaring if the need for a philosophical 
understanding of human nature and society is discounted.
It is difficult to see how one could defend setting up the 
methods of natural science as the ideal for social science 
before it has been determined through some kind of assess­
ment of human nature in its complex wholeness to what extent 
these criteria can be applied to the study of man in the 
first place. These are philosophical questions, and very 
difficult questions at that. In order to understand the 
role and meaning of politics in human life and what methods 
are appropriate to that task, it is necessary to engage in 
a type of investigation in which the facts of actual human
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self-experience are allowed to speak for themselves, as it 
were. It will not do for the political scientist to begin 
by introducing an inflexible rule of evidence borrowed from 
a specialized branch of research. To deny the primacy of a 
philosophical grasp of human nature while insisting on the 
universal applicability of "the scientific method" is tanta­
mount to setting up that method itself as the final judge of 
reality and thus to adopt a rigid metaphysical system. To 
admit the need of philosophy, in the sense of a scientifically 
valid examination of the facts of self-experience, is to 
have left the confines of empirico-quantitative methods, for 
philosophical reasoning is not an application of those 
methods or related types of theory, but a comprehensive 
assessment of reality logically prior to them.
The varied evidence available indicates that man is 
indeed a part of the physical universe, a bodily creature 
whose characteristics may be illuminated by the methods of 
natural science. It is quite another matter to proceed as 
though all realiable knowledge about human nature belonged 
to the same general level of reality. This is simply to 
ignore the whole body of humanistic evidence available to 
philosophy: Man as known by us in actual experience is not 
locked into some vast, causally determined system. To be 
human is to be engaged in conscious, purposeful activity.
to reflect about and choose between alternative lines of 
conduct. We know ourselves to be interfering to some extent 
with the flow of events, shaping it according to our own 
intentions. Our direct knowledge of freedom in the moment 
of choice is an emphatic, indeed final, humanistic refuta­
tion of the allegation that human behavior may be explained 
in analogy with, for instance, some balls on a billiard table 
knocking against each other and the walls of the table. 
Mechanistic theories of human nature may perhaps have a cer­
tain logical coherence when considered in the abstract, but 
as interpretations of the concrete reality known to the 
living, acting human being, they are wholly inappropriate.
The language of philosophical self-interpretation are 
concepts like "experience," "act," "intend," and "freedom." 
They are indispensable in an analysis of specifically human 
life, but become meaningless if applied to things. Things 
do not "experience," "act," "intend," etc. Conversely, the 
language of "cause and effect," "function," etc., used in 
the physical sciences, is alien to the mode of distinctively 
human activity, although sometimes used metaphorically to 
describe it. The theory that freedom is but an unscientific 
illusion to be progressively dispelled by the discovery of 
causal "patterns" in different areas of research remains a 
metaphysical allegation, an abstract afterthought doing
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violence to an immediate awareness. By an illegitimate and 
arbitrary inference from our knowledge of physical reality 
a confining and distorting explanatory scheme is clamped on 
actual human experience.
It may be argued that political research allegedly 
conducted according to "the scientific method" is saved by 
the constant and unavoidable intrusion of humanistic inter­
pretations which recapture for the researcher and the stu­
dent of his findings some of the humanistic meaning which is 
lost through the attempted methodological reduction of polit­
ical reality. One may indeed question whether the proponents 
of strict adherence to "the scientific method" ever come very 
close to their stated ideal for the discipline. We have been 
arguing, therefore, not primarily against what these polit­
ical scientists are actually doing, although there is consid­
erable room for criticism in this area, but against what they 
are attemptincr to do.
The "scientistic"temptation does not appear quite as 
strong in political science as it once was. This may well 
be a sign of a rediscovery of the specifically human order 
of activity. Perhaps there is then also hope for the recov­
ery of a humanistic, philosophical science of politics for 
which concepts like "freedom" and "purpose" are not unwel­
come complications but a challenge to reflection.
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Human self-awareness
The physicist and chemist have a great deal to tell 
us about man. So does the biologist. It has not been our 
intention to deny that in some ways man resembles the animal. 
He has needs which grow out of his participation in the 
organic world. What is of first importance to the political 
scientist, however, is that man is not only an organism with 
corresponding needs. He is, to use Ernst Cassirer's phrase,
the animal symbolicum. the being with an intelligence and
2 5imagination which works through symbols. The human mind, 
Susanne Langer argues, is "an organ in the service of pri­
mary needs, but of characteristically human needs."26 What­
ever the likenesses between man and animal, the pervasive­
ness of symbolization in human thought establishes one all- 
important difference. That difference, which has a direct 
bearing on the study of politics, has been extensively 
investigated by an important school of modern research, 
often called "philosophical anthropology," which has drawn 
on and integrated findings from biology, zoology, animal
2^see Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962).
Susanne I. Langer, philosophy in a New Key, 2d ed. 
(New York: New American Library, 1951), p. 43 (emphasis in 
original).
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psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. Cassirer and 
Langer are two leading contributors primarily known as 
philosophers.^7
Philosophical anthropology has shown that what makes 
man distinctively human is a unique kind of self-awareness 
which is made possible by symbolical thought. Whereas the 
animal appears to have only the perspective on the world 
which inheres in its practical need of the moment, man has 
the ability, as it were, to step outside of himself and look 
at phenomena, including himself, from an unlimited number of
27The following discussion of the difference between 
man and animal makes use in a very summary fashion of argu­
ments that are presented in detail in the following works: 
Cassirer, An Essay on Man? Langer, Philosophy in a New Key?
Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, intro, and trans. by 
Hans Meyerhoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961); Arnold Gehlen, 
Anthropologische Forschung (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1961); Adolf 
Portmann, Zoologie und das neue Bild des Menschen (Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1956); P. J. J. Buytendijk, Mensch und Tier (Ham­
burg: Rowohlt, 1958); J. v. Uexkull and G. Kriszat, Streif- 
zuge durch die Urnwe1ten von Tieren und Menschen. Bedetung- 
slehre (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956). Many other works elaborate on 
the same theme. Research in this area continues, and it is 
of course possible that the views of the philosophical 
anthropologists regarding the difference between man and 
animal will require seme modification in the future. Our 
general argument is not dependent, however, on the precision 
with which they have distinguished between the two. Even if 
it were established, for instance, that some animals have 
more of a symbolical grasp than is recognized by the phil­
osophical anthropologists, their understanding of human 
nature would still be intact. It would simply mean that 
some animals have more in common with humans than previously 
thought, and that the methods of animal psychology would 
have to be adjusted accordingly.
angles. He can detach himself from his locus in time and 
place by the use of symbols. Man appears to be the only 
creature who can form the idea of a "thing" in the sense of 
a distinct and permanent occurrence. That requires a mind 
which endows perceptions with complex and enduring meanings. 
In man, any number of images may enter symbolically into the 
perception of an orange, so that we are not only aware of 
what is immediately present to the senses, its silhouette or 
color, but can also "see" its extension in space, its soft­
ness, juiciness, meat, taste, possible uses, etc. Symboliza­
tion allows the mind to play around phenomena, to fit them 
into contexts of the past, present, and future. To the 
animal, objects do not seem to have this quality of being 
separate and permanent entities in a wider world, but instead
receive their content from a present need. For the hungry
*
dog a bone is "something to eat," for the playful dog "some­
thing to play with." Whatever it is depends on the desire 
of the moment. It can not be imagined apart from an immed­
iate urge.
What is sometimes called animal language consists, 
not of symbols, which denote meanings detached from a present 
perception, but of signs— a bark, growl, or the like, trig­
gered by what is in the animal's awareness at the moment, as 
for example, a hostile gesture in another animal. Susanne
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Langer argues that the mind of even a very clever dog is "a 
simple and direct transmitter of messages from the world to
O Qhis motor centers." Animal’language" is not symbolical, 
but symptomatic. Aristotle was getting at the same dif­
ference when he said that "speech is something different from 
29voice." Human language is an ability to think and talk of
things in their absence, to entertain ideas which need not
have any relation to a present practical need.
The point is not that animals lack intelligence. If
by that word is meant "either adjustment to the immediate
30environment or adaptive modification of environment," many 
animals must be said to possess it to a high degree. The 
point is that the animal lacks, or has just the barest rud­
iments of a type of intelligence and imagination which 
involves detachment from the here and now.
In man, all experience automatically undergoes what 
Susanne Langer calls "symbolic transformation."^1 The 
stream of perception and impulse is broken up and trans­
formed. Its content is spread out before the eyes of the
2®Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 37.
^Aristotle, The Politics, intro, and trans. by 
T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 28.
^°Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 33.
■^Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 33-54, passim.
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mind in symbolical form. Man is not immersed in his own 
impulses, but has a perspective on them. Whether he wants 
it or not, he is presented with an opportunity to analyze 
and evaluate them. He is not caught in some chain of stim­
ulus and response. In Cassirer's words:
There is an unmistakable difference between organic 
reactions and human responses. In the first case a 
direct and immediate answer is given to an outward 
stimulus; in the second case the answer is delayed.
It is interrupted and retarded by a slow and complica­
ted process of thought.^2
Reinhold Niebuhr speaks of a specifically human "conscious­
ness of consciousness" or "self-transcendence" which "expresses
33itself m  terms of memory and foresight." In the inner 
monologue which is characteristic of man, present percep­
tions, memories/ and projections are freely manipulated to 
fit whatever purpose he has in mind. Whereas the animal 
seems forever bound to its peculiar pattern of behavior, man 
can imagine himself in new circumstances.
fThe human being is aware of himself as a part of a 
greater whole. He has a world. He is capable of a struc­
tured view of reality. He can study his environment sci­
entifically, and he can build imaginary worlds. To be
32Cassirer, An E3say on Man, p. 24.
33Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. vol. 1 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), p. 72; see also 
pp. 68-74, passim.
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human is to he creative. Where there is human life, there 
is culture. The process of symbolization which underlies 
this activity is an essential part of what we have called 
man's spirituality. Max Scheler writes: "The spiritual 
being . . .  is no longer subject to its drives and its envi­
ronment. Instead, it is 'free from the environment' or . . .
34'open to the world.1 The same aspect of man's spiritual
nature is described by Paul Tillich:
Man has a world, namely a structured whole of innu­
merable parts, a cosmos, as the Greeks called it, 
because of its structured character which makes it 
accessible to men through acts of creative receiving 
and transforming. Having a world is more than having 
an environment. 5
Symbolization makes man free in a sense in which the 
animal is not. It also presents him with a unique problem. 
How is he to guide his actions? The animal is deeply sunk 
in instincts which help direct its behavior. It is secure 
in inherited natural drives that fit it into the environment. 
Since man's self-awareness is constituted by a certain 
detachment from his own drives, it is highly questionable to 
talk about instincts in a human context. In man, Arnold 
Gehlen points out, the steady, stereotyped instinctual
*
•^Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, p. 37.
33Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper 
& ROW, 1963), p. 19.
49
patterns found in the animal have been torn down. At the 
most, humans may be said to have "instinctual residues."
They are "instinctually insecure." They must look elsewhere 
for guidance.36
Like the animal, man is full of impulses and desires. 
But they do not automatically result in action. They are 
absorbed into the human inner monologue where they are 
mingled with other impulses. Symbolization transforms every­
thing into infinitely complex combinations. In the medium 
of human consciousness it becomes impossible to distinguish 
clearly this drive from that. To take just one example, it 
is not possible to separate the sexual urge in man from such 
other influences as a will to power, a sense of beauty, or a 
wish to procreate. There are in man no ready-made guides to 
action, and it is not possible to sink back into instinct.
The unique type of self-awareness which is engendered by 
symbolical thought makes man subjectto the vagaries of his 
own imagination.
The specifically human way of structuring life is for 
man to impose rules on himself. For "instinctually insecure" 
man, as opposed to the animal, it is necessary to create
36These phrases are used by Gehlen in Anthropoloerische 
Forschung, where he also shows that in man culture has taken 
the place of instinct.
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Sattern of behavior. Out of this need for self-discipline, 
dictated by his special nature, grow the norms of culture. 
These are not the result of blind spontaneity, but of a con­
scious intent to escape the chaos which is always possible 
in the animal symbolicum.
The findings of the philosophical anthropologists 
support the old Aristotelian notion that man is by nature a 
social being. Social life begins with man's ability to step 
outside of his here and now. Because he is not bound to any 
one perspective on himself and his environment, but can 
enter imaginatively into any number of points of view, he 
can put himself in the place of others and share meanings 
with them. Symbolical thought forms the basis for all kinds 
of cooperation and organization. It is the necessary pre­
requisite for grasping the idea of a role, and thus the idea 
of a society. As the animal 3ymbolicum. man can think of 
himself as playing a part in a greater scheme. Only a mind 
capable of that kind of reasoning can have a conception of 
politics, constitutions, and other laws. Contrary to what 
is the case among animals, humans have an elaborate social 
awareness. The difference between herd instinct and social 
consciousness is not one of degree but of kind. It makes 
little sense to talk, as does Maurice Duverger, for instance, 
of "animal societies" with "politics," "authority," and
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37"organized power." These terms have real meaning only in
a human context, that is, a context of symbolical activity.
They can be made to fit animal behavior only after they have
been redefined to the point of almost complete removal of
their original human content. As John Dewey points out, "no
amount of aggregate collective action of itself constitutes 
38a community."
The human frame of reference
For the political scientist to adjust his methods to 
the spiritual reality of human self-awareness and the type of 
freedom it involves represents a great improvement over the 
attempt to reduce man for purposes of scientific explanation 
to a common level with biological organisms or physical 
things. But neither can man be regarded as a mere economical 
creature, a skillful organizer with an ability to calculate 
how best to satisfy his desires now and in the future, as 
some political scientists would seem to contend or imply.39 
Symbolical activity permits the discovery of enlightened
■^Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics (London: 
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 6-12, passim.
■^John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 151.
3^For examples of reasoning that goes in that direc­
tion see Downs, Economic Interpretation, and William Riker, 
The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale Univer­
sity Press, 1962).
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self-interest, but it also makes possible the entertainment 
of ethical ideals. It permits man to evaluate himself 
morally by enabling him to contrast his present state with 
an image of what his life should really be like.
If anything stands out in the history of culture, it
is that man has used his ability to think in symbols to
express his sense of moral right and his sense of the divine.
Man is an ethical and religious being with corresponding 
needs. Many will deny that there is a moral absolute or a 
God. That does not change the fact that man is forever 
struggling with the ethical question of right and with the 
religious question of man's relation to the divine. To be 
human is to have these concerns. They will not go away just 
because from time they are pronounced irrational or meaning­
less. One may even doubt that they cease to bother those 
who claim to regard them in that way. It appears to be 
human nature to break out of such attempts to restrict the 
process of self-interpretation characteristic of man.
It should be sufficiently clear from the above argu­
ments that what is specifically human about man, a certain 
kind of self-consciousness involving a trans-subjective 
sharing of meaning and with an ethical and religious dimen­
sion, is not accessible by the same kinds of methods which 
are used to investigate physical things or organisms.
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Inasmuch as man's spiritual nature is the very mode of social 
life, empirico-quantitative methods, understood as an approx­
imation of the principles of natural science, will serve the 
social scientist poorly. What is needed is a humanistic 
approach, one which puts a premium on familiarity with and 
respect for the facts of the living reality of distinctively 
human behavior. As has already been argued in different 
ways, human action must be examined "from within," that is, 
from within the highly complicated conceptual structure 
whereby man understands his own existence and guides his 
behavior.
That does not mean that what is loosely called "empir­
ical facts" can be ignored. They provide indispensable 
information about political man. Many types of speculation 
and hypothesis need verification by reference to them. What 
should not be forgotten is that the nature and importance of 
such facts can be known only in the light of a general phil­
osophical understanding of human nature which deals with 
human meanings on their own ground. Drawing on our discus­
sion about the symbolical character of consciousness, we can 
see that the term "empirical fact" is a highly ambiguous one. 
In socio-political life, what is such a fact? The word 
"empirical" supposedly refers to phenomena which are perceived 
by the senses. According to Frank Sorauf, political science
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is "committed to the proposition that knowledge of social
behavior and institutions must come from experience, from
40sense perception of events in the real world." Such a 
view of the source of knowledge reveals a basic vagueness.
To the extent that man is aware of phenomena, they have 
already been taken up in the medium of symbolical thought. 
That means that they have been endowed with complex meanings. 
The fact that an impression is received through the senses, 
whatever that means, does not make the phenomenon present 
itself to man in no uncertain terms. As a part of human 
consciousness it is fitted into and understood through a 
complicated pattern of preconceptions, memories, taboos, 
ideals, and prejudices. A so-called "empirical fact" is 
pregnant with symbolical content. Par from being self- 
evident with respect to its own reality, it has to be deci­
phered. Only after philosophical reason has determined the 
nature of the "fact," that is, its place in the vast concep­
tual structure which constitutes man's knowledge of reality, 
is it possible to know by what method it should be investiga­
ted. Even "empirical" political reality turns out to be 
much more complex and unpredictable than is allowed for by
^°Frank J. Sorauf, Perspectives on Political Science 
(Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1965), p. 22.
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"the scientific method" in the strict empirico-quantitative 
sense.
An ethical theory of democracy, then, regards gov­
ernment as belonging to a specifically human, spiritual order 
of activity with a definite ethical end. Such a theory 
draws on what we may call humanistic evidence, facts about 
man illuminated by philosophical self-knowledge. As we have 
already hinted, that does not mean that the scholar is thrown 
back on his own subjective experience. Human consciousness 
has a dimension of universality. The process of symboliza­
tion that pervades human experience makes few meanings rad­
ically inaccessible to men in general. In fact, social life 
must be viewed as a trans-subjective existence. Symbolical 
thought allows the individual to transmit his own experiences 
to others and make the experiences of others his own. Art 
in its many different forms is a striking recognition of 
that fact. Evidence about man’s ethical conscience and its 
normative authority is available from all those who have 
taken it seriously and tried to determine its role in the 
structure of human existence. Self-knowledge is a dynamic 
process in which the testimony of others, reflected in part 
in the cultural traditions of mankind, is tested against 
direct personal insight, made possible to a large extent by 
that testimony. It is doubtful that one can really distin­
guish between that in one's knowledge of the self which comes 
out of one's own private experience and that which has been 
contributed by others. Private and trans-subjective are 
dynamically and inextricably related. Paradoxically, self- 
discovery is a social, cultural process. It will be argued 
in particular later that the pursuit of the ethical life is 
a supra-individual task.
To give an ethical interpretation of democracy is to 
appeal to the commonality of moral experience. Unless men 
have available to them, potentially at least, a common frame 
of reference grounded in reality itself, arguments about the 
human condition could never convince, but only flatter. 
Needless to say, men are likely always to have differences 
of opinion regarding the precise nature of ethical conscience. 
But arguments about it assume that a certain view comes 
closer to the truth than other views. The fact that the 
individual has to decide for himself what to believe does 
not mean that truth about the form of ethical deliberation 
is subjective. Truth is a universal commanding acceptance, 
because it refers to reality. To speak of ethical exper­
ience as inherently and exclusively subjective is to rule 
out agreement on what is moral. An overlapping of individ­
ual preferences in some particular case does not by itself 
constitute moral agreement, for it need not involve a shared
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understanding of the essential meaning and purpose of human 
life.
Those are many today who deny that there is a com­
monality of moral experience. They maintain that arguments 
about the normative validity of ethical judgments are sci­
entifically pointless. It is contended that as social sci­
entists we must keep "facts" and "values" separate. It is 
not possible here to give a full-fledged refutation of this 
attempted dichotomy. A criticism of it has been implied and 
will be implied in the following chapters. We have to limit 
ourselves at this juncture to the suggestion that the "fact- 
value" distinction becomes plausible only when a "fact" is 
conceived as some sort of independently existing, static 
phenomenon, and not as a part of, and means in, man's effort 
to achieve a comprehensive graBp of reality. The symbols by 
which a "fact" has meaning set it in this wider context and 
are thus reminders of the totality to which it belongs.
That totality becomes what it is partly because of man's 
conceptual structuring of experience. But experience is 
already guided by and understood through this continuous 
process of interpretation, so that reason and will, intellec­
tual and moral activity, are in effect developing together 
in a dialectical fashion. They are indissolubly intertwined. 
To try to extract from a "fact" its "value" component is
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only to conceal from view that what is designated a "fact" 
is simultaneously and unavoidably assigned a positive or 
negative role in the achievement of the comprehensive goal 
whose value is necessarily affirmed whenever the designa­
ting activity is performed.
When men differ in matters of theory, it is not 
always the result of divergences in formal logic. Our way 
of interpreting reality, our sense of proportion and value, 
is the result of innumerable acts of will and related concep­
tual adjustments in the past.
Thus, in the sciences of man . . . there can be a valid 
response to "I don't understand" which takes the form, 
not only "develop your intuitions," but more radically 
"change yourself." This puts an end to any aspiration 
to a value-free . . . science of man. A study of man 
is inseparable from an examination of the options 
between which men must choose.41
Such an examination requires not only an intellectual 
absorption of abstract ideas, but an orientation of the 
whole personality which connects the symbols with exper­
ience. Obviously, intelligent choice presupposes a standard: 
"The superiority of one position over another will. . . con­
sist in this, that from the more adequate position one can 
understand one's own stand and that of one's opponent, but
^Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences 
of Man," The Review of Metaphysics XXV, (Sept., 1971). 47-48.
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not the other way around. It goes without saying that this 
argument can only have weight for those in the superior 
p o s i t i o n . P a r  from indicating moral or intellectual 
arrogance, this statement, which expresses an ancient and 
fundamental insight, simply points out that a view of reality 
is superior to another by virtue of its conceptual comprehen­
siveness and intrinsic worth. The quoted passages emphasize 
the close relationship between ethical and intellectual 
activity and raise the question whether those who embrace the 
•fact-value" distinction are doing so because in the given 
sense they have mastered the opposing older view, inspired 
by the classical and Judaeo-Christian experience, and found 
it wanting, or because they have failed to do so. Philosoph­
ical scholarship aims at the most complete understanding of 
reality. The modern attempt to separate "facts" and "values" 
and the related tendency to accept only so-called "empirical 
facts" as a source of reliable knowledge, we may venture to 
say, represent a contraction in the interpretation of exper­
ience. The proper remedy for extravagant claims and pre­
mature certainty in moral matters is not a refusal to inquire
42Ibid., p. 47. For other arguments against the 
"fact-value" dichotomy see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and 
History (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1953), espec­
ially chap. 2; and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), especially the 
Introduction.
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into the validity of statements about the good for man, but
VP"
a more scrupulous analysis of moral experience as it relates 
to various aspects of life.
To those who embrace the dominant modern view, the 
notion of an ethical interpretation of democracy will seem 
subjectivistic and presumptuous. "Who is to say what is 
moral?" But is it really presumptuous to suggest that 
arguments about man's ethical life can be tested against 
objective reality, to submit that our feelings of moral 
obligation are not just impenetrable enigmas of subjectivity, 
but have a trans-subjective, trans-temporal origin and focus 
which can be illuminated by philosophy? Since perfect and 
total knowledge can safely be ruled out, this view does not
imply an eventual cessation of argument. The belief that an
objective principle of morality exists does not end, but 
gives rise to inquiry. In point of fact, is it not less 
presumptuous to say that the good for man is a matter about 
which we may profitably argue, than to refuse to entertain
the idea that reliable knowledge in this area is possible?
The latter attitude, although allegedly expressive of 
intellectual humility, would actually seem to have in it a 
considerable measure of dogmatism. An attempt to interpret 
democracy in the light of a serious consideration of man's 
sense of higher destiny, we may at least hope, should help
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to diminish rather than increase the threat of intellectual 
capriciousness, it places a central part of human exper­
ience and its relation to basic problems of politics under 
the purview of critical examination.
The next step in our development of an ethical inter­
pretation of democracy will be to try to discern the general 
form taken by ethical awareness and activity. In what way 
does man grasp and affirm his transcendent goal? Since we 
are postulating the intrinsic worth of the structuring 
influence of ethical conscience, such a "formal" approach 
is at the same time necessarily a study of the substantive 
content of morality. We shall be arguing, for instance, 
that ethical conscience is experienced as a restraint on 
impulse. That is another way of saying that a certain type 
of self-restraint has moral worth. Having analyzed the pro­
cess by which moral order is realized, we shall be looking 
for its implications for the organization of popular rule. 
Our ethical philosophy will be clarified and related to the 
institutional questions of democracy through a careful exam­
ination of Rousseau's theory of popular government. This 
analysis will help to demonstrate the close relationship 
between ethics and politics and, more specifically, the 
serious moral difficulties with the concept of plebiscitary 
democracy. By way of elimination, our argument will move
in the direction of a more tenable position. We shall con­
clude with a consideration of the concept of constitutional 
democracy. The purpose is not to develop some sort of moral 
"casuistry" of democracy tied to an elaborate set of 
institutional prescriptions. Our investigation is best 
described as a search for the general principle for the 
reconciliation of the needs of the ethical life with popular 
self-rule. We shall just barely begin the important and 
very difficult task of applying this principle to the var­
ious practical problems of democracy.
II. THE ETHICAL LIFE
It has been argued in a preliminary fashion that pol­
itics has a transcendent moral end and that a truly civ­
ilized society is possible only where the demands of the 
ethical life are recognized and respected. A treatment of 
the implications of that relationship for democracy requires 
a more extensive explication of the ethical philosophy which 
is being postulated. More detailed answers must be given to 
these questions: What is the nature of the ultimate standard 
by which the quality of social and political life has to be 
judged and to which democracy, like other forms of governmsnt, 
must be adjusted? How does the structuring principle of 
man’s ethical life order his actions? Before that principle 
is related to democracy, it also needs to be related to the 
more general ideas of community and culture.
Man's ethical conscience has been described earlier 
as a sense of sacred purpose. The latter term lends itself 
to a religious interpretation. For some Christians, we have 
said, it might seem preferable to speak of the guiding 
presence of the Holy Spirit. Although it is not the inten­
tion here to introduce a theological perspective, it is 
doubtful that man's ethical life as understood in the fol­
lowing discussion could be sharply distinguished from
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religion. Even if not bound up with a certain theology, a 
life centered in the recognition of a transcendent spiritual 
goal for man would appear to come very close to it.'*' Alle­
giance to an ethical end conceived as an ultimate of mean­
ing and worth could involve a spiritual commitment similar 
to that which is ordinarily associated in the West with the 
worship of a personal God.
The view of the ethical life which will be developed 
here is deeply colored by the Christian tradition, but it 
also draws on the classical teaching of Plato and Aristotle 
whose theology is quite different from that of Christianity. 
Our purpose is to give an. account of moral experience while 
staying short of theological claims about the nature of the 
divine reality in the direction of which man is pointed by 
ethical conscience. Ethical philosophy does not have to 
compete with theology. It leaves the possibility open of 
putting the elements of the ethical life in a broader con­
text. It does not necessarily deny the claim that the facts
"̂Paul Tillich is prepared to use the word "faith" 
even about those who do not believe in transcendent reality, 
those he calls "humanists." Their lives may still center 
around an "ultimate concern," and "if faith is understood as 
the state of being ultimately concerned about the ultimate, 
humanism implies faith." Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith 
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 62. We are dealing 
here with a "faith" that does have a transcendent object.
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of the ethical life take on additional significance when 
viewed from the privileged perspective of revelation. At 
the same time, if the structuring principle of man's ethical 
life is a manifestation of divine reality, it is evident 
that what philosophy can say about it has theological ram­
ifications.
We are proceeding on the assumption that up to a cer­
tain point, which probably can not be clearly defined, the 
ability to grasp the facts of man's ethical life is not 
dependent on accepting a particular theology. A Christian, 
a Buddhist, a Platonist, and an Aristotelian, for example, 
all recognize the presence in man of a transcendent spir­
itual awareness and a tension between that sense of higher 
destiny and contrary inclinations. Their differing theolog­
ical views do not necessarily preclude far-reaching agree­
ment on the basic nature of man's moral predicament.t
But what about the person who claims to have no ink­
ling of a transcendent goal for man? Will he be without 
referents in personal experience for the following account 
of the ethical life? It should be stressed in response that 
the term ethical conscience is not intended to signify some 
unique, specialized reality revealed only to a privileged 
few. To be sure, some must have a less confused conception 
of it than others, as is true of any subject; varying degrees
of insight are implied in the recognized need for philosoph­
ical scholarship. While it can not be ruled out categor­
ically that there are actually individuals who completely 
lack what we call ethical conscience, few would flatly deny 
that they have any "conscience" at all. It is hard, if not 
imposible, to imagine a human being who does not have his 
moments of moral guilt, remorse, and reassurance. Many will 
hasten to point out, however, that their "conscience" is of 
course "nothing but" internalized social norms, "merely" a 
mask for their own selfish interest, or the like. They will, 
in other words, admit having a "conscience," a recurrent 
sense of moral censure or approval, but attempt to explain 
away whatever moral authority it wields over them by 
introducing an explanatory theory which rules out the pos­
sibility of objective moral judgments.
To find referents in personal experience for our 
account of the ethical life it is not necessary to give up 
the idea that "conscience" in the loose, day-to-day sense of 
the word, is a veil before subjective and possibly even 
blatantly selfish intentions. It would be difficult to dis­
pute that men's purported ethical motives are usually 
mingled with morally dubious content. Perspicacity regard­
ing the influence of such elements on human action must 
indeed be considered an asset in the ethical philosopher.
It is necessary, however, for those who depreciate "con­
science" to make room for the possibility at least that what 
little moral authority is carried by it may be more than 
arbitrary. What has to be given up, to put the same thing 
differently, is dogmatic relativism or nihilism. The facts 
of the ethical life must be allowed to stand without the 
restrictive interpretation put on them by relativistic or 
nihilistic theory. This may be too much to ask, for such a 
concession would involve more than just a suspension of 
judgment. What is needed is a measure of that ethical in­
sight whose existence is the very subject of controversy.
The duality of human nature
Central to the ethical philosophy that informs this 
study is the idea of the duality of human nature. Since the 
term "dualism" has been used by different philosophers in 
different ways, its meaning here needs to be delineated with 
considerable care. It goes almost without saying that we 
cannot hope to establish conclusively the validity of the 
concept of dualism which is being advanced. That would 
require lengthy philosophical arguments far beyond the scope 
of this investigation. What can and should be done is to 
present the concept with some thoroughness and to locate it 
roughly within the Western philosophical tradition.
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The following discussion of some aspects of the dual­
ity of human nature will combine independent reflection with 
reliance on the ideas of other thinkers. The influence of 
Plato and Aristotle will be apparent. Much use will also be 
made of the thought of Irving Babbitt (1865-1933) and Paul
Elmer More (1864-1937), two important American philosophers
. . 2 and literary critics.
Whatever their differences on the theological level, 
the classical Greek philosophers and the leading Christian 
thinkers who together laid the foundation for the traditional 
Western view of man are at one in asserting that man is a 
creature of two worlds. He partakes of two intimately rela­
ted and yet distinct orders of reality, one immanent and
2Irving Babbitt taught most of his life at Harvard.
He was a professor of French literature, but his works deal 
as much with philosophy and ethics. Paul Elmer More was 
partly an academician, teaching at Princeton, for instance, 
partly a literary journalist, in which capacity he was 
editor-in-chief of The Nation. His numerous philosophical 
and literary works include books on Plato. Together, Babbitt 
and More were the main source of intellectual inspiration 
for the cultural movement called the New Humanism, whose 
influence was most powerfully felt in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Among those who can be said to have belonged to it or 
absorbed many of its ideas are T. S. Eliot, Norman Foerster, 
Austin Warren, and, more tangentially, Walter Lippmann.
Our interpretation of Babbitt's and More’s ideas 
owes much to Folke Leander’s philosophical study. The Inner 
Check. A Concept of Paul Elmer More with Reference to 
Benedetto Croce (London: Edward Wright Ltd., 1974; herein­
after referred to as Inner check).
finite, one transcendent and infinite. For Plato, the cen­
tral and most glaring fact of human existence is the paradox 
of the One and the many, the coexistence in life of Unity 
and multiplicity. Order and disorder. There is thrust on 
the philosopher, the simultaneous awareness of a Purpose of 
being, an End of Meaning and Worth, and of an opposing real­
ity tending by its own nature towards nothingness. Perhaps 
the most persistent of all philosophical themes is summed up
in these words: "Man is a strange mixture of being and non-
3being." Human life is a perpetual and ever-changing flow 
of thoughts, impressions, feelings, and actions, yet amidst 
this endless variety and motion, man is able to retain an 
image of human identity and perfection. He is not lost in 
a chaos of multiplicity. His world has a center which holds 
it together. There is in our consciousnes, Irving Babbitt 
observes, "an element of oneness somewhere with which to 
measure the infinite otherwiseness of things."^ Disorder is 
modified by the mysterious presence of a principle of order. 
In ethical terms this fundamental dualism of human existence 
can be defined as a tension between the universal Good and 
all that thwarts its purpose in the world.
•^Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 11.
^Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (New Yorfc: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 9.
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Before continuing, it should be made clear that the 
present discussion is concerned with the element of ethical 
order in life. We are interested in that aspect of the par­
adox of tie One and the many which Plato himself regards as 
fundamental. While it is not necessary for the purpose of 
this study to explore at length the types of order that do 
not have a distinctively ethical origin, the existence of 
that complication must be remembered.
The paradox described here by the word "dualism" 
should be understood as prior to all theoretical undertakings, 
as the very starting-point of philosophy. It is the primor­
dial given of man's immediate awareness of reality. The 
paradox of dualism is the category in terms of which philos­
ophy may attempt to describe reality but beyond which it 
cannot go, because it is itself constituted by it. The same 
thought is expressed somewhat differently by Irving Babbitt: 
"Life does not give here an element of oneness and there an 
element of change. It gives a oneness that is always chang­
ing. The oneness and the change are inseparable.”5 Man does 
not somehow fluctuate between the two poles of his being, 
living then in the one, now in the other. To be human is to
5Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism (Cleveland: 
World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1964), p. 7.
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live in both at once, to know order and disorder by each 
other.
The concept of dualism which is being developed needs 
to be distinguished from other attempts to deal with the 
same basic paradox. Few philosophers fail to recognize in 
some form the tension within man's awareness of reality, but 
many are led to interpret it in terms of a single principle 
which supplants the paradox and denies its essential reality. 
The attempt to go beyond the dualism which is directly given 
in human consciousness results either in a denial of 
transcendence, as in various naturalistic philosophies, or 
in a deification of immanent reality, as in the case of Hegel. 
Hegel is more sensitive than most to the dualism of being, 
but by trying to subsume it under the categories of an 
idealistic monism, he comes close to denying the existential 
reality of the tension which his dialectic logic is supposed 
to comprehend.
The classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition with 
which we are identifying has for the most part resisted the 
temptation to resolve the paradox by some such metaphysical 
means. As against naturalistic denials of a transcendent 
order of morality it has affirmed on the basis of concrete 
human experience man's ability to know that reality. As 
against attempts to identify man with the divine it has
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insisted, likewise on the basis of concrete human experience, 
on the finitude of all human achievements.
Neither should our conception of dualism be mistaken 
for the distinction between body and soul which has played a 
considerable role in Western philosophy. The tension of 
concern here is that between the totality of finite human 
reality and the infinite demand placed on that reality by 
ethical conscience. To the realm of the finite belongs not 
only our bodily characteristics, but elements of the human 
self which may be said to be a part of the "soul," such as 
our sensate feelings, emotions, imagination, and reason.
Body and soul, then, are not to be regarded as separate, 
distinct entities, but as an organic unity which stands over 
in its totality against man's transcendent sense of perfection.
In spite of some lingering ambiguities in both tradi­
tions, the Platonic body-soul dichotomy and the related 
Christian flesh-spirit dichotomy should be viewed as only a 
symbolical rendering of a tension which is actually between 
man as an organic whole of body and spirit and the sense of 
higher destiny which is both immanent in and transcendent of 
the human self. "The body" and "the flesh" express symbol­
ically the disruptive, destructive, evil inclinations of the 
human will as diverted from its true end.
The logic of participation
The task of grasping philosophically the coexistence 
in life of order and disorder is not made easy for the modern 
Westerner whose mind is steeped in the iogic of natural sci­
ence. He will be prone to view the elements of human con­
sciousness as "things." Our explication of the paradox of 
dualism will seem a strange assertion of the compatibility 
of incompatible substances. Philosophical terms like "unity," 
"multiplicity," "finite," "infinite," and "dualism" are 
likely to acquire a mathematical coloring. The result will 
be a mental picture drastically opposed to the meaning which 
the various terms are intended to convey. Reifying logic 
will miss the poiht of this discussion, for its natural ten­
dency is to reduce reality to a single level of spatial 
entities, whereas we are actually considering an irreducible 
spiritual paradox. The idea that the human self is at the 
same time and in the same respect changing and remaining the 
same, an ordered unity and a locus of disorder, will appear 
incomprehensible.
But this notion of simultaneous order and disorder is 
perfectly reasonable to another type of thought, the kind we 
use when we recognize our own enduring identity as moral 
subjects in the midst of a perpetually changing inner and 
outer life. Every new moment in a person's life is unique,
74
and he is therefore never the same, yet he knows himself to 
be the same as he has always been. In grasping this fact 
about ourselves and others we use a type of logic which is 
suited to the data of spiritual experience as we are con­
scious of them, not indirectly through mechanistic, quantita­
tive analogies, but directly in our immediate awareness of 
reality. It is a dialectical, humanistic logic which does 
not try to explain away, but simply reflects the existential
gtension in man between immanent and transcendent.
Only if reifying thought-processes are set aside for 
humanistic philosophy, is it possible to grasp the idea of 
participation fmethexis) by which Plato gives conceptual 
form to the paradox of dualism. According to this idea, 
finite man participates in, shares in the infinite. The per­
son who acts with a view to realizing the goal of ethical 
conscience becomes a part of the transcendent purpose of 
existence. By striving to embody it in his personal life he 
brings into the finite world a measure of harmony and order. 
Human activity always remains in the realm of the imperfect, 
but in individuals, peoples, and civilizations inspired by 
the universal Good it is enlisted in a higher cause and 
raised to a new dignity.
^The logical problem of dualism is discussed in Lean- 
der, Inner Check.
75
While man's ethical life is never completely ordered 
or disordered, he tends to gravitate in either direction.
Some men will have but a vague conception of the moral goal 
for man or lack the strength of will to adjust to its demands. 
To them, more than to others, life will appear meaningless, 
disjointed, absurd. Others will recognize ethical conscience 
as pointing us towards life's fulfillment and try to live up 
to it. While such men will not escape all feelings of mean­
inglessness, life is likely to impress them more with its 
element of meaning. Employing the Platonic terminology, it 
may be said that they are participating in the Good.
The higher and the lower self
The mysterious dualism of human life has been 
described by Babbitt and More as an opposition in man between 
a higher and a lower self. The latter term refers to the 
human will not guided by ethical conscience. The former 
term, which is synonymous with ethical conscience, refers to 
that in our being which pulls us in the direction of our own 
true humanity, that is, towards the realization of our highest 
potential as defined by a universally valid standard. Man 
is not merely a set of impulses striving towards their 
fulfillment. There is in him this constant stream of drives, 
emotions, impressions, and ideas; as unaffected by ethical
discipline and propelled by the mood of the moment it is 
also called by Babbitt the "temperamental" self. But man 
also has a special kind of self-awareness. Not only does he 
have the ability to examine analytically the contents of his 
own consciousness, which is a rational process that does not 
go beyond the "lower" or "temperamental" self. He is also 
capable of an ethical assessment of himself. At the back of 
his mind the individual carries a sense of what his life 
should really be like. With reference to it he passes judg­
ment on his present state and on his plans for the future. 
Man's ability to view life from a moral perspective is 
precisely what is meant by the "higher self" or, in our ter­
minology, "ethical conscience."
As a result of moral self-examination the individual 
may repudiate even strong inner drives in favor of what he 
has determined to be an ethically acceptable course of action. 
In his better moments he lets his own deepest insight into 
how he ought really to live prevail over the ethically 
unstructured inclinations of his lower self. Against the 
limitless possibilities for imperfection and disorder open 
to the individual stands the spiritual force of ethical con­
science, which holds out the hope of a truly meaningful exis­
tence .
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It is crucial to understand that ethical conscience 
is not an impulse among others. Babbitt and More express an 
important insight when they refer to it as the "inner check, " 
thereby indicating that it brings order by restraining the 
flow of human intentions. Morality is never an easy yield­
ing to the impulse of the moment. It demands the exercise 
of will. Because it frequently requires the interruption or 
holding bach of strong drives, it may involve considerable 
pain. Neither is the discovery of one's own moral short­
comings, which is the necessary prelude to a moral reorienta­
tion of action, a pleasant experience. It is not a coin­
cidence that when the word "conscience" is generally used,
it is most often the painful element of censure that is 
emphasized: "I have a bad conscience," "my conscience bothers 
me," "my conscience won't let me."
The point here is not that the occurrence of ethical 
conscience is always accompanied by pain; we shall be arguing 
later that allegiance to it is attended by a sense of hap­
piness. What should be noted is that the tension within man 
that is introduced by ethical conscience is of a special 
kind. It must not be confused with the internal conflicts 
that grow out of the multiplicity of human drives and desires. 
These are frequently at cross purposes with each other, and 
this may indeed cause anxiety and other forms of internal
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strain. Tensions of that kind are not an example of moral 
struggle or guilt, but are contained within the lower self. 
The tension in man which is ethically significant is that 
between the infinite variety of human drives, on the one 
hand, and that special will in man which always wills the 
same end, the universal, moral End, on the other. In rela­
tion to the multiplicity of inclinations which make up the
lower self it is experienced as a restraining, censuring 
7influence.
Ethical conscience in one of its aspects is man's 
true humanity revolting against the outreaching of arbitrary 
impulse. Babbitt and More are severely critical of those 
who tend to invest the unstructured expansiveness of the 
human will with moral authority. "As against the expan­
sionists of every kind," Babbitt writes, "I do not hesitate 
to affirm that what is specifically human in man and
7Sigmund Freud, by contrast, attempts to account for 
the existence of moral standards within a monistic, natural­
istic framework. His notion of the super-ego forms part of 
a theory of the self-regulation of instinctual energy. What­
ever the strengths or weaknesses of particular points in his 
psychological theories, his failure to make room for a 
transcendent source of morality ("We may reject the exis­
tence of an original, as it were natural, capacity to distin­
guish good from bad." Civilization and Its Discontents tNew 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962], p. 71) and thus rec­
ognize the essential duality of human nature is of a reduc- 
tionistic variety which limits severely the value of his 
ideas to ethical philosophy.
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ultimately divine is a certain quality of will, a will that 
is felt in its relation to his ordinary self as a will to 
refrain.
It should be repeated that we are dealing with the 
ethical origin of order. We have opposed to it the "impul­
ses,1 "spontaneity," and generally undisciplined nature of 
man's lower self. As has been indicated before, there is in 
human life not only order of an ethical kind. There may be 
a certain order or consistency even in the life of the most 
unconscionable person, who in our terminology would be ruled 
predominantly by his lower self. He may pursue his morally 
questionable goals with a high degree of efficiency and 
skill, giving thereby a kind of structure and coherence to 
his existence. In relation to the ultimate standard of human 
action, the ethical End, his life is disordered and undis­
ciplined. Although in a sense not just impulsive— they are 
organized by the motive of efficiency— his actions are eth­
ically unrestrained. Still, one speaks of the impulsiveness 
or temperamental drift of the lower self with less danger of 
being misunderstood when considering a life-style which, 
after the fashion of romantic and vitalistic philosophies, 
exults in spontaneous feeling and action. The fundamental
^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 6.
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distinction to be kept in mind, however, is that between a 
life tending towards immersion in the lower self, be it 
rationalistic or romantic, and an ethically disciplined life.
When using the word "impulse" we are employing it in 
the wide sense of positive human energy, as a name for the 
power which carries human action, mental and physical. 
"Impulse" is not understood as being necessarily blind or 
unthinking.
The human self, then, is a mysterious unity of two 
opposing wills, one of which tends to predominate. That man 
is repeatedly drawn into disharmony and destructivity, or 
sin, to speak religious language, is a glaring fact of his 
existence. But his very awareness of moral evil points out 
the duality of his will. He could know evil will only by 
good will. We have not only a self which left to itself 
pulls us in the direction of selfish and transitory goals, 
but a self that wants what is universally good and enduring. 
The higher and the lower self together form the human person. 
Still, by the paradox of dualism only our higher will is 
recognized by us as our true nature. It carries a special 
authority, the defiance of which has special consequences, 
namely feelings of moral guilt.
One of the striking features of modern ethical thought 
is a tendency to declare that various human experiences are
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not really what they are felt to be. "Conscience," it is 
said, does not represent any objective principle of morality. 
It can be only a manifestation of subjective norms. The 
trouble with this and similar allegations is that they do 
not cover the facts. They lay claim to universal validity, 
but they do not explain or account for the compelling nature 
of the sense of moral duty experienced in conscience. If as 
intelligent human beings we must recognize that conscience 
is in actual fact "nothing but" the workings of "internalized 
social norms," why do we continue to behave nevertheless as 
if conscience had a moral authority of its own? Why do 
people feel guilt and self-contempt when they go against 
their innermost notion of how a human being ought really to 
live? If the modern allegations about conscience are accep­
ted as true, those reactions can only be put down as irra­
tional. To argue, for instance, that men respect moral 
norms only for fear of punishment or losing the approval of 
their fellow humans is simply to ignore that ethical con­
science is known precisely by the fact that it compels the 
individual in a certain direction regardless of what the 
social expectations happen to be.
It should perhaps be repeated at this point that the 
nature and direction of the moral authority of conscience is 
not, and could not be, as readily apparent to everyone.
Ethical conscience cannot be described as a distinct voice 
in each man which states mechanically and without ambiguity 
the moral course of action in each and every situation to a 
passively waiting individual. It is a sense of direction 
which acquires a more definite form, that is, becomes asso­
ciated with a certain type of life, and reveals more of its 
compelling nature only as the individual makes an active 
effort to guide his behavior by it, a process which carries 
over also into his intellectual, conceptual grasp of reality. 
In the person, on the other hand, who is more inclined 
towards a life of sensual gratification, emotional indul­
gence, or ethically uniformed rationality, it is entirely 
possible that the strong onrush of desire or ambition will 
almost drown out the "still small voice" of ethical con­
science. To the extent that a person in the latter category 
does have moral qualms about his life, moreover, he may well 
be prevented by his relative lack of ethically structured 
experience and knowledge from identifying the root cause of 
his uneasiness. The nature of ethical conscience cannot be 
adequately grasped in isolation from a notion of the type of 
life which is already ordered morally and intellectually. 
Moral guilt can be properly recognized as such only within 
this ethical and conceptual frame of reference, supplied 
partially by traditions which incorporate a long process of
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culture. This is another way of saying that the nature of 
ethical conscience is revealed only very imperfectly and 
ambiguously to the person who is morally confused, as defined 
by ethical conscience itself. In the extreme case of a per­
son who is also mentally disordered, the problem would be 
compounded. The removal of confusion, then, is not a simple 
matter of deciding to "listen to conscience," for ethical 
conscience becomes known to man through a whole orientation 
of will and reason. Ethical insight must be viewed as the 
crowning achievement of an entire cultural tradition.®
Man's actual experience of ethical conscience, whether 
in the form of a sense of censure or approval, makes a non­
sub jectivistic interpretation highly palatable, even unavoid­
able. By its very nature, moral guilt would seem to be a 
sense of having done violence to a norm that is not merely 
arbitrary. If the norm that has been defied were indeed 
only subjective, and recognizable by man as only subjective, 
the feeling of guilt would be a mystery. Categorical rel- 
ativistic or nihilistic assertions about conscience come up 
against this difficulty: In the moment of guilt itself at 
least, men are not able to convince themselves of the truth 
of that view of morals. The guilt is there. The feeling is
®The important role of tradition in man's ethical 
life will be explored later in this chapter.
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a sense of having violated a sacred purpose? the latter is 
compelling precisely because it makes subjective wishes 
irrelevant or unimportant. No amount of abstract explana­
tion which may later be tacked on to the experience can 
change the sense itself. The allegation that conscience is 
in reality a mere code-word for subjectivism of one kind or 
another leaves its moral authority unexplained.
Moral self-contempt and reassurance shows up the 
duality of the self and the existence of a true human iden­
tity. We are not just playing with words when we think and 
speak of ourselves in a dualistic manner: "I am not myself," 
"I betrayed my own conscience," "I pulled myself together."
By a certain abstract type of logic this use of the word "I" 
is blatantly contradictory, but by the logic of actual human 
self-awareness it presents no problem. We are beings of two 
wills. In More's formulation:
We do not know the flux by the inner check, or the inner 
check by the flux, or either of these by some other 
element of our being, but we are immediately and inexplic­
ably conscious of both at once— we are both at once.-*-®
At the same time, only the inner check can be said to be
man's true self.^
^-®Paul Elmer More, "Definitions of Dualism, " Shelburne 
Essays, vol. 8 (New York: Phaeton Press, 1967), p. 249.
î -Cf. Romans, 7:19-23. "For the good that I would I 
do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I 
do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin
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Ethical conscience as a principle of censure and a sense of 
purpose
Morality points man beyond the flux of changing cir­
cumstances. Although finite, he is aware in ethical con­
science of a transcendent destiny. Adjusting his life to 
this lasting goal of human existence he reproduces in this 
world a measure of that order which he 'knows as the essence 
of life. We need to look closer at the process whereby 
moral order is brought into the finite world. How does the 
individual come to participate in the Good?
Let it be suggested that moral choice begins in a 
doubt. The idea of an alternative line of action is not 
going to occur to a person as long as he has no question 
about the rightness of his present course. All of a sudden, 
however, there may come to him the feeling that what he is 
doing or about to do is fraught with moral danger. Where 
before there was unquestioning activity, there is moral 
uncertainty. He is confronted by an internal inhibition, an 
uneasy sense that performance of the intended act would 
violate a sacred principle. A tension has appeared between
that dwelleth in me. I find then a law that, when I would 
do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law
of God after the inward man: But I see another law in my
members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me
into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."
what he is planning to do and what he ought to do. It has 
struck a pause in the flow of impulses embodying his orig­
inal plan. Instead of steady, uninterrupted activity there 
is a doubt. The halting of outgoing impulses allows the 
person an opportunity to scrutinize and reevaluate his inten­
tions. A new perspective has been opened up in the light of 
which he may contemplate alternative lines of action. The 
essential fact about the inner monologue which is triggered 
by the stirring of moral doubt is that it is guided by this 
principle: a moral course must be sought. The inhibition 
which sets him deliberating consists precisely in the rec­
ognition that this motive was lacking in or unsuccessfully 
applied to his original plan.
The person who acts on the opportunity afforded him 
by moral doubt will, if he is lucky, come up with a course 
of action which is not censured, as was his old one, by nag­
ging moral dissatisfaction. He will feel morally reassured.
A new determination will fill him. Action is released. The 
set of impulses which embody his new plan are felt by him to 
be in consonance with his true purpose as a human being. He 
has not acted arbitrarily, but with a view to the universal 
good for man.
A present act or plan of action is thus censured by a 
pang of moral doubt. This interference with outgoing impulse
is what Babbitt and More call the "inner check." It estab­
lishes a spiritual contrast between ethically unordered 
activity and the higher goal intended for man. There is, 
let it be repeated, considerable significance in saying that 
this end is apparent to man in the form of a "check, " 
"inhibition," or "negation." These terms indicate that eth­
ical conscience is not just a human drive among others which 
sometimes manages to overpower competing impulses. It is 
not possible to explain ethical order as the self-regulation 
of impulse. Such an attempt would ultimately end up in 
clearly unsatisfactory notions of instinctual guidance, 
which ignore the human reality of* conscious intent. Ethical 
conscience is an interference "from without" with positive 
human energy. It can order action, because it transcends it. 
Belonging to the realm of the infinite, it is experienced by 
man with reference to the endless variety of finite human 
emotions, ideas, and desires as a principle of censure; it 
wills not the multiplicity of imperfect human acts but the 
Perfection of the ethical End.
Nothing could be more tempting than to believe that 
one's own inclinations carry the authority of divine command. 
Different theories which tend to regard man's spontaneous 
wishes as the voice of God have the double attraction of 
flattering the individual and relieving him of the need to
exert the will. Not only is ethical conscience not to be 
identified with impulse. It is doubtful that it can be 
identified with positive human intentions at all. Human 
actions and plans are finite, ethical conscience an expres­
sion of infinite will. For that reason it cannot really be 
said, except in a very special sense, that ethical conscience 
gives specific commands. The person who thinks that he is 
positively ordered to perform this or that act needs to 
remember that while his motive may be that of ethical con­
science, concrete human acts fall short of perfection. Man's 
higher self points him in a definite direction, that of the 
moral End, but it does not assure attainment of the goal.
Ethical conscience makes us aware that we must not 
act arbitrarily, pursuing selfishly our own interests or 
those of our own group, but that we must instead act morally, 
seeking the common good which transcends all particularistic 
wishes. It wants our every action to advance that purpose. 
The ethical course, however, is not revealed to us in the 
form of concrete, detailed prescriptions for particular cir­
cumstances. What is moral in the particular situation may 
require considerable deliberation. Even the person who is 
truly inspired by the motive to act morally may fail in his 
purpose, for the successful planning and execution of action 
involves not only a motivating principle, but pragmatic
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reason together with a factual grasp of the pertinent cir­
cumstances. As Aristotle points out, "goodness in itself is
not enough; there must also be the power to translate it 
12into action." However powerful a man's reason or plentiful 
his knowledge, he can never predict with certainty the con­
sequences of his actions. To be able to achieve at least 
some success in finding the moral course a person must not 
only have the right motive, but wisdom and prudence regard­
ing ends and means.
Strictly speaking, then, ethical conscience only 
reveals the spirit in which we must apply our mental and 
physical resources. Moral behavior is a human creation 
conceived under its guidance. That does not mean that the 
standard of morality itself is subjective. Ethical con­
science always wills a definite course of action, the moral 
course, and motivates man to seek it, only man has to dis­
cover its concrete form in the particular case.
Ethical conscience is not only a principle of censure. 
If it were, it would be a mere negation of human life, 
demanding ascetism or even death. As already indicated, it 
is also felt by man as a sense of spiritual purpose. It 
does not always manifest itself as a check on impulse, it
^Aristotle, The Politics, p. 263.
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gives a kind of approval to certain actions by withholding 
its censure. Having first bothered an individual with a 
moral doubt, a sense of threat to his higher destiny as man, 
it may then suddenly lift its ban when a new course of action 
is contemplated. That is another way of saying that it gives 
a kind of sanction to it. The action is felt to participate 
in man's moral purpose. A set of impulses are, as it were, 
endowed with the tacit endorsement of the higher self. In 
this special sense, and then only if it is remembered that 
the action may not in the end produce the intended result, 
it may be permissible to say that ethical conscience 
"commands" certain actions. The idea of a moral command 
need3 to be understood in conjunction with the idea that 
ethical conscience is also that in man which predisposes 
against premature certainty regarding the morality of speci­
fic acts."^
The paradox of moral freedom
We are approaching the very center of the paradox of
dualism: moral freedom. Man must act to realize his sacred
-^Our notion of ethical conscience, then, should not 
be confused with a type of moral "intuitionism" which 
ascribes to specific moral judgments a self-evident, incon­
trovertible character. What can be said to be 'feelf-evident" 
according to our theory is not ordinarily the morality of 
thi3 or that act but the obligation to seek the moral course. 
Cf. Mary warnock, Ethics since 1900 (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1960), pp. 56-78.
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destiny, but the freedom to do so both is and is not of his 
own making.
Going about his business a person is suddenly aware 
that he is free to repudiate his present intentions. Myste-r 
riously, out of the clear blue, there is a recognition that 
he is now moving towards a morally questionable goal. An 
ethical perspective on what he is doing is opened up. He is 
presented with a moral choice. Where there was smug compla­
cency or a blind pursuit of ethically unworthy ends, there 
is an opportunity to reevaluate and reconstruct. In one 
sense, the freedom to recover one's moral purpose is not of 
man's own making. It is there, a free gift to accept or 
reject. It seems appropriate in this context to speak of 
grace. It should be noted that this opportunity to choose 
is indissolubly bound up with a sense of moral direction.
The moment of ethical choice is not an open-ended predic­
ament. Whenever we say moral freedom, we also say moral 
duty or responsibility, for its origin is the interruption 
of impulse by ethical conscience. Man can perhaps be said 
to be "on his own" in that he does not any longer have to 
follow his previous immoral plan. But the stirring of eth­
ical conscience is by its very nature a call to respond 
affirmatively. The individual is invited to act morally.
His freedom consists in being able to take advantage of the
opportunity- To resign it is merely to revert to the tyranny 
of spiritually destructive actions and their necessary con­
sequences. That means giving up freedom. In the most pro­
found sense of the term, moral freedom is to act in accor­
dance with the true end for man. The term does not signify 
that man is somehow left to carve out his own destiny in a 
morally undetermined universe. The end of ethical conscience 
is sacred and compelling. Its authority can be defied, but 
not repealed.
The paradox of moral freedom has another aspect. The 
moral person does not passively wait for ethical conscience 
to interfere with those of his impulses which embody an 
unethical plan. Although transcendent of finite human real­
ity, ethical conscience should not only be viewed as order­
ing life from the "outside." It is the higher self of act­
ing human persons. The moral man is striving to be moral. 
Although he knows that he may be censured when he least 
expects it, he proceeds on the premise that by trying to act 
morally he will actually come closer to the goal. In Chris­
tian language, one might say that he believes that those who 
seek shall find.
The moral man does not act at random. Prom ethical 
experience he knows that man's true humanity lies in one 
direction rather than another. He has a memory of being
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internally censured or reassured when acting in certain ways. 
As a result of innumerable choices in the past his personal­
ity has been aimed in such a direction as to avoid some of 
the more obvious pitfalls. Also, he is dependent in his 
search for the moral not only on private experience. He has 
access to the general experience of mankind as reflected in 
long-honored ethical norms. These sources of moral insight 
form the basis for the development of habits which build a 
certain ethical momentum into his character.
But what does it mean to try to act morally? It means 
not to go ahead before having asked the question, "Is this 
plan moral?" It means to put oneself in the frame of mind 
where the voice of ethical conscience will not be drowned 
out by the onrush of strong impulse. But the very opportun­
ity to scrutinize intentions from this higher point of view 
before letting them pass into action presupposes a reprieve 
from the flow of ethically unstructured impulse. It requires 
the occurrence of the inner check. When we talk of trying 
to act morally, therefore, we are actually already talking 
about man acting from inside his higher self. By the par­
adox of dualism, a person's sincere wish to act morally is 
already an opportunity to do so. The wish itself is a man­
ifestation of ethical conscience. In a sense, moral inspira­
tion cannot be commanded. It is there, or it i3 not.
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But, by the paradox of dualism, it will come to him who seeks 
it.
Morality as happiness
The preceeding argument has been an attempt to des­
cribe man's moral predicament. It has focused on the nature 
of ethical conscience and sought to show how it orders human 
life. Since the discussion has been largely formal, nagging 
questions of this kind will be lurking in the background:
"But what, in substantive terms, is the Good?" "What, 
specifically, is a moral and immoral principle of conduct?" 
These questions raise an inexhaustible subject. To even 
begin to answer them it would be necessary to relate our 
notion of ethical conscience to the moral traditions of man­
kind. The Westerner is particularly indebted for his know­
ledge of what is moral to the classical and Judaeo-Christian 
body of experience and speculation. The Oriental has availr 
able to him sources of insight of similar depth and penetra­
tion. What we are exploring here, however, is not so much 
the normative content of ethical conscience as its way of 
operation. Morality may be described as a progressive 
discovery, resulting from a dynamic interplay of ethical con­
science, as experienced directly by the individual, and the 
moral insights of humanity, as reflected in long-respected
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ethical norms. We have been trying to describe the process 
whereby ethical conscience reveals man's transcendent destiny.
But the workings of ethical conscience are indistin­
guishable from the intrinsic worth of its operation. We 
have hinted throughout at the positive content of its 
effects in our use of such words as "meaning," "harmony," 
and "worth." We shall try to show later in this chapter 
that ethical conscience is the origin of social community. 
Even with much longer explications of these terms than can 
be given here, it would not be possible to show what the 
Good is in itself. That issue can be dealt with up to a 
point by philosophical argument, but has to be settled 
ultimately by direct moral experience. It is recognized 
that without eliciting referents in the reader's personal 
experience what little has been said and will be said on the 
subject here aan only seem thin and abstract. Our primary 
objective is to describe the form taken by ethical activity. 
However, some additional remarks regarding the positive 
worth of moral activity may help shed more light on the 
nature of ethical conscience.
Man's higher will is in one of its aspects a sense of 
spiritual direction. In the person who is continually try­
ing to order his life by it, it may be described as a sense 
of happiness. The latter word has been cheapened by assoc­
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iation with romantic sentimentalism and by the general vul­
garization of terms. It is used here in the sense given it 
by Aristotle.
There are innumerable standards by which one may
assess the quality of life, such as economic production,
personal freedom, security, and sensual satisfaction. All
of these can be regarded as measures of good. The central
concern of ethical philosophy is the ultimate principle with
reference to which the relative goodness of everything else
may be judged. Aristotle observes that all human activity
aims at some good. All goods, however, are not of the same
rank. Among ends available to man that is superior to all
others which is sought for its own sake. ". . .we call
final without qualification that which is always desirable
14in itself and never for the sake of something else."
Aristotle clarifies by adding:
. . . honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we 
choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted 
from them we should still choose each of them), but we 
choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that 
by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the 
other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor in 
general, for anything other than itself.-1-5
Set above competing goods there is thus a standard, 
definable in one of its aspects as happiness, in terms of
14Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 11 (1097a).
15Ibid., p. 12 (1097k).
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which everything else must be evaluated. Something is good, 
in the strict sense of the word, to the extent that it 
contributes to happiness. It is essential to point out that 
happiness as Aristotle understands it is not simply a feel­
ing of well-being among others. It is a special kind of 
awareness beyond particular acts and their respective sat­
isfactions. The successful completion of action always 
results in some sort of pleasure, just as the interruption 
of action always causes some pain. That is true also of 
moral acts. The pleasure that follows upon their completion 
is not happiness, but only a passing feeling of satisfaction. 
Happiness is the awareness of the unvarying element in moral­
ity, the Good itself, in which individual moral acts are 
only participating. It is the sense of meaning and worth 
which attends a whole life orientation, marked by continuous 
effort to seek, not transitory, particularistic, selfish ends, 
but the enduring, universal, ethical End known in ethical 
conscience. The happy man is not an Epicurean skillfully 
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. Neither is he an 
ascetic who renounces all pleasure. He is the man who finds 
pleasure in the right things: " . . .  those things are both 
valuable and pleasant which are such to the good man."^
16Ibid., p. 262 (1176b).
98
In accordance with this important distinction between 
happiness and pleasure it is quite possible for a moral per­
son to be deprived of success in his dealings and thus also 
of pleasure, and still be happy, because of the intrinsic 
value of the orientation of his character. Plato describes 
the lot of the true philosophers who in a decadent age are 
denied the influence which is their due:
. . . they'll find no ally to save them in the fight for 
justice; and if they're not prepared to join others in 
their wickedness, and yet are unable to fight the general 
savagery single-handed, they are likely to perish like a 
man thrown among wild beasts, without profit to them­
selves or others, before they can do any good to their 
friends or society.
In spite of the fact that the good life is thwarted around
them, happiness is not beyond their reach, for their own
commitment to the Good is not diminished by their lack of
success in influencing their contemporaries. Having sought
to keep themselves "unspotted from wickedness and wrong in
this life," they will "finally leave it with cheerful compo-
17sure and good hope." The most extreme illustration of the 
same idea, perhaps, would be the martyred saint. Conversely, 
a person may be highly successful in realizing his plans and 
thus live a life of pleasure, and yet be unhappy, because of 
the low moral quality of his goals. It should be added that
i7Plato, The Republic, intro, and trans.byH. D. P. Lee, 
rev. 2d ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 292.
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according to Plato and Aristotle a life of pleasure and hap- 
iness tend to go together under normal circumstances.
To counter a possible misunderstanding it needs to be 
made clear that Aristotle does not regard happiness as some 
sort of passive state. "We must," he says, "class happiness 
as an a c t i v i t y H i s  view of the proper end for man can 
be summed up by saying that it consists in a special type of 
activity which makes man happy. ". . - to each man there 
comes just so much happiness as he has of moral and intellec­
tual goodness and of performance of actions dependent there- 
19on. Such activity, in other words, is its own reward.
", . . it is something final and self-sufficient, and is the
20end of action." Because Aristotle calls the very culmina­
tion of this activity "the contemplative life," the modern 
student used to a non-classical conception of reason stands 
in danger of underestimating its ethical element. The activ­
ity of the good man is first and foremost a process of moral 
betterment.
The ascent to happiness is a difficult and protracted
one. It requires a steady commitment to virtuous action.
^Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethic3, p. 261 (1176**). 
•^Aristotle, The Politics, p. 257.
^Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 12 (1 0 9 7 ^).
"For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; 
and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man 
blessed and h a p p y . A r i s t o t l e  distinguishes between three 
levels of human life. The lowest, which is preferred by 
"men of the most vulgar type,"22 does not aim beyond the 
pursuit of pleasure. Superior to it is what he calls the 
"political" life, which presupposes considerable moral 
attainment and enlists prosperity and other goods as means 
in the cause of the good life. Higher still, too high, indeed, 
for all but a very few, is the contemplative life, that 
in which happiness is achieved to the fullest, as far as it 
is humanly possible. It requires only a minimum of worldly 
goods. This highest level of life has many important points 
of contact with the Christian notion of saintliness.
It should be emphasized in conclusion that happiness 
is conceived by Aristotle as a social, communal value. It 
is self-sufficient, not in th$ sense that it is "sufficient 
for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but 
also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his 
friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizen­
ship."^ Aristotle's idea of happiness cannot be distin-
2llbid., p. 14 (1098a ).
22Ibid., p. 6 (1095*3).
23Ibid., p. 12, (1097^).
101
guished from his idea of true friendship, which may be defined 
as community in the good life and possible only between men 
of virtue.
The Aristotelian notion of a self-justifying higher 
activity, which is a realization of life's true end and 
accompanied by happiness, is closely analogous to the Chris­
tian notion of love. It is the Good for the sake of which 
all other goods are, or ought to be, sought. It is manifes­
ted in man's life "in so far as something divine is present 
in him."24 At this point the religious person will want to 
put his own theological interpretation on the terms. We 
shall refrain, however, from taking up a theological line of 
argument.
The ethics of community
Man is by nature a social being, said the classical 
Greek philosophers. They were joined in that view by Chris- 
ian thinkers. It has been a fundamental tenet of the tradi­
tion they started that social life aims beyond cooperation 
for the attainment of material well-being and social peace 
to the realization of the good life. Against the background 
of the above analysis we are better able to understand the 
process by which this goal is approached.
24Ibid., p. 265 (1177b ).
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We have argued previously that man is capable of 
cooperation because of his ability to think symbolically. 
This ability makes possible the planning and organization of 
activity which is a necessary prerequisite for all social 
life. Indeed, we have indicated that symbolical conscious­
ness, which is the distinctively human mode of thought, is 
in essence a social faculty; symbols are not private posses­
sions but detached meanings usable in isolation from the 
experience to which they refer. It has also been observed 
that social cooperation has as one of its origins the purely 
selfish human wish to escape the grimmer aspects of the war 
of all against all. To that argument we added the important 
point that without the recognition of an ethical, that is, 
self-justifying, goal above competing selfish interests, 
social peace will be highly precarious and ultimately 
succumb to the centrifugal forces of partisan wills. It 
remains to discuss how man realizes the good life. It is of 
man's capacity to achieve that goal that the classical and 
Christian political philosophers are primarily thinking 
when they assert that man is by nature social. Because they 
are concerned not simply with social living, but with the 
good life, - the role of ethics takes precedence.
Social life may be viewed as promoting a wide array 
of activities and corresponding values. They can be classed
as ethical, intellectual, aesthetical, and economical,^ 
defining politics as cutting across these lines. By a civ­
ilized society we mean one where these pursuits have attained 
a high level. Since the worth of everything must ultimately 
he judged by its contribution to the final purpose of life, 
civilization first and foremost signifies ethical attain­
ment. The intellectual, aesthetical, and economical life of 
a society may be said to be truly civilized to the degree 
that these activities serve the ethical goal. While their 
respective values of truth, beauty, and economy (efficiency), 
may have their own organizing principle or intrinsic standard 
of perfection, they fulfill their proper role only as they 
advance the purpose of the Ethical. By this definition, a 
society which has reached a high level of efficiency in 
attaining its goals, but whose efficiency does not measurahLy 
serve the realization of moral ends, would not be civilized 
in the full sense of the word. The point is vividly illustra­
ted by the early success of the Nazi war machine. Similarly, 
a society which exhibits a high degree of intellectual activ­
ity, but which is only marginally concerned with discovering 
the truth about the ethical life would be only marginally 
civilized. The moral goal for society to which all other
2 ^Thi3 way of categorizing human activity is sugges­
ted by Benedetto Croce.
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goals are subservient and of which they are ideally suppor­
tive we may call community.
We have argued that man is torn between spiritually 
disruptive and unifying inclinations. In a social context, 
the disintegrative pull of a person's lower self will put 
him in conflict with his fellow men. His own particularis­
tic wishes will clash with those of others. An uneasy soc­
ial peace may be maintained through the restraint suggested 
by enlightened self-interest, but to the extent that men 
lead ethically undisciplined lives, community in the real 
sense of the word will be impossible. Community can emerge 
only in a society where the centrifugal forces of egotis­
tical interests are tempered by concern for the common good.
By disposing us against what is merely arbitrary and 
selfish, ethical conscience disposes us against what sep­
arates us from others. It wills, not what is in the private 
interest of certain individuals or groups, but what is good 
for its own safce. That end is at the same time the good for 
the individual and the good for all. To the extent, there­
fore, that men are ruled by ethical conscience, they are 
unified with others. Just as in the individual moral dis­
cipline produces a self-justifying integration of the per­
sonality, in society it produces a self-justifying belonging. 
Community is human association under the guidance of ethical
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conscience. Man's true humanity is realized by being shared. 
It should be understood that community is experienced between 
those who order their lives with reference to the same 
universal moral authority. A moral person who refuses to 
participate in immorality around him may well become isola­
ted or separated. The opposite of separation in this case, 
however, would not be community.
In one sense, man's effort to achieve the good life 
can be said to be an individualistic undertaking. It is 
centered in a moral authority of which the individual is 
directly aware in himself. It is felt to be so closely 
associated with his own essential identity that it may be 
called his higher self. He realizes his true purpose by 
heeding the Socratic admonition to "know thyself." Also, 
moral betterment can come about only through personal acts 
of will. But the type of individualism we are describing 
has nothing to do with an atomistic view of man and society. 
The process of spiritual development always points beyond 
individual personality. Man's higher self is not some pri­
vate reality, but the potential for true humanity shared by 
all. Its authority is by its own nature universal, that is, 
non-individualistic. It is binding on and has effects on 
all men. This argument connects with Aristotle's teaching 
about true friendship, which in his view presupposes some
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moral elevation among the participants. Because ethical con­
science wills the same ultimate end in all men, it can be
said with Aristotle that the moral individual "is related to
Of*his friend as to himself."
The individual person is unique, not by virtue of his 
higher self, but by the meeting in his being of the infinite 
as known in ethical conscience and the finite as manifested 
in his particular mental and physical characteristics, since 
men live under different circumstances and have different 
capabilities, ethical conscience does not call men to iden­
tical lives. The professor will be able to advance the 
cause of man' s true humanity in other ways than the priest 
or the businessman, to take just three examples having to do 
with the individual's occupational situation. What should 
be carefully noted is that the higher self enlists the 
uniqueness of each person in one and the same moral cause, 
as far, that is, as that uniqueness is compatible with the 
cause. Whatever the particular circumstances, the goal is 
always this: extending the influence of the ethical will.
Community, then, is experienced, not between skill­
fully calculating egotists, or, for that matter, between
^6Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 228 (1166a). 
Aristotle's theory of friendship is developed primarily in 
books VIXX and IX.
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mere "lovers of humanity" lacking in understanding of man's 
spiritual nature and destiny, but between individuals who 
are trying to rise above whatever is separative and disrup­
tive in their characters to what is highest in each of them. 
The life they attain is not based on subjective whim, but on 
the supra-individual authority of ethical conscience. They 
are ordering their lives with reference to a "centre of judg­
ment set above the shifting impressions of the individual
27and the flux of phenomenal nature." They are unified with 
each other through loyalty to a self which is the same in all
men. In religious terminology, they are unified in God.
In the context of community, the common good is not 
merely a code-word for successful compromise between clash­
ing selfish interests. It refers to the element in human 
interaction which transcends private advantage. Such is the 
nature of a living together at a level of some ethical nobil­
ity and general cultural elevation. This type of life, 
although personally satisfying to the individuals comprising 
it, does not need to be defended by arguments of self- 
interest. It is its own justification. Whatever contributes 
to it can be supported, not because it happens to serve the 
interests of this or that individual or group, but because 
it fulfills an intrinsically valuable existence. It is the
^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 9.
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societal end for which the civilized man knows that he is 
intended. In community, men have heen brought together at a 
common center of values. In Aristotelian terminology that 
center is happiness, in Christian terminology, love.
It should be added that while community is the ethical
goal of society, it will never be completely attained. That
would presuppose the disappearance of selfish motives from
the face of the earth. To the extent that it is realized,
community will have to coexist with egotism. Drawing on our
previous discussion of the relationship between morality and 
28self-interest, we can say that although the pursuit of 
private advantage is not morality, it can to a certain extent 
be bent to fit the purposes of the moral life by the ethical 
forces of community in the surrounding society, which submit 
selfishness to a degree of control. To take an example, a 
businessman concerned only with his own well-being and pleas­
ure and trying to make a profit to further that end may 
under certain cultural circumstances still help to advance a 
higher goal. Provided that the market demand to which he is 
responding is itself cultured and at least partially growing 
out of a wish on the part of the buyers to realize moral 
ends, the businessman's desire to make a profit, which is
^®See chapter 1, pp. 23-30.
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the reward for having served the consumer efficiently, may 
actually give some support to the ethical life. In spite of 
the low moral quality of his own ultimate motive, higher 
goals are served by his economic risk-taking and imagination. 
Or consider a power-hungry democratic politician who has no 
motive for his participation in politics than to enhance his 
own personal influence. In spite of himself, he may in his 
opportunistic pandering to the voters actually serve moral­
ity, provided that the wishes of his supporters have some
2 Qethical content.
The ethical life and tradition
In the course of man's search for his own true human­
ity there slowly emerges a general sense as to what types of 
activity contribute to the goal and detract from it. In a 
society which takes that search seriously, mankind's histor­
ical experience regarding the preconditions of a civilized 
existence will be a valued source of insight and guidance to 
be drawn upon in the development of specific norms of up­
bringing and education, of intellectual, artistic, and polit­
ical activity. All of these will help to buttress the kind 
of humane social interaction which is ultimately dependent on
29jjeedless to say, the inference here is not that 
businessmen are necessarily embodiments of greed or politic­
ians the personification of an all-consuming lust for power.
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individual efforts of will. In such a society tradition 
becomes both an expression of and support for the good life. 
It helps direct man's will and imagination towards his endur­
ing spiritual purpose. It is a moulding, formative force 
checking the spontaneous growth of premature, misguided 
opinion and behavior. One might say that in encouraging 
in the individual a certain steadiness of action, tradition 
serves to make the good life habitual. And according to 
Aristotle, "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit."30
It should be carefully noted that although invaluable 
as a guide to the good life, tradition never gives final 
expression to man's higher destiny. Sound tradition grows 
out of an effort to give positive content to man's sense of 
spiritual destiny, but that sense ultimately transcends all 
specific human forms. The good life is unthinkable outside 
of tradition. Imperfect man is capable of attaining civ­
ilization only because he is born into a cultural context 
which incorporates the experience and insight of his pred­
ecessors. The good life is a communal creation, not only in 
the sense that it entails cooperation of the living, but 
because it involves the efforts of previous generations.
Still, because of the imperfection of all human accomplish-
30Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 28 (1103a).
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ments and changing circumstances, tradition must not become 
an unbending insistence on the status quo. Attempts to put 
the spirit of civilization in a cultural strait-jacket will 
stifle and perhaps even kill it. Conventional beliefs and 
norms must be continually evaluated with reference to man's 
direct knowledge of the purpose that they are supposed to 
advance. That is not to say that new circumstances and 
insights are likely to require basic revisions in the cen­
tral principles of life, moral norms among them, which are 
found at the core of mankind's cultural traditions. That 
would imply that human nature is undergoing fundamental 
change over time, a contention which is hardly supported by 
historical experience. Certain other aspects of tradition, 
those having to do with the application of central principles 
to new circumstances are more likely to stand in need of 
alteration or amendment.
It is not contradictory, but philosophically entirely 
consistent, that those who come to value cultural tradition 
the most are frequently the same who stress the need for an 
imaginative and critical assessment of contemporary society. 
Among them is Edmund Burke. His combination of a respect 
for ancient custom and willingness to challenge the ways of 
present society is apparent in his classical statement of
the primary qualification of a stateman, "a disposition to
31preserve, and an ability to improve." The same outlook is
reflected in Burke's statement that "a state without the
means of some change is without the means of its conserva- 
32tion." Similar views are expressed by one of Burke's
leading American disciples, Russell Kirk. He writes: "In a
healthy nation, tradition must be balanced by some strong
33element of curiosity and individual dissent." It must not
be ignored that "the world does change; a certain sloughing
off of tradition and prescription is at work in any vigorous
society, and a certain adding to the bulk of received opin-
34ion goes on from age to age."
It should be added that particular societies may well 
come into sharp conflict with the cultural traditions that 
originally created and sustained them. The problem then 
becomes to determine whether the break with long-respected 
principles is indeed the result of new, superior insight or
^^-Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France {London: Everyman's Library, 1964), p. 153 (herein­
after referred to as Reflections).
32Ibid., p. 19.
33Russell Kirk, A Program for conservatives (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co., 1954), p. 305.
n  i
Russell Kirk, "Prescription, Authority and Ordered 
Freedom," in Frank S. Meyer, ed., What is Conservatism? (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 31.
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m e r e l y  the result of a failure to absorb the cultural he r ­
itage, a slackening of the will and the ability to live up 
to the high demands of true civilization. This task of 
evaluation, it is evident, requires not only knowledge of 
the n e w  beliefs, but a thorough familiarity with the ancient 
traditions which have allegedly been supplanted.
What is to be preserved, then, is not tradition as an 
imperfect human creation, but a living awareness of man's 
h igher destiny. The sign of a creative culture would be 
that it manages to weed out that in its traditions which is 
only temporally conditioned, transitory, or of marginal 
value and keep that strong which speaks to man's central and 
e nduring concerns. The principles of the good life tend to 
b ecome reflected in tradition and abhor the flux of contin­
ual change, for they represent the permanent element in his­
tory. Sound tradition, as opposed to mere cultural inertia, 
is the ethical, literary, artistic, and political expression 
of w h a t  man has found to fulfill his own humanity. The civ­
ilized human being is the beneficiary of the historical
process to substitute for what is only transitory in human 
attachments that which has enduring meaning and worth. To 
relate this point to the, Platonic notion of the One and the 
m a n y  which has supplied the theme for our discussion of the 
ethical life, tradition is m a n ' s attempt to maintain his grasp 
of the Oneness in the infinite variety of human experience.
III. ROUSSEAU'S "GENERAL WILL":
MORAL FACT OR UTOPIAN FICTION?
Having developed with some care the idea of the dual­
ity of human nature and the relation of ethical conscience 
to community and culture, we are in a position to examine in 
depth the implications of man's moral predicament for the 
theory of democracy in a more narrow political sense. We 
need to apply our ethical reasoning to the difficult ques­
tion of what institutional arrangements can make popular 
rule compatible with the promotion of the ethical life. Our 
moral framework established, we shall turn to a consideration 
of one of the most influential answers to that question in 
Western political thought, that given by Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau in the Social Contract. An analysis of Rousseau's 
argument is suggested by the fact that he is widely regarded 
as a founder of modern democratic thought and by the fact 
that, directly or indirectly, his ideas form an important 
part of the hidden assumptions of much political theory in 
the twentieth century. Our examination of the doctrine of 
popular majority rule propounded by this seminal thinker is 
intended to bring some of those assumptions into the open 
and to expose certain central ethical problems with them 
which are usually blurred or evaded in modern thought.
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The following analysis of Rousseau's theory of pop­
ular rule will help to develop a fundamental distinction 
which, although crucial to democratic theory, is only vaguely 
recognized and understood by the more influential theoretic­
ians of democracy today. In his effort to reconcile ethics 
and politics Rousseau becomes the champion of a form of pop­
ular rule which may be termed "plebiscitary democracy," one 
which gives maximum freedom and power to the momentary 
majority of the people by leaving no legal obstacles which 
cannot be easily removed in the way of emerging popular 
wishes. This type of democracy may be defined in contra­
distinction to "constitutional democracy," a form of popular 
rule designed to promote, not the instant and complete pub­
lic implementation of the most recent will of the people, 
but the articulation of the "deliberate sense" of the commun­
ity, to use a phrase from the American constitutional tradi­
tion. Popular majorities are subject to constitutional 
restraints whose removal would require an elaborate proce­
dure and not only persistent but overwhelming popular 
support. The purpose of such a form of government is to 
filter out what is merely transitory or premature in the 
various expressions of popular will and to enhance the 
implementation of what is lasting and well-considered. These 
definitions, it may be argued, refer to two essentially dif­
ferent conceptions of democracy with vastly different eth­
ical implications. They delineate what may well be the fun­
damental theoretical alternative available to the proponents 
of popular rule. Intelligent choice between them requires 
a choice between conflicting answers to central questions of 
ethical philosophy. To be able to evaluate the validity of 
Rousseau's germinal theory of plebiscitary democracy we must 
carefully examine its ethical foundations. It is our pur­
pose to analyze later the concept of constitutional democracy.
An analysis of Rousseau's ideas about popular rule is 
the more appropriate here since his thinking involves a few 
important concepts and terms which bear a certain resemblanae 
to some of those advanced in our previous discussion. We 
have used the idea of a higher and a lower self in man, hint­
ing at the possibility of applying it to a whole people. We 
have indicated that the higher self, or ethical conscience, 
is not a merely private, subjective will, but a will common 
to all men. Rousseau, by way of comparison, distinguishes 
in the Social Contract and elsewhere between the general 
will (la volonte generale), which he defines as the intrin­
sically moral will of the people, and the will of all (la 
volonte de tous), which is a mere aggregation of their self­
ish interests. He also speaks of a people's common self 
(moi commun). It needs to be determined whether these
I
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similarities are substantive or just terminological and super 
ficial.
Rousseau's argument for plebiscitary popular rule in 
the Social Contract turns on the notion of the general will. 
It will be our task to decide if this concept gives an 
accurate account of the possible meeting of politics and 
morality in a democracy. Is the general will the absolute 
principle of right that it would have to be in order to 
justify the total freedom and loyalty that Rousseau claims 
for it? On the answer to this question depends the adequacy 
of the institutional arrangements for popular rule which he 
suggests.
We hope to show that there are grave objections to 
accepting Rousseau's general will as a guiding principle of 
democratic theory. It is not to be mistaken for the higher 
will in man which we have called ethical conscience and to 
which popular rule should properly be adjusted. The thrust 
of Rousseau's writings is the rejection of the type of 
dualistic philosophy we have outlined and the affirmation of 
the essential unity and goodness of human nature. Morality 
in his thought is synonymous with uninhibited impulse. His 
idea of the general will and his endorsement of majority 
rule without constitutional restraints, we shall be arguing.
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rest on an illegitimate identification of m o r a l i t y  with the 
immanent reality of spontaneously emerging popular wishes.
If Rousseau's thought can be said to involve any 
notion of philosophical dualism, it is of a v e r y  different 
k i n d  from the one w e  have described. For the existential, 
ineradicable tension in m a n  between a transcendent ethical 
purpose and contrary inclinations, he substitutes a tension 
b e t w e e n  m a n  and the institutions of conventional society, 
w hi c h  places the source of evil somehow outside of the 
essence of human nature. Writes Ro b e r t  Nisbet: “Rousseau is 
the first of the modern philosophers to see in the State a 
means of resolving the conflicts, not merely a m ong institu­
tions, b u t  within the individual himself."'*' Rousseau's 
rejection of constitutional limitations on the will of the 
people, we shall try to show, is indissolubly b o und up with 
a failure to face the moral conflict inside the human soul.
The force of tradition is strong, however, and it 
c auses in Rousseau's writings a measure of ambiguity. Irving 
Babbitt, one of h i s  severest critics, freely admits: "That 
there is some survival of the older dualism in Rousseau is 
beyond question. . . .“ Spread out in his wor k s  are sen-
^•Robert Nisbet, Community and Power, p. 140.
^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 76.
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tences which point beyond and even contradict the normal 
tendency of his philosophy. Although recognizing this 
strain, we shall be arguing that in the main the concept of 
the general will exemplifies the movement away from a trans­
cendent standard of ethics and towards the identification of 
morality with politics. Rousseau himself admits to basing 
the Social Contract on the belief that "everything is rooted 
in politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people 
would ever be other than the nature of their government made 
them.' His emphasis on the importance of politics might 
seem to put him close to Plato and Aristotle, but there are 
crucial differences stemming from very different views of 
human nature.
The concept of the general will is developed by 
Rousseau with the most thoroughness in the Social Contract, 
and our analysis will be centered in that text. It should 
be said that we will not be able to give anything like a 
comprehensive examination of this work, brief though it is. 
It contains a wealth of ideas, and also ambiguities and con­
tradictions, which can only be dealt with in part and to the 
exclusion of important points. It may be argued, on the
^Jean-Jacque Rousseau, The Confessions, intro, and 
trans. by J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1953), 
IX: 377.
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other hand, that an analysis focused on the general will 
takes one to the very heart of Rousseau's political thought. 
While the Social Contract will be our primary point of ref­
erence, it is not possible to understand fully its line of 
argument without also consulting some of his other works.
The general will needs to be put in the proper philosophical 
context. This requires a somewhat roundabout approach to 
the basic text, including some extensive introductory remarks.
Rousseau insisted to the end on the basic philosoph­
ical unity of his writings. He is supported in this regard 
by .numerous commentators who at the same time point to 
inconsistencies and tensions inside this larger unity. The 
underlying theme of his works is described by Rousseau him­
self in Rousseau Judges Jean-Jacques, where his interlocutor, 
surveying Rousseau's books, sees "everywhere the development 
of this great principle that nature made men happy and good, 
but that society depraves him and makes him miserable."^ In 
the Social Contract, which is actually devoted to the prop­
osition that there is one type of society that does not have
this effect on man, the same theme is developed with a twist.
The basic unity of Rousseau's works is indicated in 
other ways. In one passage among many where he asserts the
^Quoted in Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy 
of Rousseau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 
p. xiii (hereinafter referred to as Rousseau).
close ties between our central text and other books, he 
writes that "all that is challenging in The Social Contract 
had previously appeared in the Essay on Inequality.”^ In 
the Emile one finds a summary of the arguments that were 
later to be published in the Social Contract. Of the latter 
Rousseau writes that it "should be considered as a kind of 
appendix" to the Emile and that the two works "together make
ga single whole." It becomes still more difficult to regard 
the Social Contract as breaking in central respects with the 
rest of his thinking, when one considers'that under the 
preliminary title of Political Institutions he worked on it 
for over ten years, during which time he wrote other major 
works. Far from regarding it as some sort of deviation from 
his normal philosophical path, he thought of it as the 
treatise that would "put the seal" on his reputation.^
Rousseau the man and the thinker
It is possible to shed light on Rousseau's arguments 
in the Social Contract by drawing on his autobiographical 
writings as well as his formal treatises. It has been often 
commented upon that it is difficult, or even impossible, in
^Confessions, IX: 379.
^Quoted in Masters, Rousseau, p. xiii, n. 26.
^Confessions, IX: 377.
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the case of Rousseau to distinguish between these two types 
of writing. His frank descriptions of his "private" life 
and thoughts must be regarded, in part at least, as state­
ments of his philosophy of life. According to Judith Shklar, 
for instance, the Confessions are of "utmost significance" 
in understanding his thought, because he regarded it as "a
Qpublic act and an integral part of his moral position." The
same can be said of other biographical or semi-biographical
texts, such as the Reveries of a Solitary, which is called
gby Rousseau an "appendix" to the Confessions. Many of his 
private letters are also philosophically highly informative 
and illuminating.
That Rousseau's own character, temperament, and gen­
eral attitude towards life are frequently held up by him as 
representing an ideal is apparent from the texts themselves, 
but becomes easier to understand when one considers in what 
high regard he holds himself. Self-assessments of this kind 
are implicitly or explicitly given in many places: "I . . . 
believe, and always have believed, that I am on the whole
®Judith N. Shklar, Men and citizenst A Study of 
Rousseau's Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), p. 219.
^Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of a Solitary, 
intro, and trans. by John Gould Fletcher (New York: Lennox 
Hill, 1971), I: 39 (hereinafter referred to as Reveries).
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the best of men. . . .nl® Even more specifically and cat­
egorically, he claims to be "quite persuaded that of all the 
men I have known in my life none was better than myself."11 
He admits having vices too, but does not quite blame himself 
for them, since he is aware that they are "due much more to 
my situation than to myself."12 it is not surprising that a 
person who takes this highly favorable view of himself and 
who, moreover, is so convinced of his own uniqueness as to
believe that nature had to break the mould when it formed 
13him, should also judge his private life to be of general
interest and worthy of emulation.
Another self-assessment by Rousseau which should be
kept in mind when interpreting the Social Contract and other
works is the penetrating recognition that "it is as if my
14heart and my brain did not belong to the same person." By
the "heart" he means his "passionate temperament, and lively
15and headstrong emotions. In innumerable places he draws a
10Confessions, X: 479.
^Letter to Malesherbes, January 4, 1762, Charles W. 
Hende1, Citizen of Geneva: Selections from the Letters of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York: Oxford university Press, 
1937), p. 206 (hereinafter referred to as Citizen).
^Letter to Malesherbes, January 12, 1762, Hendel, 
Citizen, p. 209.





picture of himself as a person who always wants to act on
impulse, is moved by his passions, and is frequently
engrossed in feelings and imaginings, ranging from pastoral
dreaming to pantheistic revery and "dizzy ecstacy."^
Rousseau's obsessive impatience with everything that tends
to restrain his inclinations of the moment is too well-known
to require elaboration. The tendency is summed up in his
statement that "it is hardly in me to subject myself to 
1restraint." In the Emile the theme of removing checks on 
man's spontaneous self is developed into a program of educa­
tion, one principle of which is that "the only habit the
child should be allowed to contract is that of having no 
17habits." Inextricably intertwined with this yearning for
18unbridled freedom is the view that "man is naturally good." 
Rousseau gives this highly instructive key, not only to his 
personality, but to his philosophy:
15Letter to Malesherbes, January 26, 1762, Hendel, 
Citizen, p. 214.
•̂ Confessions, IX: 391.
17Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. by Barbara Foxley, 
with an Introduction by Andre Boutet De Monvel (London: 
Everyman's Library, 1969), I: 30.
1 O°Quoted in Masters, Rousseau, p. 3 (emphasis in 
original).
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I give myself to the impression of the moment without 
resistance and [even] without scruple? for I am per­
fectly sure that my heart loves only that which is good. 
All the evil I ever did in my life was the result of 
reflection? and the little good I have been able to do 
was the result of impulse.
The "heart" gives to Rousseau's thinking a pronounced
utopian and romantic slant. Radically dissatisfied with
society and seemingly constitutionally incapable of coming
to terms with it, he is inclined instead to people the world
by the help of his "creative imagination" with beings more
20after his own "heart."
But this tendency to escape from imperfect reality
into "an ideal world" believed by Rousseau to be more"worthy
21of my exalted feelings," is sometimes checked by moments
of sobriety and realism. Speaking about a period of his
life particularly given to romantic revery and worship of
nature, he writes: "However, in the midst of all that, I
confess that sometimes the emptiness of my chimerical dreams
22suddenly came to my mind and saddened me." it is striking 
1 Q•^Quoted in Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1963), p. 127 (hereinafter referred to as Question).
2QConfessions, IX: 398.
21Ibid.
22Letter to Malesherbes, January 26, 1762, Hendel, 
Citizen, p. 213.
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how Rousseau's “head," his reason guided by a sense of real­
ism, will catch up with his "heart" and force qualifications 
of or additions to remarks in a more dreamy vein. It revives 
in him an awareness of the imperfection of life. In his 
various writings one comes across perspicacious, piercing, 
hard-nosed comments about the human condition remarkably 
free of the romantic-utopian slant of the particular work in 
which they appear. These flashes of realism, however, are 
seldom more than a temporary counterweight to a strong wish 
to let the "heart" speak.
An analysis of the romantic-utopian tendency in
Rousseau's thought is complicated by the fact that his 
"heart" does not always crave the same thing. His works are 
full of the glories of an idyllic, pastoral, and anarchic 
existence, but in some of them, like the First Discourse, the 
Social Contract, and the book on the Government of Poland, there
are also examples of what may be termed Rousseau's Spartan 
mood, under whose influence he extolls the virtues of polit­
ical discipline, nationalism, and soldierly life. Both in­
clinations, it should be carefully noted, incorporate a pre­
occupation with freedom in the sense of an absence of 
restraint. The anarchic bent reflects this propensity in the 
case of the individual person; the spartan bent projects the 
same yearning on to the collective level where freedom is inves­
ted in the general will, which is subject to no checks.
For good reasons the Social Contract is widely regard 
ed as one of Rousseau's most sober, least romantic works.
It does have less of an emotional and impressionistic flavor 
than some of his other books. Rousseau gives as his inten­
tion in the Social Contract "to employ solely the power of 
23reason." That remark, on the other hand, is not made in 
any attempt to depreciate the "heart." Since the Social 
Contract is a treatise on political morality, it is impor­
tant to be aware of Rousseau's reminder that "by reason 
alone, unaided by conscience, we cannot establish any nat­
ural law, and that all natural right is a vain dream if it 
does not rest upon some instinctive need of the human heart.'
Not even the Social Contract can be regarded as a 
treatise of moral and political realism. As will be dem­
onstrated, it is shot through with utopianism. It might 
perhaps be viewed as representing an effort to fuse the 
"head" and the "heart," the latter predominantly Spartan in 
this work. The attempt is closely related to what we may 
regard as Rousseau's basic purpose in the Social Contract: 
to state the conditions for the recreation in a social con­
text of the natural goodness and freedom which belongs to 
man in the state of nature. Reason, Rousseau believes, is
2^Confessions, IX: 378 n.
24Emile, IV: 196.
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not fully developed in that primitive but happy 3tate, but 
can achieve its true role and potential in civil society 
under the right circumstances. The problem is to make sure 
that it does not remain an instrument for the depravity of 
conventional society, but takes its inspiration from man's 
true nature. This attempted bringing together of the "head" 
and the "heart," it is interesting to note, cannot be said 
to involve an ordering principle transcendent of both. A 
careful reading of the Social Contract suggests that there, 
too, it is the "head" that has to catch up with the "heart" 
rather than the other way around. The tendency to hide dif­
ficulties and blur distinctions, which is largely attrib­
utable to Rousseau's utopian bent, is frequently checked but 
seldom supplanted.
The state of nature
In order to put the idea of the general will in the 
proper context Rousseau's concept of the state of nature 
needs to be examined. It is evident that it is central to 
his political thought and philosophical doctrine in general. 
In the First Discourse Rousseau argues that civilization has 
degraded and corrupted man. Deeply alienated from society, 
he identifies with the plight of the descendants of his own 
century who will beg "Almighty God" to "deliver us from the
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enlightenment and fatal arts of our forefathers, and give 
back to us ignorance, innocence, and poverty, the only goods
2 Rthat can give us happiness and are precious in thy sight."*3 
This and many other passages in his works raise the much- 
debated question whether Rousseau wants a return to a prim­
itive, pre-civilized existence. It is doubtful that it can 
ever be answered with finality. Rousseau himself appears 
not to have reached a definite conclusion, but wavers depend­
ing on his mood and the subject at hand. Especially in cer­
tain autobiographical passages he seems to be longing for 
some sort of pre-societal, anarchic life:
. . .  I have never been truly accustomed to civil soci­
ety where all is worry, obligation, duty, and where my 
natural independence renders me always incapable of the 
subjections necessary to whoever wishes to live amongst 
men.
But in other places he rules out the possibility of actually 
returning to a primitive existence. In Rousseau Judges Jean- 
Jacques he claims to have shown in his works that humanity 
was happier in this "original state," but he goes on to say 
that "human nature does not turn back. Once man has left it, 
he can never return to the time of innocence and equality."27
^6jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Disr 
courses, ed. by Roger D. Masters and trans. by Roger D. Mas­
ters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1964), First Discourse, p. 62.
26Reyeries, VI: 132.
27Quoted in Cassirer, Question, p. 54.
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Even in the Emile, which displays more of an individualistic
and anarchistic tendency than the Social Contract. Rousseau
denies that when he sets out to "train a natural man" he
wants to "make him a savage and to send him back to the 
28woods." But the clearest indication that he does not 
envision, or even hope for, a return to pre-societal condi­
tions is the following passage in the Social Contract:
And although in civil society man surrenders some of the 
advantages that belong to the state of nature, he gains 
in return far greater ones; his faculties are so 
exercised and developed, his mind so enlarged, his sen­
timents so ennobled, and his whole spirit so elevated 
that, if the abuse of his new condition did not in many 
cases lower him to something worse than what he had left, 
he should constantly bless the happy hour that lifted 
him for ever from the state of nature and from a narrow, 
stupid animal made a creature of intelligence and a man.
Rousseau never makes it entirely clear if he con­
ceives of the state of nature as an actual historical state, 
or as an analytical tool, or both. He gives a somewhat dif­
ferent impression depending on his line of argument. The 
ambiguity is apparent in his description of it as "a state 
which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which 
probably never will exist, and about which it is neverthe­
less necessary to have precise notions in order to judge our
28Emile, IV: 217.
29jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, intro, 
and trans. by Maurice Cranston (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1968), bk. I, ch. VIII: 64-65.
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30present state correctly." We do not have to resolve the 
question here. It is certain that whatever else it is, the 
state of nature is a normative and analytical concept. In 
Rousseau's own words, it is employed in an effort of "hypo­
thetical and conditional reasonings better suited to clarify 
the nature of things than to show their true origin."3 It 
is an attempt to isolate that element in human nature which 
is not the product of the degeneracy of historical society.
When he writes about separating "what is original from what
32is artificial in the present nature of man," he is con­
cerned with distinguishing the depravity of civilized man as 
he now exists from his true, essential nature by virtue of 
which he can be said to be happy and good.
Rousseau points to two fundamental driving forces in 
man in the pre-societal state of innocence. The most impor­
tant is self-love (amour de soi) which is essentially a wish 
for self-preservation. He differs from Hobbes in believing 
that "since the state of nature is that in which care of our 
self-preservation is the least prejudicial to the self- 
preservation of others, that state was consequently the best




suited to peace and the most appropriate for the human
race."33 Rousseau also criticizes Hobbes for not having
noticed in the state of nature a second "principle":
. . . pity is a natural sentiment which, moderating in 
each individual the activity of love of oneself, contrib­
utes to the mutual preservation of the entire species.
It carries us without reflection to the aid of those 
whom we see suffer? in the state of nature, it takes the 
place of laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage 
that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice . . . .
These primordial drives together form the core of
man's true nature and are the source of human goodness.
In his quasi-chronological account of the emergence
of social life in the Second Discourse, Rousseau writes with
longing of ’man in his primitive state . . . placed by nature
at equal distances from the stupidity of brutes and the
O Cfatal enlightenment of cxvrl man.' This state, he thinks, 
was the "happiest" and "best for man." " . . .  the human 
race was made to remain in it always," and man "must have
come out of it only by some fatal accident, which for the
36common good ought never to have happened." In this blessed 
state, man's natural inclinations of self-love and pity made 
possible both complete individual freedom and independence 
and a harmonious living together with others, a life of
33Ibid., p. 129.
33Ibid., p. 150.
34Ibid., pp. 132-33. 
36Ibid., p. 151.
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37"peaceful anarchy" in Durkheim's phrase. There came a 
time, however, when because of the pressure of circumstance 
men started to apply themselves to tasks that a single per­
son could not perform by himself. Individual independence 
gave way to relations of dependence.
. . . from the moment one man needed the help of another, 
as soon as they observed that it was useful for a single 
person to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, 
property was introduced, labor became necessary. . . .  38
By this process, which created social relations, man's nat­
ural freedom was destroyed and "the law of property and
3 9inequality" established. Self-love was transformed into 
selfish love (amour propre). Before, under conditions of 
natural equality and lack of interdependence among men, self- 
love and pity had combined to produce a benevolent iden­
tification with others. Now, aided by the development of 
reason, awareness of inequality gives rise to vanity, snob­
bishness, contempt, and competition. No longer is the 
individual able to identify with others, he compares himself 
to them.
3?Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rousseau (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 135.
38The First and Second Discourses (Second), p. 151.
39lbid., p. 160.
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Existing society, thus, has perverted man's natural 
goodness and stifled the natural freedom from which it is 
indistinguishable. And according to Rousseau human nature 
does not turn back. What, then, could men hope for? 
Rousseau is opting in the Social Contract for a new type of 
society and culture, one of Spartan simplicity and in the 
service, not of conventional artificiality and vanity, but, 
as far as possible, of man's true nature. Cassirer states 
the problem in this way: "How can we build a genuine and 
truly human community without falling in the process into 
the evils and depravity of conventional society?"4® The 
goal is to recapture in a social existence, from which there 
is no escape, man's original goodness, and to inspire this 
existence, including the sciences and the arts, with the 
guiding forces of man's natural inclinations. For Rousseau, 
Leo Strauss observes, "the good life consists in the closest 
approximation to the state of nature which is possible on 
the level of humanity."4-1'
The theoretical task of the Social Contract is antic­
ipated in the First Discourse where Rousseau complains of 
the lack in contemporary societies of a virtuous devotion
4®Cassirer, Question, p. 54.
^Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 282.
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to the "fatherland.'* "We have physicists, geometers, chem­
ists, astronomers, poets, musicians, painters; we no longer 
have citizens. . . . What is needed is a new type of 
social cohesion. Rousseau sets out to show in the Social 
Contract how man's natural freedom can be recreated in civil 
society by attaching each individual to a common goal.
"How to find a form of association which will defend the 
person and goods of each member with the collective farce 
of all, and under which each individual, while uniting 
himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and 
remains as free as before." This is the fundamental 
problem to which the social contract holds the solution.4^
Rousseau claims to have viewed his task in this light:
"What is the nature of the government best fitted to 
create the most virtuous, the most enlightened, the 
wisest, and, in fact, the best people, taking the word 
'best' in its highest sense?" I believed that I saw a 
close relationship between that question and another, 
very nearly though not quite the same: "What is the gov­
ernment which by its nature always adheres closest to the laW ?-44
The law, it becomes clear in the Social Contract, is 
the general will, described by Rousseau as a law that a 
people, meaning each member, gives to itself. This is the 
answer to his rhetorical question, "By what inconceivable art
4^The First and Second Discourses (First), p. 59.
4^The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI: 60. 
44Confessions, IX: 377.
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has a means been found of making men free by making them 
subject. . . ?"4J*
Morality or slavery
The analysis of the general will is complicated at 
almost every turn by the abstract, utopian nature of much of 
Rousseau's thinking. His proneness to speculate in isola­
tion from imperfect reality is illustrated by the concep­
tion of slavery which is implied in his famous remark that 
"man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains."46
According to Rousseau's definition, slavery entails 
"absolute dominion for one party and absolute obedience for 
the other." It means that "you take away all freedom of the 
will" from the weaker party.47 On 'the basis of this def­
inition, one may ask if there has ever been a genuine case 
of slavery. Is there in the real world an example of a 
relationship in which one person has total power over 
another? The subjugated person, it would seem, never, short 
of death, completely loses the freedom to defy his oppressor
46Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Political 
Economy in The Social Contract and Discourses, intro, and 
trans.by G. D. H. Cole (New York: E, P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 
1950), p. 293 (hereinafter referred to as Political Economy).
46The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. Is 49.
47Ibid., bk. I, ch. IV i 55.
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in thought or deed. In the extreme case, he can accept 
death rather than submission to another will. Where slavery 
is concerned, the master has got only limited power. If he 
wants to get any work out of the slave or avoid his hatred, 
he must be willing to give some consideration to his needs 
and wishes. In the real world, in other words, there is 
even in a slave-master relationship an element of "reciproc­
ity" and "mutual obligation," a recognition of "rights,"
A qsomething which Rousseau rules out by definition: "The
words 'slavery' and 'right' are contradictory, they cancel
49each other out."
The same abstract way of thinking marks Rousseau's 
criticism of "the right of the strongest." Surely, that 
principle cannot be the basis for obedience to political 
authority, he believes. Such authority, if it is to be 
legitimate, must be based on the free consent of the gov­
erned. "Force," he argues, "is a physical power? I do not 
see how its effects could produce morality. To yield to
C  Qforce is an act of necessity, not of will. . . . one of 
the many problems with this statement is Rousseau's artific­
ially narrow conception of what constitutes "force" in human
^The social Contract, bk. I, ch. IV: 55.
49Ibid., p. 58.
50Ibid., bk. I, ch. Ill: 52.
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relationships. He ignores such intangible but nevertheless 
very important sources of power as intelligence, beauty, and 
"charisma." We have already questioned the idea that yield­
ing to force is ever a "necessity." Implied in this discus­
sion of right, however, is a notion of even greater impor­
tance, namely that all legitimate political authority must 
rest on pure morality. Right has nothing to do with force, 
says Rousseau. Morality is what it is regardless of the 
power of disputing individuals.
But Rousseau is discussing the basis for a lawful 
political order. What about actual legal rights as we know 
them in society? Are they not, in part at least, the result 
of a balancing of political power, a result of compromise 
under the guidance of more or less enlightened self-interest? 
It would seem that an adjustment to "force," in the expanded 
sense of non-moral influence, is an almost unavoidable 
ingredient in all legislation. In his discussion of polit­
ical right Rousseau simply rules out that laws might derive 
some legitimacy from compromise between the various powers 
that be. For political authority to be acceptable it must 
rest on morality alone. This, he believes, can be achieved 
by a social contract which is entered into freely on a basis 
of equality. It substitutes "a moral and lawful equality
139
for whatever physical inequality that nature may have Imposed 
51on mankind."
Rousseau defines "right" and "force" in such an 
unrealistic way that no really legitimate state can be said 
to have ever existed, and so that the true state he envis­
ions must of necessity be a utopia, an ideal which flies in 
the face of historical experience. Political legitimacy he 
views as synonymous with morality, as he understands i t .1
The "head" makes Rousseau admit that even in the 
state founded on the social contract it is possible that an 
immoral popular will, the will of all, which is presumably 
based on mere "force," will sometimes challenge the general 
will. But the "heart" does not relinquish control. It 
prevents Rousseau from seeing that as a practical matter it 
may be necessary to give some political recognition to what 
he dismisses as the will of all. He assumes the existence 
of a popular will which is an expression of pure morality, 
and as such it alone deserves any consideration. We have 
argued before that no civilized state can be built on motives 
of mere selfishness, however sophisticated. Yet, given 
human nature as it is known in real life, it appears 
inescapable that a balancing of conflicting interests will
53The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. IX: 68.
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always be a fundamental need in politics. Rousseau is 
relieved by his utopian frame of mind from confronting and 
dealing with this important issue. The choice for him is 
clear-cut: morality or slavery.
The rebirth of natural freedom
But a utopian slant does not automatically render an 
idea in political philosophy worthless. It may still offer 
a valid standard for judging imperfect reality and thus a 
sound inspiration for political change. We need to decide 
whether Rousseau's concept of the general will falls in that 
category.
The general will is the result of an act of associa­
tion, in which each individual voluntarily gives up his nat­
ural freedom. The articles of association, Rousseau writes, 
"are reducible to a 3ingle one, namely the total alienation 
by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole 
community." Rousseau is emphatic in his point that "every 
individual gives himself absolutely" so that he can no 
longer claim any rights whatever.^2 Through the social con­
tract his rights are transferred to the collective as epit­
omized in the general will. The latter becomes the inalien­
^2The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI: 60.
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able and indivisible sovereign. Rousseau speaks of the
appearance of "an artificial and collective body" which
"acquires its unity, its common ego [moi commun], its life 
53and its will." He calls this organism, "resembling that 
of man,"^4 "the public person."^5 It is
. . .  a moral being possessed of a will; and this gen­
eral will, which tends always to the preservation and 
welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the 
source of the laws, constitutes for all members of the 
State, in their relations to one another and to it, the 
rule of what is just or unjust. . . .56
By his participation in this will the individual 
attains social freedom. "The public person," Rousseau con­
tends, is completely free, for "it would be against the very
nature of a political body for the sovereign to set over
57itself a law which it could not infringe." The sovereign 
is itself the Law.
Through the ingenious postulation of a "public per­
son, " made up of each of the citizens and governed by a will 
which is by definition moral and free, Rousseau has recreated 
in a social cast the natural freedom which man has lost. It
53Ibid., p. 61.
^ Political Economy, p. 289.
^ The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI: 61.
^ Political Economy, pp. 289-90.
57The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VII: 62.
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should be noted that in their international relations each
* » « C Q"public person" is in the state of nature. By his partic­
ipation in the collective will of the people, the individual 
is at the same time totally subjugated to a unifying polit­
ical authority and his own master, for the general will
grows out of a will in each person, and "obedience to a law
59one prescribes to oneself is freedom." The individual 
need not fear a misuse of power by the sovereign, for a body
i
cannot wish to injure one of its own members.
In the civil society which is established by the soc­
ial contract, Rousseau argues, human actions become guided 
by justice and acquire "the moral quality" they did not have 
in the state of nature. Where before man was ruled by mere 
instincts, primary among them self-love and pity, he now has 
the use of the developed faculties of man as a creature of 
society, including reason. These together make for a social 
consciousness previously lacking. Through the social con­
tract, so we may interpret Rousseau's thinking, these fac­
ulties are put at the disposal of man's natural inclinations 
to produce a general elevation of the spirit. There appears 
a sense of duty and right. In the words of John Charvet,
58Political Economy, p. 290.
59The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. vllls 65.
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"the new social consciousness is founded on nature, but at
60the same time completes it."
It should be injected that also in the Social Contract 
Rousseau is vacillating between a chronological and concep­
tual analysis, without ever removing the ambiguity. In his 
discussion of the social contract he claims to be speaking
of "the passing from the state of nature to the civil soci- 
6Xety." Yet, he is positing that the contracting individ­
uals already possess the social consciousness which is also 
alleged to be the result of a social existence.
What is it about the social contract that makes it 
possible to avoid the degeneration that has afflicted histor­
ical societies? A crucial factor is that it is based on 
equality:
. . . the social pact, far from destroying natural 
equality, substitutes, on the contrary, a moral and law­
ful equality for whatever physical inequality that 
nature may have imposed on mankind; so that however 
unequal in strength and intelligence, men become equal 
by covenant and by right.62
60John Charvet, "Individual Identity and Social Con­
sciousness in Rousseau's philosophy," in Hobbes and Rousseau, 
ed. by Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City: 
Anchor Books, 1972), p. 476 (hereinafter referred to as 
"Rousseau's Philosophy").
•̂*"fhe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VIII: 64.
62Ibid., bk. I, ch. IX: 68.
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It will be remembered that according to Rousseau it 
was the appearance of inequality through the idea of prop­
erty that gave rise to the perversion of natural self-love 
into vanity and other hinds of depravity. These are symp­
tomatic of a lack of identification with others. This may 
be avoided in society, Rousseau believes, by creating the
circumstances under which self-love, which i3 "always good.
63always in accordance with the order of nature," can, as it
were, come into its own again. "Extend self-love to others
and it is transformed into virtue, a virtue which has its
64root in the heart of every one of us." Under the social 
contract self-love becomes a powerful moral force, for the 
citizens "all pledge themselves under the same conditions 
and must all enjoy the same rights." These conditions of 
equality, including an absence of relations of dependence, 
make possible the identification of each citizen with all 
others. Together with natural pity, so we may interpret 
Rousseau's meaning, self-love inspires a strong sense of 
social belonging. This new type of identification, which is 
made possible by the development of man's faculties and 
associated by Rousseau with morality, can be said to be
63Emile, bk. IV: 174.
64Ibid., p. 215.
65The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV: 76.
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"founded on nature insofar as the love of others follows 
from and is a completion of one's natural self-love (amour 
de soi). 1,88
It is important for the proper understanding of the
general will to be aware of the role that Rousseau ascribes
to self-love. The love of mankind is "nothing but the love
ft 7of justice within us," he points out in the Emile. This
love of justice, let it be carefully noted, is rooted in
man's primordial instincts. In an illuminating footnote
essential to grasping Rousseau's conception of morality, he
writes: "The love of others, springing from self-love, is
68the source of human justice." The same idea is expressed
in the Social Contract;
How should it be that the general will is always right­
ful and that all men constantly wish the happiness of 
each but for the fact that there is no one who does not 
take that word "each" to pertain to himself and in 
voting for all think of himself?
Morality, in other words, is a social version of pri­
vate self-love by way of an identification with others. When 
one remembers that self-love in the state of nature is 
essentially a wish for physical self-preservation, it is not
88Charvet, "Rousseau's Philosophy," p. 478.
67Emile, bk. IV: 215.
68Ibid., p. 197 n.
k^The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
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surprising to find that in several places in the Social Con­
tract and elsewhere Rousseau formulates the goal of the 
state in terms of mutual protection. If you look for the 
motives which make men unite themselves in civil societies, 
he writes, "you will find no other motive than that of assur­
ing the property, life, and liberty of each member by the 
protection of a l l . W e  shall return, however, to the 
moral implications of his notion of self-love.
While there is abundant evidence for viewing the gen­
eral will as a collective, "extended" version of man's nat- 
utal inclinations, it is clear that it is not simply some 
enlargement of self-love and pity as they appear in the 
state of nature. The general will emerges in a social con­
text, where man has been transformed from a "narrow, stupid 
animal" into a "creature of intelligence and a man." It
benefits from conditions under which man's different fac-
71ulties are "exercized and developed." We may view the
general will as the result of putting these faculties at the
disposal of man's true nature. Deriving their propelling
force from man's original inclinations, they are rescued
from becoming the tools of degeneracy and instead become 
constitutive elements of a wholly moral political will.
^Political Economy, p. 293.
7Lfhe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VIII: 65.
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Not only does the general will occur in a social 
environment, it speaks about social problems. Projected 
through the prism of social life, man's original inclination 
towards what is good is applied to a whole new range of con­
cerns and possibilities. To Rousseau falls the task of show­
ing what is conduct according to nature under these circum­
stances. About that subject we shall have more to say.
Individualistic collectivism
It is assumed by Rousseau that the general will is
not some sectional, particularistic, arbitrary expression of
opinion. On the contrary, it is .the very principle by which
morality is defined. In spite of that, Rousseau frequently
speaks of the general will as a mere aggregation or harmony
of "private interests."
It is what is common to those different interests which 
yields the social bond; if there were no point on which 
separate interests coincided, then society could not 
conceivably exist. And it is precisely on the basis of 
this common interest that society must be governed.72
Speaking of the "individual desires" of the citizens,
Rousseau asserts that "if we take away from these same wills,
the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, the sum
of the difference is the general will."73 The same emphasis
72Ibid., bk. II, ch. I: 69.
73Ibid., bk. II, ch. Ill: 72-73.
on numbers marks his contention that for the general will to
74be truly general "all the votes must be counted." Referring 
to the proposals of the lawgiver, but laying down a general 
principle, Rousseau maintains that "there can be no assur­
ance that an individual will is in conformity with the gen­
eral will until it has submitted to the free suffrage of the 
people."75 In another context he states without equivoca­
tion: "Any law which the people has not ratified in person 
is void; it is not law at all."75 The clear implication is 
that the general will does not exist apart from an actual 
vote in the popular assembly. The element of egalitarian 
individualism in Rousseau's thought becomes even more 
evident in his example of the state with ten thousand cit­
izens. In this state, he argues, each person has got only 
a "ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority.1,77 These 
and similar statements in the Social Contract and other 
works would seem to indicate that the general will results 
from some sort of cancelling, out of extreme or abnormal 
opinions and an addition of the remaining private interests
74Ibid., bk II, ch. II: 70 n.
75Ibid., bk. II, ch. VII: 86.
76Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XV: 141.
77Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. I, 103.
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of the citizens. But if the general will is transcendent of 
all particular wills, one may ask, why all this talk of pri­
vate interests, numbers, and ratifications in person?
While it is evident that there is a strong connection 
between Rousseau's egalitarian individualism and his idea of 
the general will, he concedes that absolute authority cannot 
be claimed for just any numerical majority. It should be 
clear, he writes, that "the general will derives its gen­
erality less from the number of voices than from the common
78interest which unites them." And although he never devel­
ops the idea with consistency and clarity, he hints at a 
basic opposition between private interests and the general 
will in his distinction of the latter from the will of all:
". . . the general will studies only the common interest
while the will of all studies private interest, and is 
indeed no more than the sum of individual d e s i r e s . T h i s  
passage, however, is immediately followed by the sentence 
previously quoted, which describes the general will as the 
result of a process of cancelling out and addition of partic­
ular wills.
Rousseau is trying, on the one hand, to present the 
general will as an absolute standard and, on the other hand,
78ibid., bk. II, ch. IV: 76.
?9lbid., bk. II, ch. Ill: 72.
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to make it somehow dependent on the assent of the individual 
as a separate entity. The closest he comes to joining these 
two perspectives, it may be gathered from his partially con­
tradictory statements, is the belief that under certain cir­
cumstances majority assent serves to confirm a will that is 
somehow latent in the people, but actually manifested as the 
general will only in a vote by the popular assembly. Such a 
rendering of his thought does not remove, but only restates, 
the basic ambiguity.
One important cause of Rousseau's difficulty is that 
he does not conceive of man as by nature a social being.
Man by himself, he believes, "is entirely complete and sol­
i t a r y . T h e  general will, therefore, could not be the 
structuring principle of man's essential nature. It must be 
some kind of addition, extension, or merging of individual­
ity. Man's social nature has to be created from this core.
Rousseau writes: "The constitution of a man is the work of
81nature; that of the state is the work of artifice." Elab­
orating on this theme, he argues:
If it is good to know how to deal with men as they are, 
it is much better to make them what there is need that 
they should be. The most absolute authority is that 
which penetrates into a man's inmost being, and concerns
80Ibid., bk. II, ch. VII: 84.
81Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XI: 135.
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itself no less with his will than with his actions. It 
is certain that all peoples become in the long run what 
the government makes them. . . . Make men, therefore, 
if you would command men: if you would have them obed­
ient to the laws, make them love the laws, and then they 
will need only to know what is their duty to do it.®
The general will, we are forced to believe, is not a 
pre-existing, universal principle or even a sense of polit­
ical direction somehow derived from such a principle, but a 
standard that is made. As Rousseau says in the Social Con­
tract, it is a law that man gives himself. What rescues 
Rousseau from the accusation of complete arbitrariness is 
his attempt to base the general will on what is good by 
nature. It has moral authority, he believes, because it 
springs from the individual's original inclinations.
The general Will and representation
One of the most noteworthy elements of Rousseau's
argument in the Social Contract is the sharp distinction
between the legislative and executive function in the state.
According to him all legislative authority belongs to the
general will which "must be general in its purpose as well
as in its nature . . . and should spring from all and apply 
83to all." The general will "cannot relate to any partic-
82Political Economy, pp. 297-98.
83The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
84ular object." The application of general rules to specific 
cases falls to the executive power, which Rousseau variously 
calls the government, the magistrates, or the prince. The 
executive function is completely subject to the sovereign 
general will. While the legislative power must be exercised 
in a democratic fashion with all the citizens participating 
in the vote, executive decisions can be entrusted, depending 
on the circumstances, to a single magistrate, which Rousseau 
calls monarchy, just a few, which he names aristocracy, or 
the citizens as a whole, which is what he gives the name 
democracy.
Rousseau's insistence on a sharp distinction between 
the executive and legislative, it may be argued, is syptoma- 
tic of a basic philosophical confusion involving an attempt 
to set up as absolute a political standard which is in fact 
much less than universal. We may expose some of that confu­
sion by analyzing his view of representation.
As far as the legislative function is concerned 
Rousseau flatly rejects the idea of representation. It is 
ruled out by the very nature of the general will. "Sov­
ereignty cannot be represented, for the same reason that it 
cannot be alienated; its essence is the general will, and
84Ibid., bk. II, ch. VI: 81.
will cannot be represented— either it is the general will or
85xt is something else. . . ." And he goes on to say:
"Since the law is nothing other than a declaration of the 
general will, it is clear that there cannot be representa­
tion of the people in the legislative power. . . ."86 in a 
famous illustration of his meaning Rousseau disputes the 
claim of the English people to be free. In reality, he 
points out, it is free only when it elects members of the 
Parliament. . .as soon as the Members are elected, the
people is enslaved. . . ."87
Rousseau's hostility to representation is further 
evidence of the view that the general will is inseparable 
from actual popular decisions. If it did transcend them and 
could be known by men individually, there would be a pos­
sibility of legislators representing the citizenry. Having 
ruled this out, Rousseau still does not face the problem 
that each single person can hardly be present for every vote 
in the assembly. Also, those who are yet too young to be 
members will be affected by laws that are passed by it. If 
this apparent violation of Rousseau's rule that laws must




"spring from all and apply to a l l "88 is not to nullify all 
actual legislation, it would seem that those not participa­
ting in the vote must somehow be represented b y  those pres­
ent in the assembly.
Curiously, Rousseau drops his emphatic opposition to 
representation in his discussion of the executive function 
of the state: " . . .  there may and should be such representa­
tion in the executive power, which is only the instrument 
for applying the law.1,88 To understand the importance to 
Rousseau's thought of the distinction between legislative 
and executive we need to look closer at his idea of general 
laws and particular applications.
Rousseau's notion of general laws, i.e., of manifesta­
tions of the general will, is extremely difficult to pin 
down. The reason is the tension produced in his thought by 
his attempt to join together to the point of identification 
what cannot be joined completely, if at all, namely the 
absolute standard of morality, on the one hand, and expres­
sions of political will, on the other. Vaguely aware that 
the ultimate principle of right and wrong cannot simply be 
identified with specific political acts, but at the same
88Ibid., bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
89Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XV: 142.
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time anxious to present the will of the majority of the 
people as the final standard of morality, he is led to con­
ceive of the laws passed by the general will in a highly 
abstract manner.
For a legislative act to be truly a law, Rousseau argues,
the matter it deals with must be "as general as the will
90which makes it.1 The idea is explained further in his 
statement that
. . .every act of sovereignty, that is every authentic act of 
the general will, binds or favours all the citizens 
equally, so that the sovereign recognizes only the whole 
body of the nation and makes no distinction between any 
of the members who compose it.9-*-
As if this standard were not difficult enough to
apply to real political life, he points out that "the law
considers all subjects collectively and all actions in the 
92abstract." Negatively stated, the general will "loses its
natural rectitude when it is directed towards any particular
93and circumscribed object."
It may be asked what a-law would be like which does 
not favor or disfavor any citizen, but deals identically
90Ibid., bk. II, ch. Vis 81.
91Ibid., bk. II, ch. IV: 76.
92Ibid., bk. II, ch. VI: 82.
93Ibid., bk. II, ch. IV: 75.
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with all of them. It should be noted that Rousseau is not 
just talking about a law that is inspired by a selfless, 
sincere commitment to the common good, but about one that 
actually "binds or favours all the citizens equally." Can 
such a piece of legislation be imagined? Barring the pos­
tulation of complete equality, including removal of all 
individual uniqueness and differences of circumstance, it 
would seem to be impossible. Not surprisingly, whenever 
Rousseau offers concrete examples of genuine laws, he 
appears to compromise his principle of generality rather 
severely.
According to Rousseau the sovereign does not have the
right to "impose greater burdens on one subject than on 
94.another." That would seem to rule out even broadly for­
mulated laws of the type that "all able-bodied men shall be 
liable to induction into military service," or that "all 
shall be taxed according to a certain rate." Clearly, even 
such laws would be more of a burden on some people than on 
others. Still, in regard to taxes Rousseau lays down the 
basic rule that they should depend on "a general will, 
decided by vote of a majority, and on the basis of a propor­
tional rating which leaves nothing arbitrary in the imposi-
94Ibid., bk. II, ch. IV:77.
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tion of the tax."®® Whether arbitrary or not, it is any­
thing but self-evident that the principle of proportionality 
affects "all the citizens equally." Indeed, it is difficult 
to see how any one rate of taxation could accomplish this 
goal. It is worthy of note that Rousseau even gives his 
support to the idea of taxes as a "fine." Heavy taxes 
should be laid, he thinks, "on all that multiplicity of 
objects of luxury, amusement, and idleness, which strike the 
eyes of all."®® Although it is not entirely clear whether 
he regards punitive taxes as a matter of legislation or just 
an executive application of legislative authority, the exam­
ple only makes explicit the unavoidable element of discrim­
ination in all actual laws. So long as no two individuals 
are identical and live under identical circumstances,- laws, 
however "general" in formulation, will affect them dif­
ferently. Not only that, no two members of a popular assem­
bly will be able to conceive of the meaning and consequences 
of a proposed law in the same way. Generality in the strict 
sense is threatened from both directions.
In a discussion of actual pieces of legislation 
Rousseau cannot but infuse his concept of generality with
^ P o l i t i c a l  Economy, p. 320. In the Social Contract 
Rousseau has some reservations about taxation, preferring 
instead "compulsory service." Bk. Ill, ch. XV:140.
^ Political Economy, p. 328.
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various kinds of particularity. By definition, a civil law 
cannot affect all equally. It discriminates in favor of a 
certain state of affairs. To speak of a law without any 
bias for or against individuals or groups is to speak of a 
pure abstraction, which does not become any more meaningful 
because allegedly a manifestation of pure morality. In its 
implied disregard for the uniqueness of individuals and cir­
cumstances, Rousseau's notion of the generality of law calls 
to mind Kant's famous ethical rule that we should always act 
in such a way that the principle of our action could become 
the standard for universal legislation. Both have a dis­
embodied quality growing out of abstract egalitarian assump­
tions at odds with infinitely diverse human reality.
We are arguing, then, that all legislation is adjusted 
to special circumstances and directed towards a particular 
end. When Rousseau writes, for instance, that some laws in 
the state will have to be designed specifically to meet the 
needs of a certain country, he is revealing an element of 
particularity which is necessarily present in some form, not 
only in every law, but in every human act. The generality 
of law, in other words, is not a distinct philosophical cat­
egory, but a matter of more or less on a continuum.
But if legislation has in it always a measure of 
particularity and application to special circumstances, it
159
cannot be sharply distinguished from executive acts. The 
philosophical artificiality of this division becomes the 
more apparent the more one considers concrete examples. Take, 
for instance, a popular assembly which appropriates money 
for some public project. Is it exercising legislative 
authority, or has it assumed an executive function? Needless 
to say, one could give examples of decisions with more of a 
"legislative" slant and less of an "executive" slant, and 
vice versa. The point is that it would not involve a jump 
from one philosophically distinct category of political 
action to another, but only a movement along a sliding scale.
Rousseau's purpose is to establish the absolute 
authority of the general will of the people. To accomplish 
that he needs to keep it untainted by all apparent arbitrar­
iness and particularism. He is sufficiently under the 
influence of the classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition 
not to make an easy identification of pure morality, even as 
he understands it, with specific political acts. He sug­
gests a fundamental difference between the general will as 
such and the multiplicity of particular applications. Hence 
his distinction between the sovereign and the "government."
. . . executive power cannot belong to the generality of 
the people as legislative or sovereign, since executive 
power is exercised only in particular acts which are 
outside the province of law and therefore outside the
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province of the sovereign which can act only to make 
laws.97
The introduction of this distinction places Rousseau 
in an impossible position. In so far as he wants to preserve 
the generality, and thus the morality, of the general will, 
he is forced to make of it a meaningless abstraction, and in 
so far as he wants to present it as a real, positive force 
in politics dealing with concrete matters, it loses its gen­
erality.
Rousseau is not satisfied, as is Plato and Aristotle 
and their Christian counterparts, with envisioning the pos­
sibility of politics as participation in the ethical purpose 
of life. He wants morality to be manifested to the full in 
the state, in the sovereign people. The theoretical result, 
his notion of the general will, must be regarded as an adul­
teration of the genuine standard of morality and the absolu- 
tization of a political principle which is far from univer­
sal. If a law is truly general in the strict sense of 
transcending all particular circumstances, it cannot also be 
a civil law or a political will, be it legislative, however 
"general,*1 or an executive application of legislative author­
ity; and if it is a manifestation of immanent reality, it is 
that much less than universal and absolute. Rousseau1s wish
97The Social Contract, bk. Ill, ch. 1:101.
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to invest the collective will of the people with unlimited 
authority and freedom prevents him from seeing that with 
reference to the real standard of morality tooth legislative 
and executive acts could only be imperfect applications to 
particular circumstances. Proceeding on the premise that 
man is naturally good, neither is he held bach toy a recogni­
tion that the ability of the state to play a moral role is 
severely circumscribed toy the inherent weakness of human 
nature.
Rousseau's hostility to the idea of representation is 
directed not only against the narrowly political concept. It 
derives from his unwillingness to accept an ethical principle 
which might restrain political authority and leave men an 
appeal beyond the decisions of the state. As will toe dis­
cussed further, his notion of morality in the Social Con­
tract is indistinguishable from a wish to secure the com­
plete unity of the political order. This unity would be 
threatened by the admission that politics is at best only an 
attempt to represent a standard above all particular soci­
eties and particular wills. The moral authority of the 
state, he thinks, must be under no suspicion.
The rejection of constitutionalism
The same unwillingness to place politics under a high­
er law is reflected in Rousseau's emphatic denunciation of
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constitutionalism. 11. . . the supreme authority can no more 
be modified than it can be alienated; to limit it is to des­
troy it. It is absurd and self-contradictory that the sov-
QQereign should give itself a superior. . . using the
analogy of an individual person he asserts that "it is
absurd that anyone should wish to bind himself for the 
99future." The same holds true for an entire state: . . it
would be against the very nature of a political body for the
sovereign to set over itself a law which it could not
infringe. Rousseau's usual abhorrence of constraint
translates into the idea that the people should always be
completely free to alter its laws. "Yesterday's law is not
binding today," he writes.'1'0  ̂ He even goes so far as to say
that if the people chooses "to do itself an injury', who has
102the right to prevent it from doing so?" So concerned is
he with laying down the absolute freedom of the sovereign 
that he forgets that he has already defined the general will 
in such a way that it could not yield an injurious decision.
According to Rousseau, it is an advantage from the 
standpoint of securing respect for laws if they acquire the
"ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XVI:144.
"ibid., bk. II, ch. 1:70.
100Ibid., bk. I, ch. VII:62.
101Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XI:135.
102Ibid., bk. II, ch. XII:99.
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dignity of age. Still, constitutional rules which cannot be 
as easily changed as other laws are expressly forbidden. 
Setting down what would appear ironically to be a more rigid 
and fundamental provision than any constitutional require­
ment, he proclaims that at the opening of each assembly the 
people must be asked if it pleases them to maintain the 
present form of government. " . . .  there is not in the
state any fundamental law which may not be revoked, not even
1 0 1 •the social pact. . . . "  It is difficult not to suspect a
strong connection between this view and Rousseau's pervasive
autobiographical theme, "I love liberty? I hate embarrass-
104ment, worry, and constraint."
We have already noted that there is in Rousseau's 
thinking a pronounced majoritarian tendency. What is right, 
he claims, becomes revealed by majority vote, provided that 
those voting be properly informed about the issue at hand, 
that they make up their own minds and are not affected by 
any sectional interests. When the majority has spoken, the 
minority cannot legitimately persist in its views and try to 
convert the majority, for it has now been proven wrong. 
Presumably, it should immediately give up its mistaken, self­
ish opinions. Indeed, since there is in politics only a
103Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XVIII:148.
^•^Con f ess ions, bk. 1:46.
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wholly right and a wholly wrong, there would seem to be no 
reason why the state should tolerate opposition. In view of 
Rousseau's prohibition against all "sectional associations," 
it is difficult to see how any effective, organized opposi­
tion could exist.
Rousseau makes no allowance for the possibility that 
even under the most favorable conditions of abundant informa­
tion and public-spiritedness the majority might only imper­
fectly express the general will. 'That recognition would 
point to the need for constitutional provisions designed to 
bring out the best in its opinions and restrain what is not 
worthy of public implementation. But Rousseau does not, and 
cannot if he is to preserve his concept of the general will,
concede the existence of any political shades or nuances.
105". . . either the will is general or it is not. . . . "  
Differences of opinion in the state must fall in a black- 
and-white category.
Rousseau's sense of realism does interfere with the 
easy flow of his thought. He admits that in practice the 
majority may not always be right. By inference, the minor­
ity is not always wrong. In the face of the danger that the 
will of all dethrone the rightful popular will, one might
^^The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. 11:70.
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expect that Rousseau would give at least some serious
thought to placing constitutional restrictions on the
momentary freedom of the majority. If the general will does
indeed express the permanent, common interest of the people,
it would seem that its public implementation would not be
hurt by having the wishes of the majority filtered through
a system of institutional checks by means of which they
could prove their quality as the enduring popular will. It
would appear logical that Rousseau should also lay down some
practical guidelines for restraining a powerful minority,
which, claiming to speak for the general will, might try to
usurp the role of the majority. But he speaks only of an
"obligation on the minority to accept the decision of the 
106majority." That, in the absence of any constitutional
guarantees supported by a tradition of constitutional moral­
ity, is scant protection against the possibility of tyranny. 
That this type of threat is real enough is evidenced by 
innumerable examples in world history, and particularly 
well, in modern times, by communist parties which claim to 
embody the true will, not only of a particular people, but
of mankind as represented by the proletariat.
Some further examples in Rousseau's thinking of a 
seemingly inexorable movement in the direction of constitu-
106Ibid., bk. I, ch. V:59.
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tionalism which is never completed but suddenly reversed
might be cited. "By themselves the people always will what
is good, but by themselves they do not always discern it,"
Rousseau writes. He also speaks of the people as a "blind 
107multitude." This assessment would seem to point directly 
towards putting some legal checks on their will and having 
popular representatives articulate theii interests. But 
these rather deprecating remarks describe the people only
i
prior to the establishment of the new political order. Yet,
also in the state founded on the social contract, as we have
seen, Rousseau envisions some difficulties. He is deeply
concerned about the danger that the executive might usurp
the authority of the sovereign. To protect against such
abuse, Rousseau prescribes "fixed and periodic assemblies
108which nothing can abolish or prorogue. . . . "  But
although this and other institutional provisions in the 
Social Contract would appear to be unconditional and more 
fundamental than any law, they are never coupled with sugges­
tions for constitutional protection of the arrangements in 
question. Not even the laws provided by the lawgiver, which 
found the new political order, are to receive any such sanc­
tion. In a passage which brings Rousseau perilously close
107Ibid., bk. II, ch. VI:83.
108Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XIII:137.
to the forbidden idea, he writes: "It is true that . . . one 
should never touch an established government unless it has
I QQbecome incompatible with the public welfare. . . . a s
though aware of the constitutional implications of this 
position, Rousseau hastens to add that "such circumspection 
is a precept of politics and not a rule of law."^® Nothing 
must stop the people from making whatever changes it wants 
at any time. Significantly, Rousseau is assuming that it 
would never occur to the citizens of the new state to pro­
tect the general will against the immoral will of all by 
means of constitutional rules. Apparently the sovereign 
needs and wants complete freedom of movement. Even an 
attempt to restrain illegitimate political wishes would dan­
gerously circumscribe the ability of the general will to 
manifest itself.
To the extent that there lingers in Rousseau's 
thought echoes of the old western dualistic view of human 
nature with its rather pessimistic assessment of man's 
capacity to rise above his lower inclinations, he is pushed 
in the direction of accepting some form of constitutionalism. 
But always the basic utopian thrust of his thinking reasserts
109Ibid., bk. Ill, ch. XVIII:147.
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itself. Inspired by his "heart," he takes it for granted
that somehow, without any constitutional guarantees, the
institutional arrangements which he prescribes will not only
be established but respected and the general will actually
expressed by the majority. This assumption goes contrary to
what Rousseau himself recognizes as the historical record.
It is little more than a hope. Indeed, the importance that
Rousseau ascribes to propaganda and other forms of moulding
public opinion does not indicate that even in the state
based on the social contract the articulation of the general
. H Iwill is going to be automatic.
The spontaneity of the moral will
Rousseau's refusal in spite of the mentioned complica­
tions to subject the will.of the majority to any form of 
restraint is finally explained by his belief that what is 
good in man is manifested spontaneously. The problem with 
which he deals in the Social Contract is how the circum­
stances can be created under which this impulsive goodness 
will be released. Man needs to be liberated from all
Ulsee Rousseau's discussion of the fourth kind of 
law in The Social contract, bk. II, ch. XII and bk. IV, ch. VIH. 
The need for propaganda and careful supervision of public 
opinion is discussed also in Politics and the Arts: Letter 
to D'Alembert on the Theatre, trans. with notes and intro, by 
Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968) and in 
The Government of Poland, trans. with notes and intro, by 
Willmoore Kendall (NewYork: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1972).
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artificial motives which pervert and lock in his true nature.
1 1 9Wherever necessary he must "be forced to be free." But
while constraint may sometimes be required to unfetter man1s 
natural inclinations, no limits must be put on that spon­
taneity once it has been restored to its rightful place as 
the guide of human behavior.
According to Rousseau the citizen who is to vote in
the assembly should "make up his own mind for himself
n 113Cn'opine que d'apres luij." We may interpret this to mean
in part that he should shut himself out from all alien 
influences and listen only to his own heart. Open to his 
natural inclinations he is in a position to respond morally 
to the issues that are put to him. The general will, adding 
or merging the spontaneous wish of all individuals so 
inspired, also becomes directed towards what is good by 
nature.
The view that man's first impulse is good is affirmed 
over and over again in Rousseau's writings. One of his most 
appreciative commentators, Ernst Cassirer, observes:
. even the ethical conscience remained for Rousseau a 
kind of 'instinct'— for it is not based simply upon reflec­
tive cogitation but springs from a spontaneous impulse.
H 2 >rhe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VII:64.
H 3Ibid., bk. XI, ch. II±:73.
il4Cas sirer, Question, p. 109.
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In the Emile Rousseau writes that "the first impulses of the 
heart give rise to the first stirrings of conscience.1 He 
goes on to say that
. . .justice and kindness are no mere abstract terms, no mere 
motal conceptions framed by the understanding, but true 
affections of the heart enlightened by reason, the nat­
ural outcome of our primitive affections. ̂ 5
His belief in the spontaneous goodness of man is evidenced
also in his autobiographical writings:
. . .  I am perfectly sure that my heart loves only that 
which is good. All the evil I ever did in my life was 
the result of reflection; and the little good I have 
been able to do was the result of impulse.116
The examples of his identification of morality with spon­
taneity, and of vice with constraint and second thoughts, 
could be multiplied. This is hardly surprising. If one 
believes, as Rousseau does, that man is good by nature and 
evil somehow alien to his essential being, it is only log­
ical to believe that what issues forth from man without the 
interference of moderating prejudice or reflection is also 
good.
According to a principle of civil law which Rousseau 
cites, "no man is bound by a contract with himself."11  ̂
Expanding on this idea he puts it down as "absurd that any-
116Emile, bk. IV:196.
116QUOted in Cassirer, Question, p. 127. 
117<phe Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VII:62.
118one should wish to bind himself for the future." Using 
his notion of the state as a public person he insists that 
neither can the state be bound by any promises to itself, 
such as constitutional laws. We are confronted here by a 
basic flaw in Rousseau's political philosophy. Is it really 
true that a person is not bound by a contract with himself? 
It is of course always possible for an individual simply to 
disregard such promises. The ability to do so, however, 
does not change the fact that he might be morally bound to 
respect it. Do we not repeatedly make promises of that 
kind? Contrary to Rousseau's ideal for both individual and 
collective life, it would seem that we are continuously 
binding ourselves for the future. It appears that our 
steadiness as moral beings is largely the result of personal 
commitments to behave or not to behave in a certain fashion. 
"I shall not again act in that way!" "I will be intellec­
tually honest." "I have to restrain my selfishness." The 
list of possible promises could be expanded indefinitely. 
Although in a sense free to disregard them, we are often 
morally obligated to respect them. The result of abroga­
ting them is ethical self-condemnation. In an analogous way, 
is it not possible for a people to make promises to itself,
HSlbid., bk. II, ch. 1:70.
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in the form of a constitution,for instance, which it is 
morally obligated to respect?
Under the philosophical theory we have previously 
developed, respect for internal promises in furtherance of 
the goal known in ethical conscience are a necessity, if man 
is to become a reasonably moral being. He will not sponta­
neously move in that direction. On the contrary, he needs 
to put checks on his inclination to act selfishly and 
arbitrarily. Morality is bought at the price of often dif­
ficult self-discipline. Rousseau, by contrast, postulates 
the ontological unity and goodness of human nature. Man 
divided against himself is for him not an irrevocable fact 
of human life, but a crime perpetrated against man by 
conventional society.
It should be remembered in this context that when
Rousseau talks about virtue and justice, he is referring to
phenomena rooted in self-love (amour de soi). The latter
phrase in itself does not invalidate his ethical standard.
The "self" in question might be, not some egotistical will
in man, but a higher, moral principle known by man and at the
same time transcendent of him. Such a dualistic conception
of human nature, however, is in sharp contradiction to
Rousseau's philosophy. His rejection of such a view may be 
illustrated by this important passage, quoted in part
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before, which takes one to the very center of his ethical 
thought:
. . .if the enthusiasm of an overflowing heart iden­
tifies me with my fellow-creature, if I feel so to speak, 
that I will not let him suffer lest I should suffer too,
I care for him because I care for myself, and the reason 
of the precept is found in nature herself, which inspires 
me with the desire for my own welfare wherever I may be. 
Prom this I conclude that it is false to say that the 
precepts of natural law are based on reason only; they 
have a firmer and more solid foundation. The love of 
others, springing from self-love, is the source of human 
justice.
All morality is thus derived from a concern for the 
private ego. And there is in this illuminating statement 
not even a hint to the tension in man between a higher and a 
lower self. There is no recognition that love belongs prop­
erly only to that in ourselves and others which has ethical 
worth, not to the whole of man but to our potential for 
spiritual growth. Rousseau is describing a gush of indis­
criminate sympathy. He sees no need to ask whether the self 
from which it emanates and the self with which the bearer 
identifies in the other person is morally uplifting or 
degrading. It is quite possible, for instance, to sym­
pathize with the wish of a criminal to escape from a prison 
or the wish of a drug addict to get a shot of narcotics, but 
normally such feelings of pity would have nothing to do with
^•^Emile, bk. IV: 197 n.
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morality, but actually stem from and attach to a self which 
is contrary to it. Unwilling to accept moral depravity as 
an inherent human characteristic, Rousseau does not rec­
ognize the urgent need for a discrimination both hard-headed 
and subtle between various inclinations of the human "heart.” 
His view of human nature is monistic, and he regards moral­
ity as immanent in impulse. He assumes that it is defined
by the spontaneous gushing forth of warm feelings, warm
ultimately out of concern for the private ego of the bearer.
To do one's moral duty, the old classical and Judaeo- 
Christian tradition teaches, is frequently a painful, labor­
ious task. It requires repeated interference with our 
spontaneous inclinations. Rousseau takes a sharply dif­
ferent view. He speaks of "the pleasure of fulfilling one's 
duty."^® In the Emile he lets the Savoyard Priest glorify 
the enjoyment of yielding to
. . .the temptation of well-doing. . . .  This temptation is
so natural, so pleasant, that it is impossible always to
resist it? and the thought of the pleasure it has once 
afforded is enough to recall it constantly to our memory.
According to the priest "there is nothing sweeter than vir­
tue." How much real ethical insight is contained in these 
effusive admonitions to "follow the inclinations of our
^^Reveries, VI: 124
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121heart"? They lack an awareness of the division in man 
between a higher and a lower and a recognition that the eth­
ical course of action is usually anything but easy and 
pleasant. Rousseau's notion of the effortlessness and 
pleasure of moral behavior may be contrasted with that of 
Aristotle who argues that to do good man must often do what 
is painful. ". . . it is on account of the pleasure that we 
do .bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain 
from noble o nes."^
When one considers that Rousseau identifies morality
with particular human impulses, it is not difficult to
understand his despairing of a happiness which lasts. "I
doubt if it is known," he writes towards the end of his 
123life. Aristotle's teaching, by contrast, is directed 
precisely towards securing a happiness which endures. Iron­
ically, Rousseau's belief in the intrinsic goodness of human 
nature does not give him the deeper sense of harmony des­
cribed by philosophers less flattering of man.
Just as Rousseau will not hear of an unavoidable divi­
sion in the human soul which makes morality frequently 
dependent on a difficult effort of will, he will not hear of
121Emile. bk. IV:255.
122Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 32 (1104b).
123Reveries, V:112.
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any corresponding ineradicable tension in society which 
threatens political unity. "Everything that destroys social 
unity is worthless," he writes, "and all institutions that 
set man at odds with himself are worthless."124 In this 
statement, which is primarily directed against historical 
Christianity, he is oblivious of the old insight that to be 
at odds with oneself is the very essence of the human predic­
ament. The classical and Judaeo-Christian tradition, too, 
aims for unity and harmony in the individual and society.
It insists, however, that what limited progress is possible 
towards that goal requires continuous moral self-discipline 
by the individual and the support of a strong cultural 
tradition.
The unity of the state
While Rousseau's egalitarian individualism leads to 
the endorsement of universal suffrage, it does not involve a 
recognition of the uniqueness of the person and of that 
uniqueness as an argument for popular participation in pub­
lic decisions. Universal suffrage is for Rousseau primarily 
a means of assuring maximum cohesion in the body politic.
He is not concerned with giving the individual considerable 
freedom to decide his own role in society. That role is to
124The Social Contract, bk. IV, ch. VIII:181.
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be defined by the will of the sovereign, from which the 
individual is to receive "his life and his being."12  ̂ The 
citizens should be "early accustomed to regard their individ­
uality only in its relation to the body of the State, and to 
be aware, so to speak, of their own existence merely as a 
part of that of the State."-*-28
In order for the general will to assert itself, 
Rousseau argues, "there should be no sectional associations 
in the state."^-2  ̂ What he disapproves of is what Robert 
Nisbet calls "autonomous groups," that is, private associa­
tions between the individual and the state with some real 
autonomy protected in law.128 Such associations, Rousseau 
believes, only divert the citizen's attachment from the 
state and thus diminish its authority, a view which may be 
compared to that of Edmund Burke that the source of affec­
tions for the state is our love for the private groups to
i OQwhich we belong.
The social pact gives to the state an "absolute power" 
over its members. As though fearful of the reactions that 
this uncompromising stand might elicit from his contemporaries,
125Ibid., bk. II, ch. VII:84.
i26poiitical Economy, p. 307.
127iphe Social Contract, bk. II, ch. 111:73.
128See Nisbet, Community and Power.
129surke, Reflections, p. 193.
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Rousseau inconsistently gives his assurances that limita­
tions on the power of the state are built into the general 
will itself. The individual needs to give up to the state 
only so much of his power, goods, and liberty which is "the 
concern of the community." He immediately adds, however,
that "the sovereign alone is judge of what is of such con- 
130cern,” which, in the absence of constitutional restraints, 
is leaving the definition to the majority of the moment.
Popular suffrage can be regarded as among other 
things a practical guarantee against the state violating the 
higher mission Which belongs to each individual and which 
can be determined in the end only by the individual, since 
as a uniquely endowed person he alone can know to what kind 
of life he is called by ethical conscience. While in 
Rousseau's thought the individual person derives his entire 
existence from the will of the political sovereign, that 
view implies that the role of each human being is ultimately 
defined with reference to a standard transcendent of all 
political authority. The state can be considered truly 
legitimate only to the extent that it respects and promotes 
the ability of the citizens to realize the goal known in 
ethical conscience. Since the latter pulls men in the 
direction of a common center, this principle is not an
13QThe Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV:74.
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invitation to anarchy, but it does place the state under a 
higher authority by which it can be judged and, as it were, 
humbled.
This notion is contrary to Rousseau's political 
thought. Always anxious to preserve the absolute authority 
of the state, he rejects what he takes to be the Christian­
ity of the Gospel:
. . . far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to 
the state, this religion detaches them from it as from 
all other things of this world; and I know of nothing 
more contrary to the social spirit. -*-3^
The type of "religion" he endorses derives its dogmas from
the political sovereign, and these must "contain nothing
contrary to the duties of the citizen.“132
Rousseau is not satisfied to think that the state 
should have some considerable share in ordering the life of 
the individual and that the individual himself may regard 
this sharing of authority with the state as an important and 
necessary means towards achieving the good life. Rousseau 
will admit no division of authority and particularly not any 
constitutional recognition of such a division. He under­
stands that if the people is to have unlimited power, 
nothing is more dangerous than the idea of a transcendent 
moral standard. If men's ultimate allegiance is to an
131Ibid., bk. IV, ch. VIII: 182. 132Ibid., p. 187.
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ethical conscience beyond and above all political authority,
there is no longer any hope for undivided loyalty to the
state. It means, as Lester Crocker puts it, that
. . .the individual conscience might at times be morally
superior to the law, or at least consider itself as such. 
And then we could bid adieu to the collective, organic unity 
of the political b o d y . 133
Nationalism and military virtue
We have noted that in the unity of the public person
i
Rousseau wants to preserve man's natural freedom. But why 
is that cohesion so important? What is the content of the 
freedom of the general will? One sign that the true will of 
the sovereign is actually being expressed, Rousseau argues, 
is that "public opinion approaches unanimity."134 conversely, 
prolonged debate and dissension is a sign that selfish 
interests are uppermost in the minds of the citizens. Using 
these criteria, one wonders how one should view a Nazi mass 
meeting where the proposals regarding the destiny of the 
German people advanced by the Filhrer— who might conceivably 
be considered a modern counterpart of the lawgiver or the 
temporary dictator, or some combination of the two— are 
greeted with the spontaneous and enthusiastic approval of a
133i.ester G. Crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract. An 
Interpretive Essay (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve 
University, 1968), p. 11.
134The social contract, bk. IV, ch. 11:151.
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unified assembly. Whatever the merit of this particular 
illustration, there are numerous indications in the Social 
Contract and elsewhere that Rousseau's emphasis on political 
unity is at least partly based on an association of the gen­
eral will with nationalism and even militarism. "Do we wish
men to be virtuous," he asks. "Then let us begin by making
135them love their country. . .
It is interesting to note that in spite of all argu­
ments designed to establish the absolute authority of the 
general will, Rousseau never presents it as supra-national. 
On the contrary, although he toys with the idea of a federa­
tion of states, he views the general will in the inter­
national arena as a sectional, particularistic will, some­
thing he dreads in the individual state:
The will of the State, though general in relation to 
its own members, is no longer so in relation to other 
States and their members, but becomes, for them, a 
particular and individual will, which has its rule of 
justice in the law of nature.136
What concerns us here about this statement is not the clear
contradiction of the interpretation that the general will is
a universal, transcendent moral standard, but the way in
which Rousseau transfers the freedom of the natural man to
3-35political Economy, p. 302.
l3^ibid., p. 290.
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the various public persons in the world. These acquire the 
natural freedom that the individual person has lost forever. 
It should be carefully noted, however, that in this new state 
of nature enjoyed by whole states conditions come much closer 
to Hobbes's conception than to Rousseau1s in the Discourses. 
The general wills of the states are likely to clash. Even 
among states based on the social contract "the weak are 
always in danger of being swallowed up" by the strong. The 
reason is that "all peoples generate a kind of centrifugal 
force, by which they brush continuously against one another, 
and they all attempt to expand at the expense of their neigh­
bours."137 The general will, one is forced to conclude, has 
in it an element of nationalistic expansionism. -It is nec­
essary to go further and say that it also has a militaristic 
coloring. The Social Contract contains numerous approving 
references to Spartan, military virtues. One of Rousseau's 
main complaints against traditional Christianity is that it 
makes the citizens poor soldiers. The militaristic tendency 
is prominent also in other works, such as the First Discourse 
and the treatise on the Government of Poland. It is closely 
associated with a preference for nationalism. "It is cer­
137The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IX:92. See also 
ch. IX-X, passim.
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tain," Rousseau writes, "that the greatest miracles of virtue 
have been produced by patriotism."
The nationalistic and militaristic bias in Rousseau's 
political thought is reflected in several of his statements 
regarding the goal of the state. In the Social Contract he 
points out, for example, that "the only way in which £men] 
can preserve themselves is by uniting their separate powers 
in a combination strong enough to overcome any resistance."139 
In several places he states as the goal of the state the 
self-preservation and protection of the members.'*'4® He 
offers in the latter part of Emile two standards for the 
"goodness" of the state. One is an increase in population. 
The other is the distribution of population. About the lat­
ter he writes that two states of equal size and population 
may still be very unequal in strength. " . . .  the more pow­
erful is always that in which the people are more evenly 
distributed over its territory. . . . "  The goodness of the 
state is here judged by military criteria.1^1
138Political Economy, p. 301.
139The Social Contract, bk. I, ch. VI:59-60.
14°See, for example, ibid., bk. Ill, ch. IX:130; 
bk. Ill, ch. X:135; bk. IV, ch. 1:149.
141EmiIe, bk. IV:432-33.
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Although Rousseau also speaks of 1 freedom and equal­
ity" as the goal of the state, his numerous expressions 
of nationalistic and militaristic sentiments would seem to 
indicate that this goal is primarily a domestic objective 
for the individual state. The possibility is clearly indica­
ted that internationally the freedom of the public person 
may entail liberty for the powerful states to expand imper- 
ialistically at the expense of the weaker. Again, the 
alleged morality of the general will is placed in a curious 
light.
At first sight there would seem to be an irreconcil­
able conflict between military and social discipline, on the 
one hand, and freedom for man's spontaneity, on the other.
The conflict is removed by what Rousseau conveniently reads 
into the general will. Social unity does not require in­
dividual self-discipline, it is supplied by the inherent 
public-spiritedness and cohesiveness of the general will 
which, made up as it is of the natural inclinations of the 
citizens, is also the first impulse of the people. By the 
nature of its own spontaneity it produces political unity.
To be forced to be free, if that be regarded as an instance 
of social discipline, means only to be compelled to yield to 
this unpolluted collective manifestation of man's true nature.
142»rhe Social Contract, bk. II, ch. XI: 96.
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In his proclivity for nationalism and militarism, 
which culminates in the work on the Government of Poland. 
Rousseau appears to be ascribing to the general will a con­
tent difficult to reconcile with certain other descriptions 
of the same will. Whether these sentiments are to be 
regarded as only an aberration or as an integral part of his 
philosophy is probably the wrong question to ask, for at the 
root of his thinking is not so much a belief in a pre­
existing, transcendent standard, which men are trying to 
articulate intellectually, as a passion for unrestrained 
freedom, a freedom associated with his own predilections and 
preferences. We may venture the interpretation that 
Rousseau's conception of the general will is deeply colored, 
if not completely determined, by his own temperament, which 
is allowed by him to roam freely. His nationalistic and 
militaristic inclinations may be viewed as one example of 
his reading into the general will what his own "heart" hap­
pens to be craving. In certain writings like the Emile 
where he is primarily concerned with an ideal for private 
life the tendency is anarchistic; in writings like the Social 
Contract where he is dealing with collective, political life 
his preference for unlimited freedom takes on a Spartan 
quality. In the latter work he brings together a pervasive 
hostility to restraint with a wish for discipline, such as
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might be found in an unruly rebel who is called to repen­
tance by his own conscience. Rousseau envisions the subor­
dination of the individual to a higher authority. In all too 
characteristic fashion, he does so, however, without putting 
man under the painful obligation of actually making a moral 
effort. Men shall achieve virtue by participating in the 
general will of the people, which is nothing but the outflow 
of their own spontaneous will. Although the release of that 
first impulse in all men may necessitate some constraining 
interference with others by those already liberated, moral­
ity itself requires of the individual only that he listen to 
his heart and yield effortlessly to its pleasant command.
Utopian dreams and harsh realities
It has not been our purpose to deny that Rousseau's 
concept of the general will has features which connect it 
with the real, transcendent standard of morality of which 
most men have some awareness. We have only tried to show 
that in its central inspiration this concept owes more to 
Rousseau's utopian-romantic imagination. What is genuine 
ethical insight in his thought, for such there is too, is 
subordinated to and vitiated by the spurious, subjectively 
inspired tendency of his philosophy as a whole. To a degree, 
subjectivity enters into all intellectual undertakings. Our
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point is that although offered under the pretentions of 
objective philosophical inquiry# Rousseau's thought has in 
it too much of that element to provide a strong link between 
moral philosophy and democratic theory.
It is difficult to dispel the suspicion that in large 
part the general will is a projection on to the people of 
Rousseau's unfailing belief in the superior goodness of his 
own heart. He views the will of the sovereign in the light 
of what he perceives to be his own divinely inspired spon­
taneity. During his life Rousseau became ever more convinced 
of his own moral innocence and the vice and deceit of other 
men. He regarded himself as always inclined towards the 
good and thwarted only by various outer restraints from 
achieving his worthy goals. "Never has the moral instinct 
deceived me," he writes.143 Late in his life he talks of 
giving back to his Author "a host of good but frustrated 
intentions."144 It is not surprising that Rousseau would 
like to see released in political society the collective 
counterpart of the spontaneous goodness which he believes to 
have been denied expression in his personal life. That he 
likes to substitute for the imperfect world around him the
143Reve r i e s , IV, p. 85.
144Ibid., II, p. 46.
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more appealing creations of his own imagination, he freely
admits. Into nature especially, where he does not have to
contend with the depravity and conceit of society, he finds
it easy to project his dreams and emotions. His worship of
nature, it may be argued, is in no small part worship of his
own elevated sentiments. What is it, he asks in a revealing
passage, which always brings him back to the "inanimate
objects" of nature.
. . . what secret charm brings me back constantly into 
your midst? Unfeeling and dead things, this charm is 
not in you; it could not be there. It is in my own 
heart which wishes to refer back everything to itself.
This, let it be suggested, is the central inspiration also
of the concept of the general will. Rousseau is reading
into it the imagined morality of his own largely subjective
and historically conditioned preferences regarding the
organization and goal of the state. He is assuming that he
has full knowledge of man's true nature and that the heart
of all men craves the same political arrangements that his
does.
It should be remembered in this context that Rousseau 
does not start from, but emphatically rejects, the notion of 
man as a social being. To him, civil society is in the lit­
eral meaning of the word artificial. The socio-political
145Quoted in Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 233.
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nature of man has to be created. As he writes in the Social 
Contract, "the constitution of a man is the work of nature; 
that of the state is the work of artifice [de l'art]."^®
We may regard Rousseau as himself the ultimate artist, the 
philosopher with the final remedy for all the ills of exist­
ing society. His general will is a product of his "creative 
imagination" rather than an acceptable conceptual rendering 
of the pre-existing, universally valid principle of morality.
Regardless of the extent to which Rousseau's tem­
perament influences his thinking, it is evident that the 
general will is not to be mistaken for the transcendent will 
of ethical conscience. His concept arbitrarily elevates a 
particularistic, national will, moral only by allegation and 
with strong totalitarian implications, to a position of 
absolute authority. The common good of political society is 
for Rousseau not the imperfect representation of a standard 
transcendent of politics, but the immanent manifestation of 
perfect morality in the will of the people.
Superficially, Rousseau's thinking in the Social Con­
tract is an endorsement of democracy and the people's right 
to self-government. It should be clear, however, that the 
people is also an instrument for Rousseau's subjective imag­
146The Social Contract, bk. Ill, ch. XI: 135.
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ination. If his assumptions regarding the spontaneous 
direction of the popular will have little to sustain them in 
real life, his democratic preferences are meaningless 
abstractions, asking to be used by those who want to exercise 
power dictatorially in the name of the people.
If Rousseau's conception of the general will grows 
out of an essentially utopian view of human nature, he is 
also offering an essentially utopian view of how democracy 
can be made to respect and promote the ethical life. The 
Social Contract has doubtful value as a theory of democracy 
and a source of inspiration for political action, for unlike 
Plato's Republic, for instance, its utopianism does not have 
the saving grace of being grounded in an adequate definition 
of the fundamental problem of morality. Plato may be crit­
icized for exaggerating man's ability to solve that problem, 
but hardly for evading it. Rousseau’s philosophy, on the 
other hand, simply assumes the goodness of human nature and 
ignores the need for moral self-discipline in the individual 
and the people. For that reason he may be accused of prepar­
ing the way, not for a morally inspired democratic order, 
but for political immorality and chaos. No amount of uto­
pian assurances about the goodness of the spontaneous will 
of the people can remove the only too real and persistent 
lower inclinations of human nature as we know it in history.
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The idea that man's first impulse is good and will 
show itself such on a large scale under the proper political 
circumstances is abstract and theoretical in a very question­
able sense. It can be maintained only in the teeth of nor­
mal experience. Rousseau himself admits that to realize the 
goals of the Social Contract a new man will be needed, one 
bearing little resemblance to the creature of vice and art­
ificiality found in actual societies. Yet, Rousseau offers 
no real proof that his psychological premises are anything 
more than hopes and dreams. Insofar as Rousseau's per­
sonal life is any indication of what kind of man will emerge 
when hostility to restraint and conventional social respons­
ibility is adopted as a principle of conduct, one is forced 
to face the rather striking contrast between the utopian- 
romantic ideal and the real.^^
Experience suggests that man's first impulse is far 
from always good. Indeed, it would seem to be more in keep­
ing with the facts to say that it tends in the opposite 
direction, towards some kind of selfishness or arbitrariness. 
Men acquire some moral virtue and steadiness precisely to 
the extent that they become accustomed to arresting the im­
pulse of the moment and subjecting it to moral scrutiny
147Cf. Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, especially 
chapters 4-5.
192
before acting. The ethical life, we have argued, needs the 
support of sound tradition and custom which help to build 
into human action a pattern of habit by which impulse is 
restrained and organized with reference to a higher standard. 
The purpose of civilization is to liberate man's higher 
potential by disciplining his spontaneity, which by itself 
tends away from all order. In Rousseau's view, however, civ­
ilization has been an instrument of enslavement: "Our wisdom 
is slavish prejudice, our customs consist in control, con­
straint, compulsion. Civilised man is born and dies a
slave.”148 vJhere there should be complete freedom for man's
*natural inclinations there are inhibiting and perverting 
cultural norms. Whatever "civilization" will be needed in 
the true state is apparently expected by Rousseau to flow 
out of man as a sort of byproduct of morality once spon­
taneity has been released in society. Granted that there 
must be morally questionable elements in any tradition, 
Rousseau's blanket denunciation of existing civilization is, 
practically speaking, a denial of the need for the formative 
guidance of culture in the ethical life.
Viewed realistically, one effect of applying Rousseau's 
teaching to life would be to relax or remove the fetters
^ sEmile, bk. I: 10.
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which restrain man's lower nature. And, as Burke points out, 
the less control is exercised by the individual internally, 
the more will have to be imposed from without by the state. 
Lack of moral self-discipline on the part of a people invites 
anarchy and increases the danger of political dictatorship.
To the extent that Rousseau's recommendations were followed, 
the general will, which needs to respect no higher moral or 
constitutional authority, would in all likelihood turn out 
to be a highly arbitrary expression of majority opinion. 
Political cohesion would probably be supplied in the end by
i
some disciplined organization, centrally led and claiming to 
act for the common good of the people, in international 
affairs, one might expect "the will of the people" to exhibit 
the same lack of restraint. Very possibly, it would turn 
out to be nationalistic and expansionistic.
Rousseau's ideas have had an enormous influence. The 
notion that morality is the result of yielding to the good­
ness of our first impulse is bound to appeal to man's all 
too natural inclination to escape the effort and pain of 
actual moral self-improvement. Placing the blame for all 
social ills not really on man himself but on his environment 
has also won Rousseau many followers. His political thought 
is more flattering than realistic. Unfortunately, his in­
fluence as a theorist of democracy is partially due precisely
to the fact that he ignores certain unpleasant truths, which 
reduce considerably the optimism with which popular rule may 
be contemplated. The achievement of the common good and, 
more comprehensively, of the good life, he thinks, is not 
dependent on a difficult process of moral self-reform, 
involving protracted cultural assimilation, by which the 
citizens develop a measure of political responsibility 
grounded in respect for•a transcendent ethical standard. 
Neither does it require that this responsibility be promoted 
and protected by constitutional laws, written or unwritten. 
On the contrary, the good of society is best served by 
removing all restraints on the momentary will of popular 
majorities. This belief, we may say in conclusion, is in 
essence a utopian dream sustained by large doses of moral 
conceit. It is evident that an adequate theory of the 
reconciliation of democracy with the ethical life must rest 
on a more realistic assessment of human nature and politics.
IV. THE ETHICS OP CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
So far we have sought to determine whether popular 
self-government can be made compatible with the needs of the 
ethical life mostly by elimination. We have tried to show 
that Rousseau's influential theory of democracy does not 
come to grips with man's moral predicament. Only because he 
denies that man's baser inclinations are apart of the essence of 
human nature and assumes the morality of the spontaneous 
popular will, can he advance his notion of plebiscitary rule, 
according to which the majority of the moment is allowed to 
set public policy. If it is true as we have argued that man 
is not spontaneously propelled in the direction of morality, 
democratic theory must instead concern itself with the need 
for ethical self-discipline and look for the political means 
by which such discipline can be promoted. We have intimated 
that some form of constitutionalism is called for.
The American Constitution
Constitutional democracy we have defined broadly as 
popular rule under legal restraints which cannot be changed 
or removed without the support of a qualified majority over 
an extended period of time. Our analysis of this concept 
may be brought into closer contact with the institutional
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problems of democracy by using the American Constitution as 
an illustration. In so doing we are not suggesting that its 
particular provisions are necessarily the best available 
example of this type of democracy, only that they offer a 
good practical illustration of the general principle.
One of the rules generally regarded as essential to 
the definition of democracy is that with some possible excep­
tions all adults should have the right to affect government 
policy through voting and be eligible for public office. The 
authors of the American Constitution did not envision "uni­
versal suffrage" in the modern sense of the word. They left 
the qualifications for the right to vote up to the individ­
ual states, assuming only that popular participation would 
be comparatively widespread, as it was already at the time 
of the adoption of the document. Perceived from the begin­
ning as more democratic than the governments of the leading 
European countries and soon viewed by foreign observers like 
Alexis de Tocqueville as the very embodiment of popular rule, 
the American constitutional system has only had its democra­
tic reputation enhanced by the extension of popular suffrage. 
Although this development was not prescribed in the original 
document, one is clearly justified in thinking of the system 
of government it regulates as democratic with regard to pop­
ular participation.
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Does it follow that we must accept Abraham Lincoln's 
description of American government as government for the 
people, by the people, and of the people? Curiously, from 
the point of view of much modern democratic theory, this 
allegedly democratic form of government is not designed to 
maximize the influence of popular majorities. Indeed, the 
founding fathers had no wish to create a "democracy," claim­
ing instead that the Constitution established a "republic." 
One might even say that through its system of checks-and- 
balances it tends to thwart the will of a momentary national 
majority. In fact, the people, viewed as an undifferentiated 
mass, is not even given constitutional recognition. There 
is no institutional channel through which a mere numerical 
majority can work its will. The "people" of the Constitu­
tion is made up of a number of overlapping, subdivided elec­
torates. Not even the President is chosen by a national 
majority. He is selected by a majority of the Electoral 
College, a body chosen by pluralities in the various States 
and according to a formula which further ignores the national 
majority by giving overrepresentation, by numerical standards, 
to the smaller States. The members of the Senate and House 
are elected by pluralities of yet other electorates (the Sen­
ate originally by the State legislatures). To the extent 
that the undifferentiated mass of the people or a majority
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thereof can be said to have a unified political will, there is 
no one point in the American system of government where that 
will can be applied. The electoral processes of American 
democracy are far removed from what might perhaps be regard­
ed as the plebiscitarian ideal, the national referendum on 
public policy.
The same anti-plebiscitarian slant marks the process 
whereby policy is made by the Federal government. The Con­
stitution prescribes a division of power between an exec­
utive, legislative, and judicial branch. In order for a 
bill to get passed it must not only be approved by both 
Houses of Congress, which are made up of members beholden to 
different electorates in their home States, but signed by 
the President. The chief executive in turn is required to 
get the approval of the Senate for certain important acts, 
such as the appointment of high-level officials in the exec­
utive branch. In its implied power of "judicial review," 
that is, of passing on the constitutionality of acts of the 
other branches of government, the Supreme Court is a check 
on each. The Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by 
the President with the approval of the Senate and could be 
removed only under unusual circumstances by the Senate, after 
a vote of impeachment in the House of Representatives, a 
congressional power of last resort hanging also over the
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head of the President. Another important feature of the 
elaborate system of checks-and-balances, of which we are 
only giving a very general and incomplete account, is the 
division of power between Federal and State government, the 
Constitution designating the proper role of each, in the 
central area of constitutional amendment, that of two avail­
able procedures which has actually been used requires con­
currence between a large majority of the States and the Fed­
eral congress.
Since no merely temporary majority of the people, 
however large, can acquire control over all the levels and 
branches of government, its power is severely limited. It 
is possible to imagine a presidential election year in which 
popular passions run so strongly in a definite direction 
that the result is not only the election of a President 
favorable to the cause, but a staggering and equally favor­
able majority in the House of Representatives and among those 
winning the third of the Senate seats to be filled that year. 
Even that is not enough to assure the full public implementa­
tion of the popular demand in question. The Senators who 
make up the two thirds of the Senate previously elected will 
not necessarily concur in the sentiments now sweeping the 
country. And their independence is protected by the Con­
stitution, as is that of any popular representative at the
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Federal level— be it a Senator, a member of the House, or a 
President. Provided that a majority of the Senate, or even 
a very powerful two thirds of that body, does not acquiece, 
the attempt to implement the popular will of the moment has 
been thwarted. And even if the necessary votes are avail­
able in the Senate, the Constitution itself is still in 
effect, prescribing the procedures by which government pol­
icy has to be determined and at the same time limiting its 
scope.
The idea of representation associated with American 
government deserves special attention. According to "Pub­
lius" in the Federalist Papers, the representative institu­
tions provided for in the Constitution are not intended to 
be mere reflectors of public opinion. They are supposed to 
contribute to the "refinement" of the will of the people. 
According to Federalist Paper number 10 (Madison), the del­
egation of authority to representative institutions is 
designed to
. . . refine and enlarge the public views by passing 
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, 
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will 
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations.
lHamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist Papers, 
intro, and ed. by Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor Books, 
1961), No. 10, p. 82.
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It should be noted that by giving many of the popular rep­
resentatives very substantial terms of office— as long as 
six years for Senators and four years for Presidents— the 
Constitution relieves them to a considerable degree from 
popular pressure. Their staying in office is not dependent 
on being always in tune with public opinion. They have the 
opportunity to follow their own best judgment even when it 
might be in sharp conflict with the wishes of the people. 
They can do so in the hope that by the time their electors 
are to pass on their performance at the polls, their stand 
will have been vindicated or their integrity will have 
earned them the respect of erstwhile opponents. The same 
freedom to deviate from or even defy public opinion of the 
moment is available to members of the House of Represent­
atives, although their inclination to exercize independent 
judgment may not be quite as strong, since their relatively 
short term of office does not offer the same protection 
against popular dissatisfaction and electoral censure. On 
the whole, the nature and role of representative institu­
tions in the United States tend to make elections not so 
much referenda on specific policies as opportunities to 
elect individuals believed to have the qualifications to 
make decisions on their own in their constituents' behalf.
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In the case of the Supreme Court, popular control is 
at a minimum. The voting public affects the composition of 
the Court only by electing the President and the Senate, in 
the first instance indirectly, in the second instance direct­
ly (since 1913). These together appoint the Justices. Once 
on the Court, moreover, a Justice cannot be removed, except 
under extreme conditions. Obviously, this gives him a 
marked independence in relation to public opinion, if he 
chooses to exercise it.
The American form of government places ultimate polit­
ical authority in the hands of the mass of the people. But 
the people in that sense is not given the power to do what 
it pleases in the short run. The current majority is always 
subject to the restraints of checks-and-balances. Only a 
majority which is, or becomes, both persistent and over­
whelming can work its will completely, to the point of re­
moving constitutional obstacles which stand in the way of 
the full realization of its wishes. The net effect of these 
legal restraints is to put on the momentary majority the 
burden of proof. In order to acquire decisive power it must 
become more than a momentary, merely partisan majority. It 
must prove itself over time as having a will worthy of com­
mon support. In the words of Willmoore Kendall:
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The American political system is not and never has been 
a system for the automatic acceptance of majority man­
dates by the minority. It is not and never has been a 
system for the large-scale coercion of the minority. . . . 
Under the American political system the majority bides 
its time until it can act by consensus. . . ,2
The idea of popular sovereignty
But is not this to make a mockery of the democratic 
ideal? Must not a true democracy always promote the maximum 
of popular control over public policy? Does not popular 
suffrage in the American form of government just barely con­
ceal the authoritarian nature of the system as a whole?
Surely, this elaborate thwarting of the will of the people 
is incompatible with the idea of popular sovereignty. The 
objection brings us to the heart of the fundamental issue 
which has to be decided by democratic theory. Granted that 
popular sovereignty may be basic to democracy, what are we 
to understand by it?
It would seem that when we attribute to the people 
the right of self-government, we can mean one of two things. 
One is that the people should be free at every turn to act 
as it pleases. The other is that the people may act only 
under certain restraints. To say that only the first mean­
^willmoore Kendall, Contra Mundum, ed. by Nellie D. 
Kendall (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1971), 
pp. 277-78 (emphasis in original).
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ing is compatible with the idea of popular sovereignty is 
either to fall into self-contradiction or utopian thinking.
If the idea means complete freedom for the people to act, it 
does not rule out the abolition of democracy and the estab­
lishment of dictatorship. That would turn popular sovereign­
ty into a meaningless concept. The proposition that the 
people may do as it pleases cannot be saved by saying that 
of course the people must not give up the democratic form of 
government, for that is to adopt the second proposition, 
namely that popular sovereignty involves limiting the 
people's freedom. The only way to defend it would be to 
take a Rousseauistic approach, attempting to prove that 
under certain circumstances it will always please the people 
to act so that popular control is perpetuated. But as we 
have shown, not even Rousseau is unequivocal in his asser­
tion of the ascendancy of the general will over the destruc­
tive and even tyrannical will of all in his ideal state. 
Unless we are to make certain blatantly unrealistic assump­
tions about the necessary and powerful presence of democra­
tic preferences in the people, we are left with the proposi­
tion that limitations on the popular will are not only 
compatible with, but actually implied in the notion of pop­
ular sovereignty. What we might regard as the general prin­
ciple of constitutionalism would thus seem to be inseparable
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from the concept itself. The question becomes: By whom are 
these limitations to be determined in scope and by whom 
applied? In a democracy, presumably, the answer must be, by 
the people.
Paradoxically, insofar as popular rule is a real con­
cept and not just some utopian dream, it refers to govern­
ment by the people under self-imposed restraints. The mean­
ing of the latter idea must be carefully analyzed. Since it 
is our purpose to investigate the compatibility of democracy 
with the needs of the ethical life, we shall be primarily 
interested in exploring its ethical dimension.
Rousseau's ideal is a people of one political will.
He can entertain it because he is assuming the essential 
unity of human nature. If we do not have recourse to his 
type of imagination, however, but base our thinking on what 
can be observed in actual societies, we are forced to recog­
nize the existence of a chronic conflict of wills, in large 
matters and small, widespread agreement between the citizens 
is sometimes achieved and maintained in certain areas, but 
the unlikelihood of popular unanimity in politics explains 
the prominence in democratic theory of the concepts of 
majority and minority. Just as there are different polit­
ical wills at work in a people at any particular time, there 
are different wills at work over time. Public opinion
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presents an ever-changing constellation of views and senti­
ments. There are continuous shifts of emphasis and varia­
tions in intensity. The lines of confrontation are repeat­
edly redrawn. Majorities are transformed into minorities, 
minorities transformed into majorities. To what in this 
varied stream of popular opinion is sovereignty to be 
attached? We have already seen that it does not belong to 
just any expression of will. An answer may be suggested by 
drawing on the ethical philosophy we have advanced.
We have argued that man is a creature of two worlds. 
His life is a tension between a perpetual and always chang­
ing flow of impulses and a sense of higher purpose. When­
ever affirmed by man, this higher will disciplines and 
structures his wishes of the moment with a view to the 
enduring moral good. It builds into his life a measure of 
unity and harmony, a certain correspondence between human 
imperfection and transcendent Perfection. Except in the 
sense that ethical conscience reveals itself to every person 
in unique circumstances, it is not some private guide to the 
goal of life. It wills the universal End for man, whose 
worth is not derived from subjective advantage. We have 
referred to this self-justifying goal as "harmony," "hap­
piness," and "community," using words which describe aspects 
of the same transcendent reality. The ultimate end of pol­
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itics may be defined as community. By this word we mean a 
special type of association, a civilized living together in 
which the intellectual, aesthetical, and economical life of 
society serves the sacred destiny shared by all. In reli­
gious terminology, this destiny is community with God. 
Referring to the partial realization of this goal which lies 
within the reach of politics, Aristotle speaks of "the good 
life."
Just as an individual is always under an obligation 
to act morally in his "private" affairs, so is he under an 
obligation to act morally when he is performing "public" or 
"political" acts, such as casting a vote in an election. The 
term "people" used in democratic theory does not signify 
some mysterious, independent entity hovering, as it were, 
over the heads of the individual citizens. It is the collec­
tive name for those same individuals acting in their capacity 
as political participants. Ethical conscience wills the 
same goal in all men, the widest possible sharing in commun­
ity. Just as each person has a higher self, therefore, a 
whole people, made up as it is of individual citizens, also 
has a higher self, namely ethical conscience as it relates 
to "public" or "political" matters. As the common self of a 
people organized for the purpose of conducting their common 
affairs, it seeks, not the partisan advantage of any person
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or group, but the kind of political order which is conducive 
to the spiritual elevation of society. Against this higher 
will, in need of no special pleading, stands an infinite num­
ber of possible factional popular wishes which detract from 
the moral goal and can be defined in contradistinction as 
the people's lower will.
A people can thus be said to have two selves, one 
which always wills the same, the furtherance of community in 
given circumstances, and one with an always varying content 
tending by itself to divert the political order to merely 
partisan objectives. But then we must ask this question 
about the idea of popular self-rule: What self is to rule?
Our analysis does not leave any alternative. The only mor­
ally defensible answer is that it must.be the higher self of 
the people, or, if that phrase has too much of a metaphys­
ical ring, the will to community in the individual citizens. 
Since in our analysis of Rousseau and in other places we 
have emphatically rejected the idea of identity between 
morality and politics, we obviously are not suggesting that 
democracy becomes acceptable only if the people can be 
expected to decide everything in accordance with ethical 
conscience. What we are contending is that the concept of 
democracy is ethically defensible only if it conceives of 
popular self-rule as designed in such a way as to promote
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the application of ethical conscience to political issues. 
Whatever other types of self-imposed limitations are implied 
in the idea of popular sovereignty, the people has to impose 
some moral discipline on itself. In other words, popular 
sovereignty must be defined with reference to an ethical 
standard.
But is there not something undemocratic about this 
notion that the people must subject itself to a superior in 
the form of an ethical purpose? Granted that the majority 
must not suddenly decide to abolish the democratic rules of 
the game, is not that view in reality hostile to the whole 
idea of popular self-government and freedom? That would be 
true only if one would also have to say that a person is not 
governing himself, but resigning his freedom, who is seeking 
to guide his behavior by ethical conscience. But this dis­
cipline is self-imposed. It is the willing affirmation of 
the universal standard of good. The structuring role of eth­
ical conscience is not viewed by the individual as some 
alien, external interference with his life, but as something 
necessary to the fulfillment of his own true humanity. To 
call it a curtailment of freedom is to transform the idea of 
freedom into a formula for immorality and unhappiness.
Freedom, we have argued in some detail earlier, can 
be adequately understood only in conjunction with the moral
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worth of chosen goals, so that a person is free in the 
strict philosophical sense only to the extent that by his 
actions he enriches and fulfills his life as defined by the 
spiritual harmony of happiness. Community being the highest 
value, a meaningful existence cannot be distinguished from 
the widest possible sharing of the good life with others. 
Freedom, therefore, is properly the ability to act with con­
cern for what promotes the spiritual well-being of all 
affected. A people can be said to be exercising freedom in 
governing itself only when it is genuinely trying to realize 
the conditions of community.
Democratic "freedoms"— freedom of expression, of 
association, etc.— are appropriately labelled such, for in a 
world of finite insight and endless change and diversity, 
they give recognition to the need for constant examination 
and reexamination of means and to the need for protection of 
the uniqueness of mission belonging to each individual by 
virtue of his special spiritual and physical gifts and cir­
cumstances in life. Political freedoms are not ends in them­
selves. When their exercise is detached from a concern for 
the common good, they degenerate into opportunities for pri­
vate aggrandizement and licence. They become an endorsement 
of the politically and morally destructive forces of society. 
Popular majorities feeding on that type of "freedom" and
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wedded only to selfish advantage are in effect conspirator­
ial groups seeking to expand at the expense of competitors. 
To extend the concept of popular sovereignty to include this 
kind of popular will is to include in the definition of 
democracy what is inherently destructive of the very exis­
tence of this and other forms of government.
Constitutionalism and ethical conscience
Insofar as it is compatible with the needs of the 
ethical life, democracy seeks to promote a certain quality 
of popular will. This leads us to the role of the constitu­
tion. It may be viewed in analogy with the rules or prin­
ciples which the individual person adopts for his private 
behavior. Aware of his own moral and other weaknesses, he 
does not give sovereignty to his impulse of the moment, but 
to standards of conduct which he has pledged not to change 
or abrogate on whim or under the pressure of passion, but 
only after careful and sober deliberation. A constitution 
serves a similar function in the public realm. It is a 
standard of political behavior which is not supposed to be 
changed on the spur of the moment, but only through an elab­
orate procedure which enhances the likelihood that the deci­
sion be made when the emotions are calm and respectable 
motives uppermost. Needless to say, only people of high
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moral culture will subject their political wishes to con­
stitutional restraints for the specific purpose of advancing 
the ethical goal of community. Where citizens are lacking 
in this respect they will accept restraints, if at all, only 
as a way of advancing their own personal advantage. They 
may endorse the constitutional objective of leaving an 
appeal from the people drunk to the people sober, but then 
as a means of promoting enlightened self-interest as distin­
guished from unenlightened, short-sighted self-interest.
There is a certain similarity between constitutionalism 
inspired by moral motives and constitutionalism inspired by 
mere sophisticated egotism. Both have the effect of curbing 
the expansiveness of the lower will of individuals and 
groups. We have argued previously that men's ability to 
discern what is in their own enlightened self-interest 
depends in the end on their having some notion, however 
vague, of what transcends the calculus of private advantage.3
But in order to establish the ethical necessity of 
constitutionalism we need to state with more precision its 
relation to ethical conscience. A constitution, it may be 
said in general, is a recognition of the need to put checks 
on the tendency of individuals and groups to impose their
3See chapter I, pp. 28-29.
own idea of What is politically desirable on others. It is 
an attempt to purge politics of blatant arbitrariness. 
Specific designations of power and various procedural 
requirements# whether prescribed by long-honored precedence 
or a written document, counteract the inclination to proceed 
with disregard for the rest of society. The requirement to 
follow a fundamental law gives a measure of impartiality to 
the formulation and implementation of public policy. It 
tends to promote a detachment of government from various 
competing special interests. The law, not any particular 
will, is sovereign. Short of destruction of the political 
order, the strong are not free to crush the weak. The lat­
ter are left an appeal against raw power. The very opposite 
of arbitrariness in politics would be correspondence between 
the political influence of individual citizens and groups 
and their contribution to community. No constitution can 
accomplish this goal. It is an attempt to limit the in­
fluence of selfish interest, not by eradicating it, which is 
impossible, but by taming it. In the context of democracy, 
that means that the majority of the moment is not given 
total freedom to dictate policy. To do so would be to max­
imize the influence of the tendency, present to some degree 
in all expressions of political will, to disregard the good 
of the whole.
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To become an effective regulating force a constitu­
tion must have the support of the community. Since the moral 
capacity of a people is limited, this support must also be 
found elsewhere. For an elaboration of this point we may 
draw on one of the most original of American thinkers,
John C. Calhoun. His constitutional reasoning is of interest 
here because it recognizes the existence of a common good in 
the moral sense while being adjusted to the preponderance of 
self-interest as a motivating force in politics. Calhoun is 
reconciled to the fact that the latter state of affairs can­
not be drastically changed and that therefore self-interest 
must somehow be turned into the service of the common good, 
a need to which we have previously alluded.4
Concern for merely private advantage, Calhoun 
believes, must be restrained by constitutional checks. The 
only way that these checks can be made effective, however, 
is for the provisions of the constitution to give power to, 
and thereby become aligned with, various major interests 
which can help to enforce them in practice. The self- 
interest of each portion of the community which is recognized 
by the constitution will restrain the self-interest of the 
others.
4See chapter I, pp. 25-26, chapter II, pp. 108-109, 
and chapter III, pp. 138-140.
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It is this negative power— the power of preventing or 
arresting the action of the government, be it called by 
what term it may, veto, interposition, nullification, 
check, or balance of power— which in fact forms the con­
stitution. . . .  Without this there can be no negative, 
and without a negative, no constitution.^
The American Constitution with its elaborate system 
of checks-and-balances exhibits at least the likeness of the 
kind of "negative" on government which Calhoun is describing. 
It has a general effect of great ethical interest. The Con­
stitution makes a consideration of the needs and wishes of 
numerous groups a requirement fora majority that wishes to 
achieve any part of its program. The approximation of a 
consensus is needed before government policy can be made. 
Competing groups, whether in the majority or the minority, 
are induced from the very start to adopt a politically 
inclusive perspective. To further their own cause in pol­
itics that same cause must be defined with a view to making 
it acceptable to other groups which might otherwise "veto" it.
This built-in inducement to consider the wishes of 
other groups, we must emphasize, will not necessarily, and 
indeed only in exceptional cases, lead to the adoption of a 
genuinely moral point of view, that is, to a subordination 
of private advantage to the needs of the common good. But
5John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and 
Selections from the Discourses, intro, and ed. by C. Gordon 
Post (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953), p. 28 (hereinafter 
referred to as Disquisition).
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it does tend to reduce the element of blatant self-seeking 
and thus give some support to the moral aspirations also 
present in the people and its representatives. The self- 
restraints suggested by mere enlightened self-interest, it 
should be carefully noted, do not in themselves have any 
moral worth. Their motive is egotism of some kind. But 
paradoxically they greatly facilitate the task of those who 
are striving to give politics a higher direction. These 
citizens can to some extent enlist the selfishly inspired 
restraint of others in support of the moral end. They may 
even be able to transform it by an appeal to ethical con­
science. Since politics is not normally, if ever, a sphere 
of morally elevated activity, the ethical importance of this 
point can hardly be exaggerated. What might perhaps be 
called the Hobbesian intellectual tradition goes too far in 
making egotism the sole structuring principle of politics. 
There is as great a need, however, to guard against concep­
tions of politics which are based on unrealistic or even 
naive expectations about the degree to which morality can 
take the place of self-interest.
Our reasoning ties in with Calhoun's argument in 
favor of government by "concurrent majority." We may cite 
his description of the contrast between that form of gov-
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ernment and one of simple majority rule, by "numerical
majority" in his terminology.
The same cause which in governments of the numerical 
majority gives to party attachments and antipathies such 
force as to place party triumph and ascendancy above the 
safety and prosperity of the community will just as cer­
tainly give them sufficient force to overpower all 
regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral obliga­
tions of every description. . . .  In the government of 
the concurrent majority, on the contrary, the same cause 
which prevents such strife as the means of obtaining 
power, and which makes it the interest of each portion 
to conciliate and promote the interests of the others, 
would exert a powerful influence toward purifying and 
elevating the character of the government and the people, 
morally as well as politically.6
What is of interest to our present argument is not so 
much whether the specific institutional suggestions offered 
by Calhoun will accomplish the stated goal, but the principle 
itself: In a government of concurrent majority self-interest 
is checked by self-interest in such a way that, willy-nilly, 
it becomes a potential support for moral aspirations. The 
extent to which a constitution will actually promote distinc­
tively ethical restraints, however, will depend entirely on 
the extent to which the perpetual conflict of interests is 
leavened by the motive of community among the political 
participants. To serve the higher goal it must be rooted 
in considerable moral culture.
6Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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A constitution, then, is an attempt to purge politics 
of the kind of political egotism which would crush every­
thing in its way. Insofar as it is inspired by the moral 
motive, it aims even further, to the substitution of ethical 
conscience for enlightened self-interest as the ordering 
principle of politics. It then becomes the institutional 
embodiment of the rejection, not only of the kind of 
arbitrariness which threatens the peaceful balancing of 
group interests, but of every form of arbitrariness. Its 
provisions become a means of lifting politics in the direc­
tion of fulfillment of a higher law. As Walter Lippmann 
writes:
Constitutional restraints and bills of rights, the whole 
apparatus of responsible government and of an indepen*i 
dent judiciary, the conception of due process of law in 
courts, in legislatures, among executives, are but the 
rough approximations by which men have sought to exorcise 
the devil of arbitrariness in human relations.7
Although always imperfect and less than successful, 
constitutions serve their highest purpose by allowing the 
censuring of "caprice and willfulness" with a view to the 
moral end.
But if it may thus be said that the principle of con­
stitutionalism i3 disapproval of political power exercised
7Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1943), p. 346.
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for only particularistic ends, it is similar to the ultimate 
principle of morality itself. What is ethical conscience 
but the higher will in man which censures, and thereby 
defines, the arbitrary? Indeed, can it not be argued that 
to the extent that the principle of constitutionalism is not 
just the name for the flawed impartiality of enlightened 
self-interest, it is identical with ethical conscience? 
Clearly, whatever the apparent correspondence or proximity 
of self-interest and morality in some particular cases, 
man's ethical will is always in tension with the motive of 
selfishness. It cannot be said, therefore, that constitu­
tionalism of every hind has moral worth. But as an activity 
by which men direct their common affairs, politics bears 
heavily on the achievement of the conditions of community.
As such it is very much the concern of ethical conscience. 
What we are suggesting is that constitutionalism is just 
another term for man's moral will applied to the organiza­
tion of political activity. Constitutionalism is demanded 
by ethical conscience because it is necessary to the achieve­
ment of the moral goal. In its political aspect, man's 
higher will may be called the "spirit" of constitutionalism. 
To develop this concept we need to remember that the words 
"government" and "constitution" are not names for something 
existing apart from the citizens. Those who participate in
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politics under the rules of a constitution accept it as a 
guide for their personal behavior, so that strictly speaking 
the constitution as a practical force is identical with the 
political activity of the individuals who assent to its pro­
visions and supply or withhold the spirit of constitutionalism.
If the good life is to be approached, men's lower
inclinations have to be disciplined in some way. According
to Edmund Burke,
Society requires not only that the passions of individ­
uals should be subjectedd but that even in the mass and 
body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of 
men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, 
and their passions brought into subjection. This can 
only be done by a power but of themselves; and not, in 
the exercise of its function, subject to that will and 
to those passions which it is its office to bridle and 
subdue.8
In its moral dimension, this restraining power is in 
a certain sense external to individual persons as Burke 
writes. It transcends man. It is not a part of his lower 
self of unprincipled impulse, but disciplines it from the 
outside. But in another sense, which Burke does not here 
recognize, it is also in man. It is man's own ethical con­
science, the principle of true humanity he shares with others.
The "private" habits by which the individual tries to 
lift himself out of the ever-present inclination to yield to
®Burke, Reflections, pp. 57-58 (emphasis in original).
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morally unexamined impulse cannot be sharply distinguished 
from those of his habits which he tries to follow for the 
same purpose in his "public" or "political" life. They are, 
in fact, only two aspects of one and the same attempt to 
achieve the moral end. Since the end itself is social but 
its attainment dependent on individual effort, the prereq­
uisites are both "private" and "public." In the "public" 
sphere, ethical conscience demands a special type of coop­
eration with others, namely one which minimizes the in­
fluence of arbitrariness. It applies to a broader context a 
question which describes all moral deliberation: "Is this 
contemplated action good?" As entertained by the individual 
in politics the same question may be formulated thus: "Is 
this contemplated 'public' action of the kind that contrib­
utes to community?" Although concerned with "public"
*affairs, it puts a moral obligation on each citizen. The 
shared habit of asking this question is the moral dimension 
of constitutionalism. It is translated by practical neces­
sity into a call for specific institutional restrictions 
binding on all. The higher will in man does not work in a 
vacuum but on the concrete material of political reality. 
Given men's selfish and otherwise flawed behavior and their 
unavoidable clashes of interest, the political advancement 
of community is not possible without common assent to some
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superior coordinating rule. The willingness to subject one­
self to this kind of restraint out of concern for the moral 
end, therefore, is indistinguishable from ethical conscience 
itself. All actual constitutions are transcended by man's 
ethical will, but the demand for them is directly rooted in 
it. Applied to the conduct of public affairs, that will can 
indeed be described as the spirit of constitutionalism.
In a democracy, constitutional provisions are imposed 
by the people on itself. That does not mean that they will 
all meet with the full approval of every citizen* While a 
person may be critical of various parts of his country's 
constitution, he may still respect it, in the spirit of con­
stitutionalism. He may recognize, in other words, that the 
continued curbing of political arbitrariness requires of him 
that he should abide by the provisions of which he dis­
approves as long as they are in effect, and try to change 
them, not by stretching or distoring their meaning, but 
through the process of revision prescribed by the constitu­
tion. He may also be on his guard against the possibility 
that his own view of how the ethical end can be promoted by 
government is mistaken. In its denial of all arbitrariness 
ethical conscience is a warning against premature certainty 
regarding the moral worthiness of concrete political 
proposals. There is a crucial distinction to be made
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between support for specific constitutional rules and the 
willingness itself to accept such rules, even when they may 
not seem wholly appropriate, in the interest of the higher 
goal.
A constitution may be viewed as forming a part of the 
varied cultural habits by which men direct their behavior 
towards the form of intrinsically valuable association which 
is community. These habits help to restrain the centrifugal, 
disruptive inclinations always present in society. They are 
tentative directives transcended by the directing principle 
itself. It is incompatible with the moral purpose of life 
to regard these habits as final, in no need of revision or 
improvement. The spirit of constitutionalism demands not 
only respect for the fundamental law, but the possibility to 
change that law on the basis of insight into how it could 
better serve the enduring goal. Particular constitutions 
are subject to a higher law. "To those who ask where this 
higher law is to be found," Walter Lippmann writes, "the 
answer is that it is a progressive discovery of men striving 
to civilize themselves, and that its scope and implications 
are a gradual revelation that is by no means completed."9
It has been one of our contentions that ethical con­
science is better described as a principle of censure or
9Lippmann, The Good Society, p. 347.
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self-examination than as a positive command to perform this
or that act. Although moral conduct is attended by a sense
of higher purpose, it never completely fulfills that purpose.
The ultimate standard of good is always felt to have been
betrayed to some extent. We may relate the idea of ethical
conscience as a principle of censure to our discussion of
constitutionalism by putting out own interpretation on the
following compact statement by Calhoun:
It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the con­
stitution, and the positive which makes the government. 
The one is the power of acting, and the other the power 
of preventing or arresting action. The two, combined, 
make constitutional governments.1°
Against the background of our previous ethical anal­
ysis, these sentences may be read as a general description 
of man's moral life. The "negative power" would be the cen­
suring, structuring activity of ethical conscience. The 
"positive power" we may understand as concrete human inten­
tions. "The one is the power of acting," Calhoun writes, 
calling to mind our notion of impulse as the force which 
carries human action. The other is "the power of preventing 
or arresting action," he goes on, giving a description also 
of the role of ethical conscience in regard to impulse. "The 
two, combined, make constitutional governments." We may
l0Calhoun, Disquisition, p. 28 (emphasis in original).
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take that to mean that positive action, structured or dis­
ciplined by ethical conscience, is morality. This reading of 
the passage obviously strains Calhoun's meaning. He is 
referring in this statement not primarily to a moral "neg­
ative" on government. But since politics is largely the 
pursuit of partisan goals, the demands of ethical conscience 
in regard to the procedural rules tend to run parallel to 
those of enlightened self-interest. The moral goal can be 
advanced only through a pragmatic adjustment to the stubborn 
reality of political self-seeking. In relation to the lat­
ter, ethical conscience has to be a "negative." consequent­
ly, it is possible to use Calhoun's words to illustrate our 
point: The spirit of constitutionalism, as distinguished
from actual constitutions, written or unwritten, is iden­
tical to ethical conscience as applied to the organization 
of political life; it advances community by seeking to curb 
political inclinations incompatible with the goal.
We are probably well-advised to pause briefly at this 
juncture to recapitulate some of our previous reasoning. Our 
rendering of the relationship between ethical conscience and 
constitutionalism might seem to put an undue emphasis on the 
negative aspect of morality. Surely, morality also has a 
positive side. While this is certainly true, words must not 
take the place of precise analysis of the underlying meaning.
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We have explained before in some detail in what sense eth­
ical conscience should be regarded as an "inner check," but 
to avoid misunderstanding in our present context a few addi­
tional remarks may be called for.
It might be objected to our argument about the spirit 
of constitutionalism that quick and spontaneous decisions 
are often moral, and that decisions based on careful delib­
eration could well be immoral. The latter part of the 
objection need not detain us, since it is simply a restate­
ment of our own explicit position: An attempt to protect 
deliberation through constitutional provisions may have no 
other motive than a morally oblivious wish to facilitate 
bargaining between factional groups. Constitutional restric­
tions in themselves are no guarantee that morality will be 
promoted.
But what about the other assertion, that spontaneous 
acts may sometimes be moral? First of all, it is lacking in 
clarity. If what is meant is that impulse somehow defines 
morality, it is clearly false, for particular intentions are 
always transcended by the ultimate standard of good. To 
argue that there may emerge out of man certain impulses 
which are a perfect expression of morality is to claim that 
man can be God. If what is meant, however, is that impulse 
may come to participate in and thus advance the good, we
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are again entertaining a restatement of our own position: 
Ethical conscience gives its sanction to certain impulses by 
withholding its censure and, as it were, aligning itself 
with them.
Most likely, the mentioned objection is the result of 
skipping over the essential question of just how impulses 
might acquire moral worth. It is a failure to subject this 
question to rigorous philosophical analysis which lends some 
credence to Rousseauistic ethics. Leaving aside the case of 
spontaneity which has moral consequences by mere chance, 
every moral act is by definition sanctioned by ethical con­
science. But as we have argued at some length that higher prin­
ciple itself is never identical to the impulse calling for 
action. The finite reality of human acts is transcended by 
the Good. In the strictest sense, therefore, moral virtue 
is always associated with a type of restraint. There is a 
never-ending tension between the imperfection of everything 
human and the standard of perfection. Man is under a per­
manent censure which loses some of its sharpness to the 
extent that he lives up to his higher self. Ethical con­
science is indeed a sense of purpose, but in a world of 
flawed intentions and acts that purpose i3 revealed either 
through censure or a qualified withholding of censure. In 
the latter case, the specific act is attended by moral reassurance.
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If we say that spontaneous acts are sometimes moral, 
we are describing in one highly ambiguous word what i3 in 
fact a dualistic experience, namely impulse and the struc­
turing role of ethical conscience. The wording is accept­
able only if it is understood that what is called a spontan­
eous moral act is one involving no extended ethical delib­
eration. Whether we take as an example a person whose 
character has already been morally structured, so that there 
is a certain moral momentum built into his impulsive life, 
or a situation in which the moral course is so clear that 
there might be said to be an "impulsive" inclination to fol­
low that course, it is only after an impulse has been 
arrested for ethical scrutiny, however quick, that the 
individual can recognize it as good and thus become jus­
tified to act on it. Moral conduct presupposes the inter­
ference of the question, "Is this moral?," which is the 
particularized embodiment of ethical conscience.
This analysis in no way contradicts the idea that 
ethical conscience reveals a positive purpose. It is only a 
reminder that in relation to human finitude in general and 
human evil in particular this purpose is necessarily felt as 
an"inner check." This point deserves special emphasis in a 
discussion of constitutionalism, for politics is predominant­
ly the pursuit of selfish interests. Moreover, although it
I
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is true that individual persons sometimes act morally "on 
impulse," a theory of democracy must concern itself with the 
question of how a certain type of collective activity is to 
be organized, if it is to respect and promote the moral end.
If the spirit of constitutionalism is a rejection of 
the arbitrary, it is also an affirmation of the good life as 
it is advanced by politics. It negates because it affirms. 
To say that it demands institutional restraints on partisan­
ship is to say that it promotes the moral opposite, the sub­
stance of which in changing circumstances is the discovery 
of men trying to achieve community. The belief that ethical 
conscience sanctions positive acts by government is fault­
less. But there is always a tendency among men of all 
political persuasions to exaggerate the moral purity of the 
causes they happen to advocate. And even when the motive is 
pure, as far as that is possible, the political wisdom of 
its translation into practical proposals may be questionable. 
The spirit of constitutionalism responds to human imperfec­
tion and depravity, on the one hand, and the need for gov­
ernment action, on the other. As a constant reminder of 
man's shortcomings, it casts a doubt on the moral worth of 
all political wishes. As an aspect of the principle of 
community, it is also what gives to politics its higher 
direction and final justification.
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We have rejected Rousseau’s idea of plebiscitary 
democracy, because it ignores the need for moral restraints 
in the individual and the people. Could it not be objected 
that what is wrong with his democratic theory is not his 
rejection of constitutionalism but his failure to recognize 
the need for the moral self-discipline which could make his 
ideal of plebiscitary rule practicable? This is not really 
an objection to our argument, but actually a somewhat con­
fused confirmation of it. Rousseau regards self-discipline 
in our sense of the term as the very root of evil. Morality 
is served, he believes, by uninhibied spontaneity. What 
should be understood is that had he seen the moral necessity 
of self-restraint, he would have had to drop his ban on con­
stitutionalism. The reason is that when men are engaging in 
political activity under the type of restraints which serve 
the common good, they are by that token also acting con­
stitutionally. The goal requires that they order their 
behavior with reference to a common standard not subject to 
instantaneous repeal. The distinguishing mark of constitu­
tionalism is not so much the laying down of written provi­
sions, as is the belief of Thomas Paine, for i n s t a n c e . I t
^According to Paine, wherever a constitution "cannot 
be produced in a visible form, there is none. . . . can 
then Mr. Burke produce the English Constitution? If he can­
not, we may fairly conclude, that though it has been so much
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is rather the willingness for the sake of a higher goal to 
subject present political wishes to scrutiny according to a 
set of rules not itself resting on the preference of the 
moment.
Just how maximum room is to be made for moral consid­
erations in the making of government policy is a matter of 
applying the acceptance of restraints to difficult practical 
problems. The formulation of specific constitutional provi­
sions, including sanctions which assure adherence to them, 
will have to be adjusted to the circumstances. In a democ­
racy, this task is in the hands of the people and its rep­
resentatives, the implication being that the common good is 
best served by the broadest possible participation in the 
process. Given the preponderance of selfish motives in pol­
itics, the goal of community cannot be advanced, except by 
some lucky coincidence, by simply implementing the most 
recent expression of majority will. There is need for an 
element of pause, of deliberation under the guidance of 
moral motives. Whatever the constitutional arrangements 
which are best designed to encourage such an examination of
talked about, no such thing as a constitution exists, or 
ever did exist, and consequently that the people have yet a 
constitution to form." Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, intro, 
and ed. by Henry Collins (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1971), pp. 93-94.
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intentions before they can become government policy, those 
arrangements are demanded by ethical conscience.
To suggest that perhaps Rousseau's ideal of plebis­
citary democracy could be realized through moral self- 
discipline on the part of the citizens is to get involved in 
a contradiction in terms. If plebiscitary democracy means 
an absence of constitutional inhibitions on the people, but 
such inhibitions are necessarily present whenever the cit­
izens are coordinating their political activity with a view 
to the achievement of community, the concept of ethical 
restraints in politics and the concept of plebiscitary 
democracy are incompatible.
Constitutionalism vs. plebiscitary impatience
It is not our purpose here to develop a set of con­
stitutional prescriptions. We have used the American Con­
stitution to illustrate a general principle and not to 
assert that in the American context its provisions offer the 
practical solution to the problem of making democracy compat­
ible with the needs of the ethical life. The Constitution 
does tend to restrain temporary popular majorities in a way 
conducive to the emergence of government by "consensus." It 
does so without giving tyrannical veto-power to a self- 
seeking, dedicated minority. A majority which is not merely
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transitory and partisan, but capable of putting sustained or 
even mounting pressure on the various bodies of government, 
can overcome the resistance of a merely partisan minority, 
with its built-in premium on deliberation the American Con­
stitution provides an opportunity for putting ethical checks 
both on the people's representatives and on momentary elec­
toral majorities.
We may add some perspective to our thesis about the 
moral necessity of constitutionalism and at the same time 
give more attention to the institutional problems of democ­
racy by putting the American Constitution alongside an old 
and recurrent criticism of that document Which has given a 
strong element of ambiguity to the American political tradi­
tion. We are referring to a general impatience with rep­
resentative institutions as set up by the Constitution. This 
dissatisfaction, which has marked plebiscitarian overtones, 
is exemplified in the thinking of Thomas Jefferson. In this 
Enlightenment figure of eclectic and often poorly integrated 
views one finds an unresolved strain, reflected in American 
politics to this day, between the constitutional temperament 
as understood in our discussion, and a rather different 
temperament, more akin to that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It 
should be made clear that in concentrating for our purposes 
on Jefferson's strong plebiscitarian tendency, we are not
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claiming to be analyzing more than one side of his thought. 
Not only are some of his arguments to which we will refer 
contradicted or modified by other of his statements. It is 
also possible to argue that his theory was often contradic­
ted by his practice.
Although Jefferson finally came around to endorsing 
the American Constitution, one need not study his political 
thought for long to discover reasons for regarding his 
approval of constitutionalism in general as qualified and 
ambiguous. It should be noted at the outset that when 
Jefferson comes down most clearly on the side of constitu­
tional restraints, as in the case of his insistance on a 
Bill of Rights, he is usually more concerned about protect­
ing the people against their governors than the other way 
around. Although by no means blind to the shortcomings of 
the common man, his admitted inclination is to entrust the 
public interest to the mass of the people or a majority 
thereof rather than to popular representatives. It is 
significant that his democratic sentiments are of a kind 
that tends to undermine the principle of constitutionalism. 
He speaks of the ideal, regarded by him as unfortunately 
unattainable in practice, that "every form of government 
were so perfectly contrived, that the will of the majority could
always be obtained, fairly and without i m p e d i m e n t . T h e  
best available type of government, which he terms "repub­
lican, " is repeatedly described by him as one that allows 
for the most direct and faithful execution of the people's 
will. In its purest form, it would be "a government by its 
citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according 
to rules established by the majority." Negatively, the 
principle is stated thus: "The further the departure from 
direct and constant control by the citizens, the less the 
government has of the ingredient of republicanism. ... 1,13 
Jefferson's majoritarianism is most clearly spelled out in 
his call for "absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the 
majority— the vital principle of republics."^
Jefferson's plebiscitarian propensity brings him into 
collision with the idea of representation developed by 
Edmund Burke in his famous speech to his constituents in 
Bristol. Applying this Burkean idea to democracy we may 
take it to mean that elected officials should not be mere 
executioners of shifting popular wishes. The mass of the 
people should have the ultimate political power, but not 
instant, unquestioned authority to dictate government policy.
^Thomas Jefferson, The Life and Selected Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, ed. by Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New 
York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 492.
13xbid., p. 670. 14Ibid w  p. 3 2 4 .
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Popular representatives should have the opportunity to act 
independently to check and refine popular opinion. They 
should act as the people's "higher self." Jefferson, how­
ever, in many places expresses deep suspicion of a concep­
tion of representation that might violate the principle of 
direct and immediate popular control. He applauds a trea­
tise on the American Constitution by fellow Virginian John 
Taylor, which, in Jefferson's view, "settles unanswerably
the right of instructing representatives and their duty to 
15obey." Since direct popular participation or control is 
impossible at the national level, Jefferson settles for "the 
nearest approach to a pure republic, which is practicable, " 
namely government through "representatives chosen either pro
hac vice, or for such short terms as should render secure
1 6the duty of expressing the will of their constituents."
Jefferson the plebiscitarian wants the removal of
obstacles to the full and instant implementation of the
people's will. Throughout he remains critical of important
features in the American Constitution which tend to thwart
that goal. As might be expected, there is only one body in
the national government of the United States that Jefferson 
is prepared to call "mainly republican" ̂ — the House of Rep-
ISibid., p. 669. 16Ibid.t p. $70.
17ibid., p. 671. We are relying in this paragraph pri­
marily on Jefferson's illuminating letter to John Taylor of 
May 28, 1816.
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resentatives. The reason is that because the members of 
that body have a relatively short term of office they can be 
expected to listen carefully to their constituents or else 
be rather promptly ousted. The Senate, the Presidency, and 
the Supreme Court are all criticized by Jefferson for being 
too far removed from the control of the people, by the length 
of their terms of office or by the fact that they are chosen 
or appointed only indirectly by the people. What arouses 
his dissatisfaction is the very real possibility of a gov­
ernment policy which does not always meet with the approval 
of the majority. The logical extension of Jefferson's line 
of argument are such devices as recall and referendum, which 
have played some role in the American political tradition.
But perhaps the most striking example of Jefferson's 
anti-constitutional temperament is his belief that no coun­
try should go long without a revolution. "I hold it, that a 
little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as nec­
essary in the political world as storms in the physical."^®
At the bottom of this lack of concern for the orderly pro­
cess of government as a protection against arbitrariness 
lies a belief in the soundness or even goodness of the un­
inhibited popular will.
18 Ibid., p. 413.
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In view of our previous analysis of the relation 
between ethics and politics, it is not surprising that Jef­
ferson's view of man and ethics should bear a strong resem­
blance in important respects to that of Rousseau- His view of 
human nature, like Rousseau's, is monistic. It comes in
Jefferson's case steeped in an emphatic materialism and
19sensationalism. Man's moral sense is not conceived by him 
as introducing a tension between immanent and transcendent 
in man's inner life. He describes it as a spontaneous force, 
an "instinct" which puts man on the moral course. Knowingly 
or unknowingly echoing Rousseau, he describes it as a pleas­
urable feeling of benevolence towards others which "prompts 
us irresistibly to feel and to succor their distresses."2®
For Jefferson the plebiscitarian, we may state in 
conclusion, government does not have the purpose of 
restraining the momentary will of the people with a view to 
some higher moral standard. The wish of the majority at any 
moment is itself the only reliable expression of the public 
good. The best form of government is one which respects the 
principle that "the will of the majority is in all cases to 
prevail.
19"0n the basis of sensation, of matter in motion, we 
may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or 
need." Ibid., p. 700. Jefferson's thinking in this as in 
many other respects is influenced by John Locke.
2®Ibid., p. 638. 21Ibid., p. 322.
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The plebiscitarian tendency in the American political 
tradition, contradicted in Jefferson's case by other el­
ements, recurs in more recent expressions of impatience with 
constitutional restraints on the majority. A good example 
is the criticism directed against the so-called "deadlock of 
democracy" by James MacGregor Burns. The American constitu­
tional system. Burns complains, is defective in that it 
"requires us to await a wide consensus before acting."22 It 
will not allow the speedy and effective implementation of 
the will of the majority, which should be the purpose of 
democracy. The basis of the presumption against simple 
majority rule in the Constitution, Burns observes,
. . .has been a pervading distrust of the people when
organized in a national block or party. The people, 
yes— but only in their separated, federalized, localized 
capacities. Popular government, yes— but not really 
popular rule by hungry majorities.23
The latter kind of government ought to be established, Burns
argues, by revising the American form of government in
accordance with what he calls "the Jeffersonian model." This
model he draws from Jefferson the practical politician, whom
he regards as wedded to the ideal of vigorous government
action supported by a national majority coalition. Jefferson-
22James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 323.
23Ibid., pp. 334-35.
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ian majority rule. Burns contends, has "a more popular, egal­
itarian impetus than the Madisonian.11 ̂  Burns proposes sev­
eral reforms designed to create a new form of government, 
such as abolition of the Electoral College, Federal control 
over elections to the national government, uniformization of 
congressional districts, removal of procedures which dis­
courage popular voting, centralization of the political par­
ties, and removal of traditional congressional practices 
which undermine party discipline. What he wants is a system 
in which decisive power belongs to the numerical national 
majority and in which political candidates are members of 
national parties with distinct, well-defined platforms, so 
that elections can in effect become national plebiscites on 
alternative government policies.
What is of immediate concern to us here are not the 
specific reforms suggested by Burns, but the temperament 
that inspires them. According to Burns, the majority prin­
ciple joined to a system of national party competition is 
not enough to make possible the sweeping governmental action 
that must be available to the majority in a more democratic 
America. It will take determined, central leadership. The 
decisive role must be played by the President. He must
2^ibid., p. 41.
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"assume full responsibility, in the priority areas, for the
functions and effectiveness of the whole governmental sys- 
25tern." When the power of the Presidency "is exercised most
responsibly it is not confined to mere t i n k e r i n g . T h e
man holding that office must be able and willing to cut
through the separation-of-powers apparatus in order to get
things done. For example, he has to "ignore the absurd
'rule'. . . that the President does not interfere in the
legislative department. He must interfere, and openly so.
In his approving analysis of Jefferson's leadership in
broadening executive power on the basis of a mobilized
national majority, Burns observes that
. . . the high point of Jefferson's majoritarianism 
. . . came in the Louisiana Purchase. When the chips 
were down, when a great decision had to be made and 
pressed quickly, Jefferson violated congressional rights, 
by-passed accepted constitutional processes, refused to 
go through the long process of a constitutional amend­
ment, and threw himself and his party on the mercy of 
the new popular majority, that he was building up.28
Whatever the accuracy of this interpretation of 
Jefferson's action, it is apparent that Burns sees a need
25]3urns, Uncommon Sense (New York: Harper & Row, 1972),
p. 129.
26Ibid., p. 173.
2^Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy, p. 338.
28ibid., pp. 39-40.
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for executive leadership that is willing to bend or even
break the rules when it is necessary to serve the presumed
interests of the majority.
The great political leader is not content to whittle 
down his goals to what he thinks he can achieve through 
the existing structure of political forces. Rather he 
seeks to enlarge and vivify the structure so that the 
goals can be realized as fully as possible. He knows 
that archaic governmental routines cannot always be bro­
ken up by adjustment and adaptation but, as Burnham says, 
by "the application of overwhelming external force."29
Burns impatience with constitutional obstacles to 
instant and sweeping change does not quite amount to a 
repudiation of the idea of constitutionalism. Whether for 
tactical or other reasons, he does not attack it head on.
But he undermines it by advocating an exercise of power not 
overly sensitive to the intent or spirit of constitutional 
provisions. If he sees the danger of political arbitrar­
iness, he is apparently less disturbed by it than by the 
risk that the popular majority might not get its way.
It has been suggested by critics that Burns's unwill­
ingness to accept the restraints of the American Constitu­
tion is rooted in frustration over the fact that at this 
time in American history those restraints happen to reduce 
the likelihood of public implementation of the particular
^9 Burns, Uncommon Sense, p. 175.
policies that he believes to be mandatory.Assuming, how­
ever, that his arguments for the empowering of numerical 
national majorities is not just a case of intellectual 
opportunism, we must take him to mean that there is some­
thing about the uninhibited will of the mass of the people 
which entitles it to a decisive influence over government 
policy. If Burns is to retain the idea that democracy can 
be defended on ethical grounds, the presumption must be that 
this type of popular will is somehow morally superior to 
other types. He would be leaning then in the direction of 
the Rousseauistic belief in the morality of spontaneous pop­
ular wishes as they emerge, hot from citizens in their 
capacity as members of social groups, but in their capacity 
as members of the undifferentiated mass. Although Rousseau 
does not advocate strong executive leadership by one individ­
ual for normal circumstances, it is difficult not to see the 
affinity between his pervasive hostility to inner and outer 
restraints and Burns's belief that "the presidency at its 
best seeks to liberate American society as a whole from what­
ever binds i t . " T h e  premise at work would seem to be that
30willmoore Kendall writes, for instance: "Since 
Burns and his friends cannot win under the existing rules, 
he asks us to change the rules so that he and his friends 
can win." Contra Mundum, p. 273 (emphasis in original).
^Burns, Uncommon Sense, p. 173.
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only if the people is free to cast off all institutional 
shackels can true democracy be realized.
It would be possible to question the democratic 
claims of Burns's brand of plebiscitarianism by arguing that
it enhances the danger of popularly supported despotism, or
32"Caesarism" in James Burnham’s term. It is worthy of note 
that insistance on the unlimited authority of the popular 
will often tends to go together with a preference for highly 
centralized, or even totalitarian, forms of government.
What is of primary concern to us here, however, is the fun­
damental ethical issue of popular rule with or without con­
stitutional restraints.
Although not entirely clear-cut, Burns's theory of 
democracy exhibits a general tendency whose ultimate ethical 
and political implications are brought out in the thought of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Burns and other theorists of democ­
racy of the plebiscitarian bent may not actually be self­
admitted disciples of Rousseau and, needless to say, they 
are likely to differ with him in many particulars. They do 
share with him an impatience with constitutional restraints 
and a related presumption in favor of the spontaneous pop-
3 2 Cf. James Burnham, CongresB and the American Tradi­
tion (Chicago! Henry Regnery Co., 1965), especially chap­
ter XXV.
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ular will. In the final analysis, their type of democratic 
theory must be defended at the ethical level. They may not 
all have recognized the full implications of their plebis- 
citarian preferences, but the logical ethical basis for 
those preferences is supplied by Rousseau. And if our anal­
ysis of that archetypal plebiscitarian is generally correct, 
they do not withstand critical examination. We are just­
ified, therefore, in approaching the institutional prescrip­
tions of these theorists with considerable scepticism.
A theory of democracy which does not recognize the 
paramount need of constitutionalism evades the realities of 
man's moral predicament. An attempt to carry the plebis­
citarian ideal into practice will tend, in the long run at 
least, to defeat the ethical purpose of community and there-, 
by also to undermine popular rule itself. Plebiscitary 
democracy, it may be suggested, is not a real political con­
cept, but a quasi-concept. It is not based on a realistic 
assessment of the possibilities open to man, but on some 
highly dubious assumptions: Assuming that political man is
not predominantly or even partially motivated by selfish­
ness; assuming that he is instead spontaneously propelled in 
the direction of morality; assuming that the popular majority 
of the moment is most likely to give expression to the com­
mon good— assuming all of this, plebiscitary democracy
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becomes a concept descriptive of human potentiality. But 
these things, we have tried to show, cannot be assumed.
They actually run counter to concrete experience. Few 
modern democratic theorists embrace plebiscitarianism in the 
pure Rousseauistic form, but many lean in its direction. To 
that extent they give to democratic theory a utopian slant 
inimical to a realistic consideration of the institutional 
problems of popular rule.
That is not to say that each proposal for changing 
the American political system which is advanced by thinkers 
like Burns is necessarily destructive of the moral goal of 
politics. Precisely what constitutional arrangements will 
help to make democracy compatible with the needs of the eth­
ical life under some particular historical circumstances is 
not just a matter of motive but of political prudence and 
imagination. Obviously, constitutional restraints are not 
an end in themselves. They are desirable insofar as they 
serve the higher goal. For many reasons even the most nobly 
and skillfully conceived constitution may at some time begin 
to defeat its original purpose. Profound social and polit­
ical changes may necessitate constitutional amendment or 
even transformation. A sound constitution recognizes that 
fact and provides the means for its own revision. The point 
to be made about Burns's recommendations is that whatever
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merit may be found in some of them belongs to them not 
because of, but in spite of his plebiscitarian leanings.
We may perhaps sum up our argument regarding the two 
available concepts of popular rule by drawing a parallel 
between two types of citizens and two types of democracy. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau asks us to picture an individual who 
always acts spontaneously. To this type of citizen cor­
responds a form of democracy which gives complete freedom to 
the spontaneous popular will. This plebiscitary notion of 
democracy is not founded in reality but in an imaginary 
world. We may oppose to this parallel another, which pic­
tures an individual who acts under self-imposed moral 
restraints. To that kind of citizen corresponds a form of 
popular government under constitutional limitations designed 
to promote a certain quality of popular will. Only this 
type of democracy recognizes man's real moral predicament.
It allows an opportunity to temper the centrifugal forces of 
political self-seeking by considerations of the common good. 
It can be joined to and sustained by man's sense of higher 
purpose, constitutional democracy at its best, we may con­
clude, would be popular self-rule in the cause of community. 
To the extent that democracy approaches this high standard, 
it can be supported on moral grounds. Going a step further 
than is really warranted by our argument, it may perhaps
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even be said that in this concept of democracy we have the 
noblest idea of politics.
Democracy, leadership, and culture
Just because popular rule without constitutional 
restraints is an ethically unacceptable notion, popular rule 
under such restrictions offers no guarantee that ethical 
motives will be promoted. Constitutional restraints are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the furtherance 
of community. Everything turns on the absence or presence 
of what we have called the spirit of constitutionalism. It 
will emerge only in a people of advanced spiritual culture.
Referring to the United States but making a general 
observation. Rene de Visme Williamson argues that "the Con­
stitution functions as a mirror for the national con- 
33science." The constitutional norm serves as a constant 
reminder of the contrast between the values endorsed by the 
people in its better moments, when it looks at politics in 
the light of the moral End, and the imperfect, sometimes 
degrading practice of day-to-day politics. The law thus has 
a moral function. John Middleton Murry writes:
^•^Rene de Visme Williamson, Independence and Involve­
ment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
pp. 126-27.
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Just as the democratic society freely chooses its gov­
ernment, so the democratic citizen must freely choose to 
do his duty to the commonweal. He puts his conscience 
in control of his actions. He obeys the law, not as an 
external command, but as the expression of his own better 
self, which wills to act in obedience to a law which its 
reason recognizes to be n e c e s s a r y . 34
Representative institutions, which are central to any 
constitutional system, do not by themselves assure the moral 
dignity of democratic politics. The people must not only be 
able to recognize but also willing to give their support to 
leaders who have a genuine concern for the common good.
That presupposes a measure of moral attainment and perspicac­
ity as well as trust. According to Williamson, "people who
35have no ideals can have no representatives." Representa­
tion in the morally significant sense implies a shared under­
standing of the ultimate goal of life and also an awareness 
that some men are better equipped for leadership than others. 
The true criterion is not wealth, position, or birth, but a 
special type of ability. The good representative is able to 
represent not the lower, partisan selves of his fellow cit­
izens, but their will to community. The willingness to put 
this kind of trust in elected leaders, to the point of 
respecting their judgment when it goes contrary to one’s own
^Quoted in John Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of 
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 124.
35Williamson, Independence and involvement, p. 198.
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wishes of the moment, is essential to the fulfillment of the 
higher goal of politics. To be worthy of such trust, a pop­
ular representative cannot be just an average, ordinary per­
son. In addition to political prudence and skill, he must 
have in even greater measure than the people who elect him a 
sense of the moral purpose of politics. In a position to 
lead and not only follow, he must be able to rise above the 
popular passions and biases of the hour and of his own 
period in history.
Let there be no hedging or equivocation on this point: 
Constitutional democracy implies leadership. Contrary to 
various utopian dreams, every possible form of government 
will have its "elites." The democratic ideal is not to do 
away with leaders, but to make them as numerous as possible 
and to create the circumstances in which a commitment to the 
common good is encouraged among them. Here, constitutional­
ism plays an important role. It places restraints on the 
inclination to misuse power both among elected leaders and 
the electorate. But these restrictions in themselves will 
be morally ineffective unless they form part of a whole pat­
tern of high aspirations in the people. The emergence and 
maintenance of an elevated general sense as to the proper 
end of the political order requires both assimilation of 
mankind's noblest traditions of spiritual culture and
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creativity in their application to new circumstances. Polit­
ical morality is dependent on what is contributed by up­
bringing and education in the family, by schools and univer­
sities, churches, artists and authors, and, perhaps more 
than anything else, the personal example of good men.
True leadership, like the spirit of constitutionalism, 
is incompatible with spiritual arrogance. Although the pop­
ular representative must in a sense seek to put himself 
above his constituents, the proper standard for so doing 
puts even his best efforts in a humbling light. According 
to Irving Babbitt,
A man needs to look, not down, but up, to standards set 
so much above his ordinary self as to make him feel that 
he is himself spiritually the underdog. The man who 
thus looks up is becoming worthy to be looked up to in 
turn, and, to this extent qualifying for leadership. ^ 6
A sense of humility, a sense of the contrast between 
man's sacred destiny, as reflected in the highest standards 
of conduct known by civilization, and man's actual attain­
ments, Babbitt regards as inseparable from all true leader­
ship. This qualification, we may add, has particular 
application to democracy, for in that form of government 
each adult is to some extent supposed to be a leader of 
others. To be worthy of that leadership, the citizen must
^Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 257.
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be the beneficiary of moral culture* The success of democ­
racy depends on the widest possible sharing in the accom­
plishments of civilization. In addition to prudential and 
intellectual virtues, the citizens must have some commitment 
to the morally mandatory but never fully reachable goal of 
community. In the West, we are heavily indebted for our 
understanding of this supreme social value to the classical 
and Judaeo-Christian tradition. Christianity, especially, 
with its inclusive view of who are to contribute to and 
participate in community provides indispensable support for 
democracy. By giving his ultimate loyalty to a cause which 
transcends his own time and place and the merely partisan 
wishes of his own people, the democratic citizen does not 
betray the idea of popular self-rule, but, on the contrary, 
affirms the unifying principle which alone can sustain it in 
the long run and give it moral worth.
We can see that the simultaneous awareness of human 
limitations and potentialities, an awareness growing out of 
several thousand years of spiritual experience and intellec­
tual effort, is also the very root of constitutionalism in 
the higher sense. We subject our political behavior to the 
restraints of a common legal authority because we know that 
premature certainty, self-seeking, and even positive evil 
always threaten to infect our actions. Pledging to respect
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a constitution conceived with real concern for the common 
good of community, we recognize both our depravity and our 
sacred destiny.
It is possible that our interpretation of democracy 
will leave some dedicated Christians, for instance, with the 
feeling that we have not gone far enough in relating our 
concept of the spirit of constitutionalism to the theolog­
ical concept of the Holy Spirit and to specific principles 
of Christian ethics. We have intentionally avoided associa­
ting our theory too closely with a particular theology in 
order not to spur inferences which might unnecessarily com­
plicate acceptance of our argument by those without definite 
religious convictions. We have chosen a largely "formal" 
approach, trying to show that already in the form or struc­
ture of ethical deliberation, as distinguished from the sub­
stantive content of morality in specific cases, lie some 
far-reaching implications for popular government. From an 
analysis of man's moral predicament and of the way in which 
he approaches the ethical end, we have been able to derive a 
recommendation of constitutional democracy. This movement 
from description to prescription has been possible because 
the "form" taken by moral choice is also an aspect of the 
substance of morality.
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The value relativist or nihilist, on the other hand, 
is likely to feel that in asserting the intrinsic superior­
ity of the concept of constitutional democracy over the con­
cept of plebiscitary democracy we have gone further than is 
intellectually meaningful. Our analysis of man's moral life 
has been centered in the notion of ethical conscience. Up 
to a point, this notion can be clarified by intellectual 
discourse. It becomes finally comprehensible, however, only 
as it finds, the proper referent in personal experience. To 
the person who in his search for the meaning of life has 
been able to find nothing sacred or transcendent, it must 
remain disturbingly abstract. What we may hope is that to 
the extent that persuasion is dependent on argument, our 
attempt at a philosophy of popular rule has some merit.
Speaking about a higher will in man to which democ­
racy, like all other forms of government, owes its final 
allegiance, we may have seemed at times to have given the 
standard of morality a human source. And that it has, in a 
sense, for ethical conscience is most certainly a will in 
man. Moral obligation does not await adoption of a theology. 
But as we have emphasized, ethical conscience also transcends 
the human. It is ultimately divine. While we have refrained 
from introducing specifically religious lines of argument, a 
non-secular conception of man has informed our reasoning.
When we contend that constitutionalism is a necessary polit­
ical condition for the fulfillment of man's true humanity, 
we are thus only affirming in other words that the human 
purpose, in politics as elsewhere, is to glorify God.
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